Communicative Action as Feminist Epistemology by Gilman, Todd Nathaniel
Portland State University 
PDXScholar 
Dissertations and Theses Dissertations and Theses 
10-25-1995 
Communicative Action as Feminist Epistemology 
Todd Nathaniel Gilman 
Portland State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Gilman, Todd Nathaniel, "Communicative Action as Feminist Epistemology" (1995). Dissertations and 
Theses. Paper 4906. 
https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.6782 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and 
Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more 
accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu. 
IBESIS APPROVAL 
The abstract and thesis of Todd Nathaniel Gilman for the 
Master of Arts ~g~~--P_o_l_i_t_1_·c_a~1~s_c_i_e_n_c_e~~~~~~~~~~~ 
were presented October 2 5 ' 19 9 5 and accepted by the thesis 
committee and the deparunent. 
COMMITTEE APPROVALS: 
Cr ig L. ckrr 
~ry L. Scott 
Kathryn Farr 
Representative of the Office of Graduate Studies 
DEPARTMENT APPROVAL: _
y L. Scott, hair 
Department of Political Science 
, Chair 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * -..:· 
ACCEPTED FOR PORTLAND ST A TE UNiV ERSITY BY 1lIE LIBR.Al{Y 
by &. on ,f:2'4,£<u-k~~ /Wo 
ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Todd Nathaniel Gilman for the Master of Arts in Political 
Science presented October 1995. 
Title: Communicative Action as Feminist Epistemology 
This thesis proposes that feminist social and political theory adopt the epistemology 
inherent in Jurgen Habermas's communicative ethics in order to more coherently work 
toward the goal of freeing individuals from social oppression. This thesis first 
examines the fundamental differences that exist between the particular claims for 
knowledge made by the three major schools of feminist theory; the empirical feminists, 
the standpoint feminists, and those allied with postmodernism. After illuminating the 
specifics of these feminist claims, the conception of knowledge central to Habermas's 
thought is explored and shown to be split into three distinct realms; the objective, the 
social, and the subjective. 
It is shown that the three realms of Habermas's knowledge account for the 
underlying claims of the differing groups of feminist theory, and provide a basis for 
reconciling the differences between them. Habermas's objective realm of knowledge 
corresponds to the concerns of empirically oriented feminists. A need for an accurate 
description of the events and conditions of the actual world is shared by both, as is a 
trust in the human potential for grasping these objects and events accurately. Standpoint 
feminism's concern for interpersonal relations, accounting for the context of an 
individual's or group's existence, is reflected in the type of knowledge that Habermas 
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considers social in nature. Habermas's conception of our capacity for social knowledge, 
which guides our actions with other human beings, is shown to be dependent upon both 
social existence and communication. Finally, Habermas acknowledges the human 
potential for critical knowledge to explain the individual's ability to differentiate herself 
from the group, a task which a postmodern feminism demands to avoid essentializing 
any aspect of women. 
If feminist theory is able to move beyond the entrenched differences that it now finds 
itself locked within, perhaps then it will be able to continue with the project shared with 
Habermas, that of providing a meaningful emancipation for human beings. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Feminist political and social theory today faces a dilemma, a dilemma which stems 
from the foundations of its allegiance with a philosophical investigation into the ability 
of the feminist political movement to deal with some of the most basic terms of its own 
debate. Notions such as "justice," "woman," and "rationality" are hotly contested as 
being either essential or antithetical to a project aimed toward the emancipation of 
women. These disputed concepts revolve around what feminist scholars claim to 
know, and what they claim can be known, about the nature of women specifically, and 
humanity in general. What some scholars claim to know, others argue to be 
unknowable, and the features of a theory that these scholars regard unknowable, still 
others find essential to any feminist project. To resolve this discord, in a manner 
agreeable to feminism as both a political and philosophical movement intent on human 
emancipation, requires an explanation of a unified feminist "way of knowing," a 
feminist epistemology. 
Feminists, however, are not the only theorists involved in a questioning and 
reconstruction of human understanding in a manner consistent with an emancipating 
project. One of the most complete, recent investigations into these themes has been that 
of Jilrgen Habermas. He also has begun with a question concerning what is possible 
for human beings to know about the world, about a life in social interaction, and how it 
would be to best guide our actions in this world. He has developed a strong 
understanding of human social life based on a notion of communicative action, and 
from this foundation he has moved to investigate what is possible and proper in social 
ordering, outlined through a theory of discourse ethics. This inquiry has led Habermas 
to new insights in the idea of knowledge and how it relates to moral and ethical 
questions. 
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In this thesis, questions raised by the search for an acceptable feminist epistemology 
will be compared to some of the central insights of Habermas's theory of discourse 
ethics. Both share some criticisms of traditional Enlightenment epistemology while at 
the same time depending deeply upon it for foundations. While both seek to move 
away from many of the Enlightenment's tenets, both remain firmly and purposefully 
tied to its central theme of working toward human emancipation, i.e., setting individuals 
free from the tyranny of oppression. What both sets of theories reject as the flotsam 
and jetsam of post-Enlightenment social science, combined with what both tie firmly to 
the deck of their theory, suggests many interesting similarities. A comparison of what 
remains on board and what is tossed to sea by both schools of thought may provide 
insight for feminist theory in its attempt to become a coherent political and philosophical 
movement. 
This thesis seeks to explore fully the possibility of feminist political and 
philosophical thought making a shift toward Habermas's philosophy of language. In 
order for feminist theory as a whole to become more communicatively oriented, 
Habermas's ethics will be required to demonstrate concern for the claims for knowledge 
particular to each feminist school of thought. Habermas's treatment of empirical 
concerns, his ability to account for our existence as embedded creatures, and yet our 
ability to be individuals, will all be important considerations for comparison. Whether 
or not Habermas's work in this area can be translated into real world improvements in 
the lives of individuals remains to be seen. Certainly feminism, with its foundations in 
social activism rather than academic philosophy, holds some advantage in this area, and 
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with some insight and conjecture, we may be able to see how a cooperative allegiance 
between these two schools, rather than an uninformed misunderstanding, may help both 
achieve their goal of a humanity free from domination. 
FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGIES 
The recognition that epistemological assumptions have political consequences has 
kept a concern for a theory of knowledge a central theme in feminist writings. I A 
theoretical self-understanding of the intellectual presuppositions of feminist inquiry 
remains fundamental to understanding what various writers have referred to as 
"women's ways of knowing" or "women's experience." These terms have represented 
a feminist investigation into the realm of knowledge as well as a reluctance to adopt 
' uncritically the traditional terms of epistemological inquiry.2 But inquiry into 
epistemology is also important for another philosophical tum which many feminists 
have taken. Many now write that the terms and goals of the feminist project must be 
more inclusive than is permitted by a singular investigation of issues of gender. If 
feminist theory is to aim towards an emancipation of women, it must aim equally at the 
ending of all varieties of oppression, as there are many 'types' of women oppressed by 
many types of power. Any theory to liberate white, middle-class women must also 
liberate working class women, women of color, and women oppressed due to their 
status as citizens of third-world nations.3 These developments have begun to change the 
focus of feminist theory. 
I Kathleen Lennon and Margret Whitford, eds., Knowing the Difference: Feminist Perspectives 
in Epistemology (New York: Routledge, 1994), 1. 
2Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter, "Introduction: When Feminisms Intersect Epistemology," 
chap in Feminist Epistemologies (New York: Routledge, 1993), 1-2. 
3Linda Nicholson, ed., Feminism/Postmodernism (New York: Routledge, 1990), 1-4. 
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Some of the earliest work in feminist theory was critical of the results of empirical 
science as it had been traditionally practiced. Initial feminist insights saw that traditional 
science had simply been done poorly, focused exclusively on the experience of men in 
society and neglected the actual lives and existence of women. The idea followed that 
an enlightened scientist, one aware of the traditional bias against women, would be able 
to produce less biased, and more "scientific" results. These results would be inclusive 
of the lives of both men and women, and a more accurate representation of all 
individuals. This version of feminism pursues the goals of empirical science with a 
more enlightened mission. Feminist empiricism has been praised as being a more 
inclusive use of the traditions of scientific method.4 
For many feminists, however, this method was inadequate for discovering and 
exposing the androcentrism of traditional science. The plight of women could only be 
fully understood through a scientific methodology spec~fically aware of the lives of 
women, investigated from the perspective of women. This led feminists to build a 
science from the standpoint of women, a standpoint fully aware of their 
underprivileged position in society, and aware of the role that women have played in 
society. 5 This science is aware of women's experience with care and connectedness, 
with home labor, and importantly, her experience as an outsider.6 This standpoint 
would incorporate emotion and feeling, and would be directly opposed to the objectivity 
and disinterestedness of empiricism, even feminist empiricism. These feminists are 
4For further explanation see: Aµ{son Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (Sussex: 
Rowman and Allanheld, 1983), 355-358. 
5see for example: Jaggar, Feminist Politics; and Sandra Harding, Whose Science? Whose 
Knowled2e? Thinkin2 From Women's Lives (lthica: Cornell University Press, 1991). 
6For further examples which emphasize women's experiences see Nancy Chodorow, ~ 
Reproduction of Motherin~ (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); and Nancy Hartsock, 
Money. Sex. and Power- Toward a Feminist Historical Materialism (New York: Longman, 1986). 
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very firm in their criticism of traditional Cartesian dualism, the philosophical separation 
of mind and body, and any acceptable theory of interaction for them will need to 
account for our existence as physical as well as thinking creatures. Further, in addition 
to embodiedness, feminist analysis in many disciplines has emphasized the significance 
of the context of investigation. 7 This has led many feminist writers to question the 
feasibility of any universal knowledge that might be independent of physical existence 
and location. With recognition of embodiment comes a recognition of difference 
between groups of humans, and any universal connection between them will need to be 
carefully defended. With human physical existence there will need to be a clearer 
understanding of what it is that makes us human, and why there is any conception of a 
"correct" order to interaction or morality. 
But this science too is insufficient and inappropriate for the demands of another 
group of feminist scholars. First, standpoint science continues to rely upon many of the 
assumptions of misogynist science. Second, a reliance upon a 'feminist standpoint' 
seems to identify a way of being that is uniquely and cross culturally female. This 
essentialism becomes problematic as the point of view of women of color, lesbians, or 
women of the third world are incorporated into "feminism." To reject this assigned 
way of being, some feminists have turned towards an allegiance with postmodernism in 
order to account for each individual as different, unique, and not dependent on any 
particular understanding of being female. Postmodern feminism is opposed to the 
objectivity of positivism or the possibility of objective knowledge at all. 8 A postmodern 
epistemology is devised such that no individual is predetermined to a way of being and 
7 Alcoff and Potter, "When Feminisms Intersect Epistemology," I. 
Ssee Jane Flax, "Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory," in 
Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. Linda Nicholson (New York: Routledge, 1990), 39-62. 
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each individual is allowed to exist in their own particular context, embedded, but not 
pre-determined. 9 
This more recent tum of feminism, however, has also left many wanting, as writers 
have begun to question what an alliance with postmodemism brings to their struggle. 
What is left of 'feminism' if there is no functioning category of "woman"? What is left 
of the world of connection that women turned to in the standpoint theories if each is 
radically unconnected and differentiated?lO These questions have led feminist writers to 
back away from the claims of postmodemism to seek another, more coherent 
understanding of human life. This new understanding will be required to remain true to 
the underlying goal of feminist theory, that of emancipation for women, but it will also 
need to be aware of the critiques of each of the above attempts towards a feminist 
epistemology. To date, there is only an understanding of the inadequacies of previous 
attempts at feminist epistemology. Feminist writers have only pointed towards the 
direction this next theory might take and there has been no fully successful attempt at 
this latest development in feminist theory. 
JURGEN HABERMAS 
The third chapter of this thesis seeks to explore a possible source of enlightenment 
for this next stage in the development of feminist epistemology. Here we travel to the 
European continent, the Frankfurt School and Jiirgen Habermas's development of a 
9see Donna Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist 
Feminism in the 1980s, " in Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. Linda Nicholson (New York: 
Routledge, 1990), 190-234. 
I Osee Christine Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference: Feminism, Modernity, and 
Postmodernism," in Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. Linda Nicholson (New York: Routledge, 1990), 
63-82. 
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theory of communicative action and discourse ethics. The epistemology involved in his 
work has not yet been fully explored by feminist writers, and may provide valuable 
insight into human interaction for feminist epistemology. 
Habermas has been credited by many writers as having been influential in shifting a 
great deal of philosophical debate from a philosophy of consciousness to a philosophy 
of language. This has grown out of Habermas's need to explain the insufficiency of 
traditional empirical-analytic science's ability to explain fundamental human 
phenomena. With this shift, Habermas has worked to expand the notion of rationality 
from a strictly strategic understanding to a more complex and inclusive notion capable 
of explaining human abilities to achieve mutual understanding. While the empirical-
analytic sciences provide important information for much of our existence, they must be 
supplemented by other types of science, based on other types of knowledge. 
Habermas's thinking is founded upon a conception of human social life as 
"communicative action" which forms the bases of all human interaction and our social 
existence. I I The development of human social life has been intertwined with our ability 
to symbolically mediate our interactions, and cannot be adequately understood without 
an understanding of how language is a part of our interaction. Each human community 
depends fundamentally on a background know ledge of these symbolic interactions 
which coordinate all other interactions. This background knowledge, shared by all 
members of a community is referred to as their lifeworld. Human beings are seen as 
dependent on this lifeworld and on our linguistic abilities, for both our knowledge and 
our identities. 
I I See Jilrgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, volume l, Reason and the 
Rationalization of Society, trans. by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984; original 
German edition published by Suhrkamp Verlag, 1981); and Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of 
Communicative Action, volume 2, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, 
trans. by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987; original German edition published by 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1981). 
Habermas has also begun to devise a detailed understanding of what universally 
connects human beings. 12 As all human beings depend on their lifeworld in order to 
8 
successfully communicate with other individuals, there must be a method of mediation 
that enables the repair of interruptions, or misunderstandings about the lifeworld. This 
process of reaching agreement about what counts as valid for a background assumption 
is universally used in human communities. Without such a process, human interaction 
would occur upon a broken and incoherent set of assumptions which would make 
mutual understanding between individuals impossible. Habermas's claims for this 
process are not based on any mystical understanding about the nature of reaching 
consensus, but are instead carefully based on what would be empirically necessary for 
communication to occur at all. 
From this understanding of a universal connection between social actors, Habermas 
shows how ethical norms are worked out in communities, and how they come to be 
accepted as valid by all members of that community. This will also explain how some 
of these norms come to be challenged by other members of that community, and are 
seen as valid or invalid when challenged before the more universally accepted criteria 
for validity. This is an important development which feminists will need to pay 
particular attention to, as it demonstrates how new and radically different ways of 
knowing might come to be more accepted, as feminist theory aims to accomplish. 
12 See Jurgen Habennas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. by Christian 
Lenhart and Shierry Weber Nicholson (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993; original German edition 
published by Suhrkamp Verlag, 1983); and Jurgen Habennas, Justification and Application: 
Remarks on Discourse Ethics. trans. by Ciaran P. Cronin (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993; 
original German edition published by Suhrkamp Verlag 1990 and 1991 ). 
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SYNTHESIS 
The fourth chapter of this thesis will explore the ability of Habermas's epistemology 
to satisfy the criteria demanded by a feminist political theory. While a limited number 
of feminist writers have explored a few, specific aspects of Habermas's theory, 13 there 
has been neither a full feminist examination of communicative action's epistemic 
foundations, nor of Habermas's latest writings on the universal aspects of discourse 
ethics. One intent of this investigation will be to show that transitions made by feminist 
theory from empiricism, through standpoint theory and postmodernism, has led 
feminist theory back to the project of the Enlightenment and its original intentions. 
Following this return, it still remains unclear how feminist political and philosophical 
thought can reconcile the deep divisions within its own work. This paper's use of 
Habermasian thought will demonstrate how many of the same concerns faced by 
feminists have been fairly treated and successfully integrated into a single theory in 
Habermas's theory of communicative action. It will be shown how many of the 
concerns incorporated by Habermas could be acceptable to the many camps within 
feminist theory. 
First, it will be shown that Habermas and the feminists have similar ideas on the 
nature of knowledge. Again, both reject most concepts of a single "gods-eye" approach 
to what can be known by agents. Discourse ethics removes reliance upon a single, 
'proper' way of life that all communities must adhere to. Habermas also uses an 
l 3For examples of these partial feminist critiques of Habermas see: Nancy Fraser, "What's 
Critical About Critical Theory? The Case of Habermas and Gender," chap. in Unruly Practices: 
Power. Discourse. and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory (Minneapolis, University of 
Minnesota Press, 1989), 113-143; or Marie Flemming, "Women's Place in Communicative 
Reason," in Women and Reason, eds. Elizabeth Harvey and Kathleen Okruhlik (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1992), 254-262. 
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understanding of validity claims to knowledge rather than relying upon a notion of the 
truth of a knowledge claim. Further, as many feminists have rejected the claim to 
objectivity that has founded much of Western science, Habermas's reliance on reasons 
will again be attractive. For Habermas, the validity of a claim to knowledge is not based 
on the vantage point from which the knowledge is derived, but rather because reasons 
acceptable to all can be offered to support the claim. Finally, as many feminists have 
critiqued the flaws of an instrumental rationality, the notion of rationality will be 
explored and shown compatible. 
Similarities shared by Habermas and feminists concerning epistemic agency will 
also be explored. As called for by many feminist epistemologies, Habermas builds 
communicative action in specific opposition to Cartesian notions that truth or meaning 
can be discovered through a solitary endeavor. There is no separation of knower and 
knowing in communicative action. Further, there is a specific emphasis on human 
interconnectedness for both individual identity and a sense of community. This is 
compatible with feminist concern for caring and mutual awareness that has been absent 
in most western philosophy. The linguistic grounding of these aspects of human 
existence also removes any dependence on special, exclusive criteria for rationality or 
'humanness.' Certain uses of these criteria have long been used to exclude women and 
other "irrationals" from philosophical importance. In communicative action, however, 
any actor capable of speech is a focus of consideration. 
Criteria concerning the justification of knowledge are also of fundamental concern to 
both Habermas and feminist theory. While Habermas has been selective in 
incorporating any assumptions of the Enlightenment into his works, he believes that 
important aspects of the Enlightenment must be retained if the project of human 
emancipation from oppression is to be realized. Although much of feminist theory is 
directly hostile to the Enlightenment, some feminists too have recently realized that to 
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reject all standards of judgment leaves no criteria left to consider the justness of human 
relations. If feminists seek the emancipation of women, they too must retain some idea 
of what it will mean to be free of domination. The justification of knowledge, where 
Habermas and some feminists have begun to engage directly the postmodernist 
challenge to any universal concepts, will be the final key to showing how feminist 
theory can move together with Habermas toward a human existence free from 
oppression. 
CHAPTER II 
FEMINIST WAYS OF KNOWING 
For the past three decades, feminist theory has been engaged in a critique of the 
products, methods, and assumptions of the scientific inquiry into human social and 
political interaction. This continuing feminist investigation has led to questioning the 
foundations of knowledge itself, challenging our ability to know answers to some of the 
most basic problems of human social life. In order to know about how we should 
interact, we must be clear about what we can know about ourselves and about each 
other. For feminists, responding to this challenge means a careful consideration of the 
social role and identity of women as individuals in communal life. This clarification 
concerns epistemological assumptions, and how they relate to moral and ethical 
questions of human interaction. 
Feminist philosophers have argued for and against of a number of differing 
approaches to create this feminist knowledge. Some remain tied to the traditions of 
empiricism, to notions of objectivity, and the idea that a knowledge unmediated by 
circumstance and appearing to be universal, is achievable, desirable, and that its further 
acquisition will lead to human emancipation. Others write that knowledge can never be 
more than particular, and that any "universal" knowledge only serves male dominance, 
not the liberation of women. Another battle revolves around the correct understanding 
of what it means to be a woman, and whether or not one's sex deeply unites a group of 
individuals, or whether gender is only one of many peripheral aspects of one's being. 
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Finally, there is a debate over the criteria for validating claims to any of this knowledge, 
what these criteria would be, or whether there is any true "validity" at all. 
Whether or not a resolution of these debates is possible is not yet known, but a 
number of feminists continue working to develop a theory of feminist knowledge 
which may transcend these differences and be acceptable to all of these groups. A brief 
exploration of what these attempts have entailed, and the debates surrounding their 
separate projects will prove useful in understanding the wide range of demands that 
feminist theory makes upon an epistemology. These include some very powerful 
critiques of traditional Western epistemology, and some very enlightening claims for 
consideration in the future development of any acceptable theory of human knowledge. 
In addition to gaining insight into the strengths and weakness of current feminist 
thought, this chapter will point out steps which feminist theory will need to take as it 
seeks to resolve its internal disagreements. The overview to follow will examine major 
developments in contemporary feminist theory: empiricism, standpoint theory, and 
postmodernism, while attempting to avoid becoming bogged down in the myriad of 
specific positions within each of them. The chapter will show that none of these options 
remain uncontested, as none presents an epistemology wholly compatible with a 
coherent feminist theory. Examination of the parallels between these theories, along 
with the rifts between them, will point this inquiry towards the direction feminist 
epistemology must take to become a coherent political and philosophical movement. 
This task should further assist us in seeing the ways feminist theory remains engaged in 
the debate over how an epistemology can be devised to strengthen and support the aims 




The first appearance of a feminist science oriented to the demands of women began 
in fields oriented toward empirical science, and remains tied to these epistemological 
claims within their philosophical investigation. Even before feminism began its critique 
of the foundations of knowledge, feminists were actively employing the empirical 
sciences to ask questions about the adequacy of theories concerning women in biology, 
anthropology, and sociology. Whether or not these sciences were fairly portraying the 
lives and experiences of women, in their claims to study 'all mankind,' was seriously 
questioned. Feminist critiques argued that most social science had been built upon 
models developed within a world dominated by males, and the results of those studies 
had thus been "limited by the particular interests, perspectives and experiences" of 
males. I A science limited in such a fashion, excluding from consideration one-half of 
its supposed population and focusing on the interests of the other half, is not faithful to 
the ideals of scientific inquiry. These feminists argue that social biases, androcentrism, 
and a subsequent misapplication of scientific method, have been the root cause of poor 
science in the past. Poorly conducted science has resulted in the formation of false 
beliefs, guiding attention towards improper scientific questions, which when answered, 
provide scientific knowledge tainted by the original biases. These feminists argue for 
changes to be made in scientific communities to end these biases and expand scientific 
knowledge to its fullest potential. 
This group of feminists, who have worked to end the androcentric bias in science, 
while leaving scientific method as it is, have been labeled "feminist empiricists" by 
I Marcia Millman and Rosabeth Moss Kantor, Another Voice: Feminist Perspectives on Social 
Life and Social Science (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1975), viii. 
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Sandra Harding, or "liberal feminists" by Allison Jaggar.2 Such a feminist science 
works to correct the tradition which often excludes women as being irrational, not 'fully 
human,' or dependent upon men for support. These feminists intend to include women 
in the scientific process, as both the subjects and objects of inquiry, to understand 
women's experiences as fully and legitimately human lives. Helen Longina described 
feminist empiricism as centrally concerned with designing research for women rather 
than merely about women, requiring a special consideration of the specific contexts of 
women's lives. She further questions what actual benefit there might be from 
'discovering' any new epistemology. To what degree is it true that "if we could just get 
the epistemology right, we would get the science right"?3 It does not seem that we can 
simply dismiss all of the accumulated knowledge that has been produced in the last few 
hundred years by traditional science. 
Away From "Bad Science" 
Empirical feminists are particularly interested in critiquing the poor execution of 
otherwise good science. They are concerned that the methods of traditional science have 
been applied in a restricted fashion, and that removing these limitations and expanding 
the realm of scientific inquiry would vastly expand the usefulness and acceptability of 
knowledge to humanity. Feminist empiricists accept the philosophical bases of 
scientific inquiry, and seek to finally fulfill its primary goal, arriving at a true knowledge 
of the world. This will be achieved by rejecting the biased assumptions with which the 
2see Allison Jaggar, Feminist Politics. 355-358; and Sandra Harding, "Rethinking Standpoint 
Epistemology: What Is 'Strong Objectivity,'" in Feminist Epistemologies, eds. Linda Alcoff and 
Elizabeth Potter (New York: Routledge, 1993), 49-82. 
3ttelen E. Longino, "Subjects, Power, and Knowledge: Description and Prescription in Feminist 
Philosophies of Science," in Feminist Epistemologies, eds. Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter 
(New York: Routledge, 1993), 101. 
method had previously been applied. To these feminists, the use of "bad science," 
science which has been guided by a sexist bias, has been responsible for many of the 
poor, and incomplete results of past science. 
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This misapplication of scientific method can be seen in the role of women portrayed 
in traditional models of social life used in the social sciences. These models represent 
as typical and significant social interaction, realms where only males commonly exist as 
actors, areas such as work or politics, and away from locations of women's activity, the 
home, the grocery, or the laundry.4 The importance of the "mundane," private aspects 
of social life become more important in feminist science, acknowledging that these are 
aspects of both men's and women's lives.5 They argue for a shift in our perception of 
social relations; for example, changing the focus of the study of vast social 
organizations from management to the majority of these groups composed of 
secretaries and office workers,6 or rethinking the reverence to the male "genius artists" 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who depended upon the social structure's 
support of change and development, a social structure made up significantly of 
women. 7 In other cases the results of this science were actually seen as hostile towards 
women, where androcentric science had proved capable of producing "valid" scientific 
research able to legitimize rape, or proving the genetic superiority of males at 
4Lyn H. Lofland, "The "Thereness" of Women: A Selective Review of Urban Sociology," in 
Another Voice: Feminist Perspectives on Social Life and Social Science, eds. Marcia Millman 
and Rosabeth Moss Kantor (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1975), 144-170. 
5Millman and Kantor, Another Voice, xii-xiii. 
6Rosabeth Moss Kantor, "Women and the Structure of Organizations: Explorations in Theory 
and Behavior," in Another Voice: Feminist Perspectives on Social Life and Social Science, eds. 
Marcia Millman and Rosabeth Moss Kantor (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1975), 34-74. 
7Gaye Tuchman, "Women and the Creation of Culture," in Another Voice: Feminist 
Perspectives on Social Life and Social Science, eds. Marcia Millman and Rosabeth Moss Kantor 
(Garden City: Anchor Books, 1975), 171-202. 
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mathematics. 8 Feminist empiricists hope to alter the science which has produced and 
reproduced forces that keep women subjugated by and subordinate to men. 
An important improvement for science would be the development of alternative 
models to relieve the "systematic blindness" of science to social reality. A refocusing of 
scientific models would not exclude men, but rather include the study of women, thus 
creating a more complete understanding of human life, involving both men and 
women. Research ought to be done with the elimination of androcentric biases, 
producing more objective, non-political, and "scientific" results. A process of 
systematic observation, with the observer guided by strict adherence to neutral 
procedures, will lead to the eradication of sexism necessary for truly scientific results. 
These observers will most certainly no longer be exclusively male if this bias is to be 
avoided, and the addition of female scientists will be a first step towards seeing that 
science is not simply 'male-centered. '9 Thus, by following the prescriptions of what 
has long been understood as the scientific method, a better, more encompassing science 
will be established. Feminists in this tradition intend no special privileges for women, 
seeking only that equal opportunity be given to all individuals to be both subject and 
object of scientific inquiry. There should be no discrimination in science because of 
sex.10 Further, by not departing radically from "science as usual," feminist empiricism 
is argued to be more readily accepted by established science. 
8Karen Messing, "The Scientific Mystique: Can a White Lab Coat Guarantee Purity in the 
Search for Knowledge about the Nature of Women?" in Women's Nature: Rationalizations of 
Inequality. eds. Marian Lowe and Ruth Hubbard (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983), 75-85. 
9Messing, "The Scientific Mystique," 84-85. 
1 OJaggar, Feminist Politics, 357. 
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The "Subject" of Knowled~e 
Important characteristics of the empirical feminist's epistemology can be illustrated 
through the agent of knowledge empiricism presupposes. Positivist science relies upon 
the Cartesian notion of a separation between mind and body. The body is seen to 
remain tied to subjective impulses which should not be allowed to influence the pure, 
objective processes of the mind in searching for scientific knowledge. As each mind is 
capable of pure thought, rejecting the influences of physical existence is the only way of 
achieving universal, scientific knowledge. Only knowledge produced free from the 
influences of physical existence or characteristics of the body is sought, thus feminist 
empiricists do not seek to identify the differences that men or women might claim as 
knowledge, as these differences are rejected as biased. Disembodiment allows subjects 
to be unitary, homogeneous and identical in their completeness. These individuals 
produce knowledge which is consistent and coherent. Knowledge is not produced by a 
community or by social groups, where there may be differences within or between 
groups. A heterogeneous subject, or multiple subjects, might produce knowledge that 
is inconsistent or incoherent. I I 
Another distinctive trait of empiricism concerns not the disembodiment of the 
scientist, but assumptions about scientific interactions, where objects of research are 
studied by scientific subjects.12 This subject is a central figure in empirical, positivist 
research, neither historically attached to her surroundings, nor linked to the object 
studied. Neither the subject's existence nor the investigation itself has a significant effect 
upon the objects being studied. Feminist empiricism retains these scientific separations, 
11 Harding, "Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology," 63. 
l 2Jbid., 63-64. 
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between a subject's mind and body, as wen as between scientific subjects and objects to 
be studied. 
The Objective Nature of Knowledge 
Feminists within this tradition accept assumptions concerning the existence of a 
world independent of human attempts to understand it, and that true human know ledge 
of this world's existence is possible. There is no challenge to norms of empirical 
research, such as detached observation or of fallibility, only to the incompleteness of the 
empirical research that has gone before. Scientific results are properly based upon the 
experience of individuals, and information gained through sensory experiences. 
Empirical feminism is not less objective than previous science, but rather emphasizes 
the desirability of objective knowledge, and more rigorously pursues its achievement. 
These feminists argue that they hold the point of view of the truly rational, unattached 
observer and are thus able to provide the most unbiased and objective understanding of 
human actions possible.13 
With all knowledge based in experience, there is a traditional scientific intent to 
separate the normative and empirical aspects of knowledge. The normative, evaluative, 
and judgmental aspects of knowledge are all excluded from empirical science. The 
empirical is objective, observable, and thus, universal, not relying upon any particular 
characteristic of the subject to be accepted. Any consideration of the observer's values, 
interests, and emotions is rejected since these would bias the scientific results. The 
result of this unbiased method is objective knowledge, the goal of positive scientific 
method. Philosophy of science is relied upon to construct rules which provide a guide 
to drawing inferences from these experiences.14 With strict adherence to scientific 
13 Jaggar, Feminist Politics, 357-8. 
14Ibid., 355-57. 
method any other observer, male or female, will be able to agree with the scientific 
account of what has been described. 
Politics of Empiricism 
20 
The political result of a feminism guided by the goal of applying the traditional 
assumptions and methods of scientific inquiry, is an alliance with the traditional 
Western movement to emancipate individuals, the Enlightenment. These feminists are 
comfortable working within the claims, assumptions, and goals of the liberal tradition, 
and argue for an application of liberal principles with a more strict adherence to their 
nature. "Liberal feminism" remains founded upon a notion of human nature being 
individualistic, with no necessary connection between these separate actors.15 It 
accounts for actors, working from calculated, rational choices, as atomistic and isolated 
individuals who have no interconnections with other actors that significantly relate to 
their being. 
Liberal feminists seek no special privileges for women, and only defend a claim to 
equal rights and equal opportunity for all. There is commonly an argument for "sexual 
equality" and the creation of gender neutral policies of social organization. Therefore 
liberal feminists feel the benefits of their theory will be apparent and appealing to all. If 
men rationally apply the criteria for objectivity to the traditional emphasis on male 
interests, they too will see the soundness and justness of a liberalism enlightened by the 
feminist movement. The advantages of this political theory are apparent from the 
position of a rational detached observer, the observer central to the claims of this 
understanding of science. 
15Jbid., 357-358. 
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THE FEMINIST ST AND POINT 
For many feminists, however, this reliance on the traditional methodology and goals 
of empirical science does not arrive at the core difficulty in emancipating women from a 
male-dominated world. It is argued that power relations are structured by those able to 
decide what knowledge is and how it functions, and that continued reliance upon 
knowledge legitimated by a tradition of men does not allow women to achieve the 
power that they need in order to free themselves of male dominance. Power is seen as 
fundamentally connected to knowledge, and in order to posses their own power, 
women must to be able to use a knowledge created from the experience women have 
had in their lives. An alternative science can be created, based upon this knowledge and 
power, and opposed to science built upon a male understanding of knowledg~ and a 
male possession of power. By working within a knowledge built upon a woman's 
perception of the world, this science hopes to more clearly discern the oppression of 
male dominance, to more fully understand the significance of women in social life, and 
empower women with the ability to free themselves from male oppression. 
The creation of a feminist standpoint science, based upon a feminist knowledge and 
understanding of the world, has been explored by many influential authors in the 
feminist camp.16 This tum of emphasis in feminist epistemology is placed by some in 
the late 1970s, when a deeper "hermeneutics of suspicion" emerged in feminist 
theory .17 Concern grew that one's perspective on reality, and one's style of thinking, as 
well as the questions asked in investigation, may be influenced by a gender bias. These 
l 6see Allison Jaggar, Feminist Politics; Sandra Harding, Whose Science?: or Nancy Hartsock, 
Money. Sex. and Power. as only a few of the possible examples. 
1 7 Susan Bordo, "Feminism, Postmodernism, and Gender-Skepticism," in 
Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. Linda Nicholson (New York: Routledge, 1990), 143. 
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theorists hold that all knowledge claims are made from some particular location, some 
particular point of view, and based upon some foundational beliefs. Any claim to be 
free of this embeddedness in location, the often claimed "God's-eye-view" from 
positive science, is untenable. Standpoint theorists claim that traditional science has 
been done from the unquestioned and uncriticized standpoint of men, supporting and 
continuing the domination of women in society. Thus, if a foundational standpoint is 
unavoidable for any science, a more appropriate and less oppressive science would be 
achieved by replacing the male oriented foundation with a female standpoint, a feminist 
view of science. 
Sandra Harding compares the feminist rejection of traditional science to the rejection 
of what Thomas Kuhn referred to as a "normal" or "mature" science. IS In a mature 
science the conceptual and methodological assumptions are shared and accepted by 
most inquirers in a field. As Kuhn argues, there is no reason to believe that a consensus 
among scientists guarantees an ultimate, or "more correct" know ledge of the actual 
nature of the world. The creation of a feminist standpoint is then a move towards a 
"successor science."19 Women need their own understanding of social life, an 
understanding which is aware that daily activity contains an interpretation of the world 
and an understanding of how power relationships are at work in a society .20 Standpoint 
theorists claim neither traditional nor postmodern theories of knowledge provide 
18 Sandra Harding, "The Instability of the Analytical Categories of Feminist Theory," in 
Feminist Theory in Practice and Process, eds. Micheline R. Malson, Jean F. O'Barr, Sarah 
Westphal-Whil, and Mary Wyer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 18. See also 
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1970). 
l 9Mary Hawkes worth, "Knowers, Knowing, Known: Feminist Theory and Claims of Truth," in 
Feminist Theory in Practice and Process, eds. Micheline R. Malson, Jean F. O'Barr, Sarah 
Westphal-Whil, and Mary Wyer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 330. 
20Nancy Hartsock, "Foucault on Power: A Theory for Women?" in Feminism/Postmodernism, 
ed. Linda Nicholson (New York: Routledge, 1990), 168-172. 
23 
women with the power to end their historic subjugation to men, and that only a new, 
specifically feminist science can provide the ability to clear away the illusions of the old 
science. 
Two of the earliest influential writings concerning a female point of view were those 
of Nancy Chodorow and Carol Gilligan. 21 Chodorow's work investigated the 
psychological development of women as opposed to the development of men, creating 
a theory that essentially described the ways of women's knowing, based on an 
interpretation of women's social experiences. Building upon this argument, Gilligan's 
research concerning a "different voice" pointed out the traditional androcentrism of 
psychology, specifically the model of moral development created by Lawrence 
Kohlberg. Gilligan argued that his theory was necessarily incomplete by focusing its 
model specifically upon the experience of men and boys. Her book explored the terms 
of women's moral discourse in order to investigate its own standards of development. 
In this way she created a feminine "counter-model" to moral development specific to 
women, differing from that of men. 22 
A way from Objectivity 
A feminist standpoint acknowledges the benefits and accomplishments of feminist 
science pursued within the confines of an empiricist paradigm, but criticizes the feminist 
reaction to the traditions of "bad science" as not strong enough. Relying upon the 
norms and methods of "science as usual" is too weak to systematically identify the 
2 l Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Motherin1:; and Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: 
Psycholo~ica] Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982). 
22 For a discussion of how Gilligan's final conc1usion remains an essential description of 
women's moral development, even though it relies upon some empirical methodologies, see Nancy 
Fraser and Linda Nicholson, "Social Criticism Without Philosophy: An Encounter Between 
Feminism and Postmodemism," in Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. Linda Nicholson (New York: 
Routledge, 1990), 32-33. 
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biases upon which such a science is structured. The notion of objectivity has not been 
endowed with enough power to detect the sexist and androcentric assumptions that are 
the dominant beliefs of the modem period.23 The very idea of objectivity in knowledge 
is rejected, as a feminist standpoint finds all knowledge embedded and contextual, and 
therefore saturated in the value that positivism claims to be free of. 
Standpoint feminism also rejects the traditional foundations for science because of 
the knowledge claims rejected or excluded by empirical science. Within scientific 
communities a group of qualified observers develop whose claims to knowledge are 
accepted, while claims from those who do not meet this community's criteria for 
acceptance are rejected.24 Further, the knowledge claims which these communities 
consider valid are extremely limited. Only knowledge claims unattached to particular 
circumstances are accepted as knowledge, and those claims tied to emotions or 
supported by a particular interpretation of history or cultural position were rejected. The 
scientific community has been so oriented to focus on value-free claims, that it has also 
tended to exclude claims from those individuals who are seen to typify those values. 
These rejected individuals, who embody the characteristics of emotion, culture, or 
history, have commonly been women and those from colonized groups25. 
Standpoint theory seeks to embrace those rejected by empiricism, women or the 
colonized, who embody gender, emotion, or history. This rejection of traditional 
rationality has led some to label the movement of feminist standpoint science as "anti-
23 Harding, "Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology," 51-52. 
24Jbid. 70. 
25 Alison Jaggar, "Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology," in Women and 
Reason, eds. Elizabeth Harvey and Kathleen Okruhlik (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1992), 115-142. 
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rationalism. "26 Standpoint theory openly confronts the historical use of the term 
"rational" as a means of denigrating women as the "irrational." In response to this 
history, standpoint theory seeks to valorize this excluded and denigrated 'other,' and to 
build a science upon her "irrational" characteristics. This leads to a science which 
includes concepts of emotion, nature, body, and intuition. The standpoint project would 
hope to build a social order that accommodates women in all of their female differences, 
rather than sanitize individuals into imperfect and ununique copies of the "everyman." 
Embedded Subjects of Know led~e 
In addition to claiming the contextuality of knowledge, feminist standpoint theory 
demands consideration for the embodiment of the subject of knowledge. Jaggar writes 
that the conception of human nature is essential to feminism, and begins with a rejection 
of classical Cartesian dualism, the separation of the mind and body. Reliance on a 
dualism, separation of mind and body, leads science toward "political skepticism and 
solipsism. "27 This stems from the liberal assumption that individuals are solitary and 
have needs and interests that are separate and in competition with other individuals. 
This, however, is an unrealistic picture of humans, even if one assumes only healthy 
adults, as the necessity of reproductive biology alone points to the impossibility of self-
sufficiency. Ignoring biological existence deprives liberals from the most basic way of 
identifying human needs. 
Abstract individualism assumes that essential human characteristics are derived prior 
to any social context. Jaggar feels, however, that meaning is given to inner experience 
and behavior only by the emotions, beliefs, and attitudes given to us by our social 
26christine Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference: Feminism, Modernity, and Postmodemism," 
in Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. Linda Nicholson (New York: Routledge, 1990), 67. 
27 Jaggar, Feminist Politics, 40. 
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context. Contemporary research also has shown that many cognitive and emotional 
differences stem from sexual differences. If these points are even partially true, then the 
idea of a "presocial human being with out any determinate kind of nature is conceptually 
incoherent. "28 Central to the liberal idea of rationality is autonomy or self-definition. If, 
however, the central needs, desires, and beliefs of the individual are based on those of 
society, then the ultimate authority of the individual comes into question. In addition, 
liberal rationality is connected with the need for the individual to maximize their self-
interest. Jaggar feels that while this egoism may be an accurate model for males, this 
has not historically been the role of women. 
Another consequence of the embodiment of subjects is the rejection of the positivist 
conception of an unattached observer recording the actions of a distinct object of study. 
As was stated above, there is to be no ideal vantage point from which to observe, no 
God's-eye or universal position. With the rejection of any unembedded position, the 
distinction between subject and object begins to atrophy. The subjects are as "real and 
visible" as any object. Further, there becomes no object that is not touched by the 
existence of the subject. All observers must interpret whatever it is that they perceive, 
whether a social or a physical phenomenon, the line separating the two is gone.29 This 
conception of the scientific observer will allow investigation to account for the 
attachments that individuals, observer and observed, have in the world. It will also 
allow a greater role for gender, attachment, and emotion in scientific inquiry, factors that 
are an inescapable component of human social life. 
A key part of human interaction stems from our emotional interaction, another 
aspect of human life which has not been adequately considered by traditional science. 
28Jbid., 42. 
29ttarding, "Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology," 63-64. 
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Jaggar writes that traditional epistemology treats emotion with suspicion and hostility. 30 
In the positivist tradition, emotions only play a role as the stimulus that begins a 
scientific investigation, prodding the scientist to begin an investigation. In the testing 
and judgment of these hypotheses, however, the focus upon "replicability" works to 
cancel out all emotional influences. While this distinction between discovery and 
verification may filter out the values of individual researchers, it does not remove the 
values of the social context of the investigation. 31 Emotions and values are a part of the 
scientific enterprise, at all levels. Feminist standpoint theory argues that for science to 
be accurate requires that it be able to acknowledge the continuous interaction between 
"how we understand the world and who we are as people."32 To allow the full 
development of knowledge will then require a better understanding of the important role 
that emotions play in its acquisition. 
Another development in the nature of the subjects of knowledge concerns their 
identity. In empirical science there was always an emphasis on the individual 
discoverer of knowledge, of the individual who was able to observe and to understand. 
In a standpoint theory, however, individuals no longer produce knowledge, which is 
instead seen as the creation of communities. Standpoint theory holds that any 
"discovery" of knowledge only becomes valid after it has been accepted by the 
community .33 Further, the agents of knowledge in a feminist standpoint claim to be 
"heterogeneous and multiple," representing the feminist claim that there is no ideal type 
of agent, no singular way of being that is able to discover and posses legitimate 
30 Allison Jaggar, "Love and Knowledge," 115-142. 
31Jbid., 126-127. 
32Jbid., 135. 
33Harding, "Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology," 65. 
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knowledge. The knowledge claims of these heterogeneous communities of knowledge 
are intended to be compatible with the claims of other marginalized groups, who have 
also been excluded from making knowledge claims. 
A New Type of Knowled~e 
A central claim made from the feminist standpoint concerns the value-content of 
knowledge, where all knowledge is held to be contextual. All claims to knowledge are 
embedded in a history and social existence, and to consider knowledge separate from 
these influences is to follow a false ideal. The isolated, detached, ideal-observer which 
is found in so many empirical epistemologies, has no place in a standpoint theory. 
Again, if there is no ideal location or perspective from which to observe, and any 
vantage point is value laden, feminist standpoint theory argues that the best vantage 
point to choose for scientific inquiry is that of women. Feminism needs to consider the 
"historical, political, and theoretical process" that has created women as the subjects as 
well as the objects of knowledge. 34 By historically situating a subject, she is less likely 
to mistake herself for the "universal man." Women, who hold a subordinate status in 
society, do not have an interest in distorting their perception of reality in order to justify 
the injustice of their dominant position, in the way that men do in a male dominated 
world. Women, without a need to alter their perception of reality, are therefore more 
likely to develop a "clearer and more trustworthy understanding of the world. "35 
Standpoint theorists also point to other ways in which our basic perceptions of the 
world imply notions of Cartesian thought. The comprehensivness of dualism is even 
apparent in the rules of logic. As standpoint theorists point out, even the principles of 
34Hartsock, "Foucault on Power," 170-71. 
35 Jaggar, Feminist Politics, 384. 
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logic divide the world into "A and not-A." The principle of identity (if anything is A it is 
A) and the principle of contradiction (nothing can be both A and not-A), both work to 
exclude the "middle," that which is neither A nor not-A. These principles, however, 
are not representative of the empirical world, where objects are constantly in the process 
of transition, growing or decaying, and are very rarely at condition A, or its opposite. 36 
This in tum has provided those in possession of the power to define knowledge a way 
to define what is A and what is not-A, rational or irrational, human or non-human. 
Nancy Hartsock asks, in whose interest is it to maintain these dichotomies ? Only those 
who have placed themselves outside of time and space, outside of change. 37 Those 
who have defined themselves as A, as rational, as truly human beings. 
Justification of Knowledge Claims 
The creation of a particular standpoint in which knowledge is legitimated is not a 
radically new idea in the history of philosophy. Most feminist standpoint theorists base 
their ideas of a privileged female perception of reality in Hegel's consideration of what 
can be known about a relationship between a master and slave from the master's point 
of view.38 Hegel argues it is in the master's interest to create a false interpretation of the 
world in order to legitimize her continued dominance over another human being. It is, 
on the other hand, the slave who does not benefit from a social advantage and possesses 
an unclouded position from which to view the relationship. Marx and Engel's 
developed this insight into the "standpoint of the proletariat," and it is within this 
tradition that feminist standpoint theorists developed what they consider the only true 
36Nancy Jay, "Gender and Dichotomy," Feminist Studies 7 (1981): 38-56; in Hartsock, 
"Foucault on Power," 162-163. 
37ttartsock, "Foucault on Power," 163. 
38ttarding, "Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology," 53-54; Jaggar, Feminist Politics. 377-383. 
vantage point from which to observe the human condition. This vantage point is not 
that of the dominant male position in society, but the standpoint of the subjugated 
woman.39 
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Standpoint theory does not claim a unique position from which to find truth, only 
that this position does not depend on a distorted view of the world. This position, free 
from illusion, is available to any group which has historically been subjugated or 
repressed.40 Although the possibility of an "unmediated" truth is rejected by standpoint 
theorists, the notion of truth is not altogether abandoned.41 Standpoint theorists argue 
that while dominant social positions result in distorted views of society, those in other 
positions in society are able to see through the ideological camouflage and correctly 
perceive the world. 
Sandra Harding has written an influential account of how the notion of "objectivity" 
also remains available to a standpoint theory. 42 For Harding, a feminist standpoint 
produces a more adequate, and more unbiased scientific viewpoint which she calls, 
"strong objectivity." Strong objectivity requires that the subject of knowledge be located 
in the same epistemological context as the objects of knowledge. Further, all of the 
objectivity-maximizing procedures which are focused upon the object of observation 
must also be focused upon the observers, the scientists and the society which produced 
them.43 For Harding, and many standpoint theorists, a "maximally critical study of 
scientists" and their communities can only be done by those who have been 
39Harding, "Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology," 54. 
40 Harding, "Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology," 66-67; and Harding, "The Instability of the 
Analytical Categories of Feminist Theory," 29-30 
41 Hawkesworth, "Knowers, Knowing, Known," 330. 
42 Harding, "Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology,"; and Harding, "The Instability of the 
Analytical Categories of Feminist Theory." 
43 Harding, "Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology," 69. 
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marginalized by such communities. The result of such a critical reflection of objectivity 
seeking method requires that scientists and their communities exist in "democratically-
advancing projects for scientific and epistemological reasons as well as moral and 
political ones. "44 
Defending a Feminist Standpoint 
Standpoint theorists have considered the postmodern critics of epistemology, who 
warn that any epistemology eventually leads to exploitation and placing limitations on 
thought by legitimizing the beliefs of the powerful. Standpoint feminists, however, feel 
that feminism cannot stand with these arguments, and in fact must build on an 
epistemology as a defense against both traditional empiricism and relativism. 
Traditional objectivism tends towards an incoherent, value-free disinterestedness and a 
defense of the status quo. Relativism provides us no foundations to accept feminist 
interpretations of sexual, familial, or work relations.45 Support for the creation of a 
feminist standpoint epistemology emerges in light of the importance for feminism as a 
political movement to have an epistemology of its own. Only from the standpoint of 
women, long oppressed and excluded in this society, is the project of the emancipation 
of women likely to succeed. Standpoint theory unites women, as women, on the basis 
of their shared experiences in social life, forming a bond between them in their fight 
against male domination. 
44Ibid., 69. 
45 Sandra Harding, "Feminism, Science, and the Anti-Enlightenment Critiques," in 
Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. Nicholson (New York: Routledge, 1990), 87-88. 
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POSTMODERNISM 
Not all feminists, however, are convinced by nor co-opted into the position of the 
standpoint epistemologists. Some writers in feminist theory have begun to criticize 
what they refer to as earlier "oversimplifications of history," and to move away from 
the use of gender as an analytical category. They argue that to write of any "male" or 
"female" reality or perspective is to assign a way of being to individuals and to 
"homogenize diversity and obscure particularity. "46 To create essential descriptions of 
the way women are to act and be opposes the battle which the feminists movement has 
long fought for, the ability to be different than the way they are described by the status 
quo. 
For these authors, feminist theory properly belongs in the realm of postmodern 
thought. Feminist critiques of the self, knowledge, and truth are too far divorced from 
these concepts of the enlightenment to be compatible with any theory that relies upon 
these traditionally oppressive ideas. The future of feminism "cannot lie in reviving or 
appropriating Enlightenment concepts of the person or knowledge. "47 Both feminism 
and postmodemism attempt to develop new criticisms of social relations not dependent 
on traditional philosophical foundations.48 
46Bordo, "Gender Skepticism," 143. 
47Jane Flax, "Postmodemism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory," 42. 
48Fraser and Nicholson, "Social Criticism without Philosophy," 19. 
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Standpoint as Incoherent and Insufficient 
The tum to a postmodern feminism begins with an examination of the many 
problematic presuppositions of the feminist standpoint claim that a feminist 
understanding of the world can be "truer" than previous, male, standpoints. 
Postmodemists question why anyone should accept the idea that one group, dominant 
or oppressed, has a privileged access to the truth. For postmodemism, there is no 
position that is closer to the truth than any other, and every "standpoint" is equally far 
from universal truth. Standpoint theory assumes that this oppressed class, unlike the 
dominating men, can be free of the determination assigned to them by their participation 
in the social system. The notion of a standpoint assumes that the oppressed are not only 
undamaged by their oppression, it assumes that this position of submission has given 
them a privileged, i.e. more than different, ability to perceive reality.49 
Standpoint theory also rests on some essential description of what is female, 
although no understanding of this deep identity has been shown to be universally 
coherent. There are two traditional approaches to science that have assigned an essential 
way of being to women. First, is a biological determinism, which relies upon claims of 
a woman's role in reproduction and for a nurturing nature "inherent" in women. 
Another has been a cross-cultural examination of male and female spheres of activity, 
the public and private realms, as an explanation of why women are generally bound to 
the home in social relations. Neither of these, however, is sufficient for understanding 
the diversity of forms which gender or sexism can take existing across cultures and 
times. Both of these themes were flawed in their attempt to find a single "grand 
feature" of human existence that would explain all the features of sexism. As 
49Ibid., 56. 
34 
postmodemism denies the existence of these 'large descriptions' of social life, this has 
strengthened the call for a postmodern tum in feminism that more adequately explains 
the diversity of social existence. 
While it may be true that there is a seemingly universal feature of human societies 
called "gender," the actual manifestations of this idea are widely diverse and it is simply 
not always the case that "difference" equates with "unequal" across social contexts.50 
Standpoint theory depends upon a system of gendered social relations in which there is 
a category of beings who are fundamentally alike by virtue of their sex, and that an 
opposing group is also somehow fundamentally alike in a way different from the first. 
Postmodemism rejects the existence of these alleged bonds between individuals, either 
across vast cultural differences or within a neighborhood. To postmodemists it is 
incoherent to claim, on the one hand, there is a fundamental difference in self-
consciousness between men and women, while on the other hand, claiming that this 
self-understanding is basically similar among women and among men, across cultures, 
classes, and races. Any similarity claimed to be cross-cultural becomes difficult to 
guarantee when given any actual context or example. These essentialist claims serve as 
a strong method for developing a bond among women, but they seem deficient in their 
representations of differences that exist between women. These differences have 
become an increasing concern with the emergence of feminist voices from communities 
of differing class and ethnic backgrounds. These differences must be accounted for in 
any acceptable feminist epistemology. 
50Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," 64. 
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A Postmodern Self 
Postmodern feminism rejects the essentialist project of assigning a gender identity 
and is critical of any epistemology which assigns a deep sense of self. Postmodernists 
reject psychoanalytic claims that an identity is formed in early childhood and remains 
constant thereafter. To suggest that self-identities are permanently formed in childhood 
suggests that a simple solution to these problems lies in the way we raise our children. 
Many feel that feminist critiques of social life are more powerful than implied by the 
claim that "allowing boys to play with dolls would be sufficient to bring about equality 
between the sexes."51 Essentialists also tend to claim that their deep self-understanding 
influences and directs every action that subjects and objects engage in. Arguing that 
these identities determine all of one's future actions seems to presuppose an 
understanding of a public-private life difference that men and women will lead. Such a 
distinction should only be claimed valid for specific, modem, and Western societies, as 
there is little cros.s-cultural evidence for this similarity. Such claims play a powerful 
role in the writings of Chodorow and Gilligan. Gilligan wrote of "a" voice determining 
how women would react in given situations, not that there were a plurality of voices 
offering a number of possible resolutions to the moral dilemmas.52 
Feminism allied with the methods of postmodemism seeks to avoid any essential 
identification of the subject. It must replace unitary notions of "woman" with a more 
plural notion of social identity. A notion aware not only of variables of gender, but also 
of class, race, age, and ethnicity. Jane Flax argues simply against the existence of a 
stable or coherent self and that no human faculty is capable of any form or reason 
51 Fraser and Nicholson, "Social Criticism without Philosophy," 30. 
52Jbid., 32. 
which allows insight into one's own processes of thought or into "laws of nature. "53 
Donna Haraway's influential, enthusiastic support of a postmodern rejection of firm 
boundaries for feminism argues for "pleasure in the confusion of boundaries and 
responsibilities in their construction. "54 She favors a feminism as a "continuous 
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cultural reinvention, postmodernist critique, and historical materialism." 55 Haraway 
feels that the struggles which have presented themselves to feminists have become too 
diverse for any single theory to account for. Claims made by a particular theory about 
the characteristics of the category "woman" can be shown to exclude many non-white 
women, while a category of "black" can essentialize black women and rule out white 
women. There was no singular "she" among women, and only a sea of differences that 
leaves us unable to identify similarities or invite allegiance: 
"There is nothing about being "female" that naturally binds women. 
There is not even such a state as "being" female, itself a highly complex 
category constructed in contested sexual scientific discourses and other 
social practices. Gender, race, or class consciousness is an achievement 
forced on us by the terrible historical experience of the contradictory 
social realities of patriarchy, colonialism, racism and capitalism. Who 
counts as "us" in my own rhetoric? Which identities are available to 
ground such a potent political myth called "us," and what could motivate 
enlistment in this collectivity?"56 
A postmodern feminist theory must insist that a "natural matrix of unity" is neither 
desired nor coherent. 57 
Haraway summarizes her own ideas as being built around two themes. The first is 
an argument against any universal or comprehensive theory, for these are doomed to 
53pJax, "Postmodernism and Gender Relations," 41. 





misrepresent most of reality. Second, her essay revolves around a central character of 
the "cyborg" which is to represent and emphasize the need to take responsibility for and 
acknowledge the affects of science on social life. This means there can be no creation of 
an anti-science metaphysics or a demonetization of technology that surfaces in the 
politics of a feminist standpoint. It calls for a "recreation of boundaries," where a partial 
connection with others is affirmed as a passage "out of the maze of dualisms" that have 
long defined our bodies and ourselves.58 
Where the feminist standpoint held aloft the notion of an "other" to oppose the 
traditions of subject-object relations, and actively celebrated the irrational and embodied 
aspects of the feminine that had been assigned them by sexist philosophy, a postmodern 
feminism champions not the theme of "other" but the theme of "difference. "59 Rather 
than a reliance upon the singular difference available in gender, a proliferation of 
differences is adopted. 
Anti-Universalist Nature of Knowled~e 
Where standpoint theory argued against a universal conception of knowledge in 
order to break knowledge into different "knowledges" for different groups, 
postmodemists break knowledge down a step further into different "knowings" 
between individuals. This further denies the homogeneity of knowledge, even within 
groups, and prefers to hold each individual responsible for their own conceptions of 
knowledge. Fraser and Nicholson argue that one of the prime tenants of 
postmodemism, one that ought to be shared with feminism, is the strong position it 
takes against any meta-narratives.6() Postmodemism would join with feminism to fight 
58Jbid., 222-223. 
59Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," 67. 
60Fraser and Nicholson, "Social Criticism without Philosophy," 26-30. 
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against the "very large social theories" of history, culture, or psychology which claim to 
identify causes and features of sexism that operate across contexts and across eras.61 
Any theory which makes these types of claims rests fundamentally upon some 
assumption about an essential nature of human beings and the conditions of social life 
that individuals operate within. For postmodern writers, these "essentialist" theories, of 
which standpoint theory is a prime example, are not sufficiently aware of issues of 
historical, cultural, and individual diversity which feminists must account for. 
Justification of Knowledge 
Feminists in favor of a postmodern tum to their project argue there is no force or 
reality outside of our social relations and activity that will relieve us of our partiality and 
differences. They further argue that the most beneficial path for feminism to follow is 
with those who seek to further the decentering of world views. Feminist theory, like 
other postmodemisms, can encourage toleration of ambiguity and multiplicity and 
work to expose the roots of the need to impose order and structure upon reality no 
matter how arbitrary and oppressive these needs may be.62 Rather than be tempted by a 
"will to truth" postmodern feminists develop a commitment to plurality and difference. 
Feminism should focus on deconstructing paradigms of social understanding which 
rely upon traditional philosophical epistemologies, and upon moral and political theory 
rooted in partial and historically situated characteristics that are shown as necessary, 
universal and ahistoric truths. 
61 Ibid., 27. 
62p]ax, "Postmodernism and Gender Relations," 56. 
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In Support of a Feminist Postmodernism 
The advantages of a coalition between these two movements stems from 
postmodernism's powerful focus on philosophic criticisms and feminism's primary 
concern for political-social issues. Feminism would strengthen postmodernism's 
weakness in supporting social activism, and postmodernism will help feminist theory 
avoid falling into "foundationalism and essentialism. "63 Fraser and Nicholson argue 
that in order to be accommodating to the wide range of social possibilities and 
problems, a postmodern feminism would need to be pragmatic in its approach to 
identifying bias. 64 It would tailor its methods and categories to fit the specific use that it 
is called for at the time. It would include multiple categories when possible in order to 
avoid the "metaphysical comfort" of a single feminist epistemology. This diverse and 
multifaceted theory would be most useful in its application to political practice. 
Feminist politics is seen as an increasing system of alliances, rather than a unified front 
around a single interest or identity. Feminist politics would be cognizant that there is no 
single solution to the diversity of contemporary oppressions confronting women, child 
care, social security, or housing. Rather than argue for a single grand scheme to 
represent feminism, there ought instead be an alliance between "many feminisms. "65 
63Fraser and Nicholson, "Social Criticism without Philosophy," 20. 
64Jbid., 34. 
65 Ibid., 34-35. 
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ENLIGHTENMENT REVISITED 
Recently, however, there has been another tum in feminist theory, arguing that the 
project of feminism must remain tied to some understanding of justice if the goal of 
emancipation is to be coherently attempted. These writers are currently working toward 
a suitable epistemology upon which to base this development in the feminist project. 
This "way of knowing" will be enlightened by the penetrating feminist critiques of 
mainstream epistemology, building upon the strengths and acknowledging the 
weaknesses of previous, if insufficient attempts at a feminist theory of knowledge. This 
new theory will have to work carefully through the claims it makes for the deeply 
contested notions of "woman" and "rationality," and will need to plan meticulously the 
role which the "re-introduced" notion of "justice" will play. 
These theorists acknowledge improvements of expanded scientific inquiry initiated 
by feminist empiricism but do not find its assumptions consistent with feminist needs. 
Empiricism relies heavily upon traditional notions of rationality, which have been used 
in the past to exclude women as non-rational. If the notion of rationality is to be 
retained, a new understanding of the concept will need to be attempted by these 
theorists. A further characteristic of empirical science was its aim toward an objective 
knowledge. While this concept has been thoroughly criticized by many feminists, 
many theorists are beginning to reconsider its benefits, questioning its hostile rejection 
by standpoint theorists and the uselessness attributed to it by the postmodemists. 
This group also acknowledges the importance of critiquing the androcentric subject 
of knowledge highlighted by standpoint theorists. It has also been important to re-
examine the Enlightenment's ideal of a universal knower whose knowledge is 
unmediated by environment. Dualism remains rejected by these feminists, and a 
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knowledge of human beings must be found that does not rely upon a separation of our 
physical existence from our ability to know. But standpoint theories rested upon two 
questionable assumptions. First, the notion of a privileged viewpoint from where the 
oppressed accurately perceive reality seems incoherent with the rejection of any 
universal knower. Second, standpoint epistemologies are unable to overcome the 
essentialism that accompanies to the notion of woman, however widely defined. The 
distinction of women in general as "different" has legitimated unequal treatment of 
women in the past and must be rejected "theoretically and practically" if women are to 
be considered in society as the "nondifferentiated" equals of men.66 
Postmodemism as well is no longer viewed as pro-feminism. A growing number 
of writers highlight the gulf that exists between the tenants of postmodemism and the 
values and goals of feminist theory. Postmodemism's rejection of assigned ways of 
being avoids essentialism, and denies any privileged vantage point for philosophical 
investigation, but upon examination becomes inappropriate for feminist theory in a 
number of ways. First, the timing of an allegiance between feminism and 
postmodemism seems strange, for why is it that "just at the moment in W estem history 
when previously silenced populations have begun to speak for themselves and on behalf 
of their subjectivities, that the concept of the subject and the possibility of 
discovering/creating a liberating "truth" become suspect?" 67 Postmodemism is 
interpreted by these authors as serving the needs of a specific group; white, privileged 
men of the industrialized West, who have already had an Enlightenment for themselves 
and are now ready to subject that tradition to critique. "Mainstream" postmodemism 
66Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," 67. 
67Nancy Hartsock, "Rethinking Modernism: Minority vs. Majority Theories," Cultural Critique 
7 (Fall 1987): 187-206; in Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," 75. 
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does not seem any more aware of issues of gender than any of the pro-Enlightenment 
theories that it claims to reject. 68 
A further, and more damaging weakness in an alliance between postmodernism and 
feminism is the difficulty of building any political movement around a postmodern 
identity. Feminism seeks actual political and social change from the claims made by the 
women's movement. To identify a constituency and to bond them into a motivated 
movement, requires some source of shared identity between the movement's members. 
Feminism in the past has found this bond in the shared identity of women within the 
movement as "women." The postmodern rejection of subject centered inquiry and 
theory, and its rejection of labels and identities, does not allow a strong, permanent, or 
motivating use of the notion "woman." This seems antithetical to the needs of feminist 
theory which revolves around this specific constituency. If specific subjects are unable 
to identify with a postmodernist flag, it will be difficult to attract and rally the dedicated 
followers necessary for an organized political movement such as feminism. Further, 
postmodernism's "robust" celebration of differences, rather than a celebration of shared 
identity could be politically unreliable, creating a weakness in the face of the modern 
state and uses of power. 69 
Christine Di Stefano attributes the dilemma in the search for feminist epistemology 
to an inability in any of these three schools of thought to deal adequately with the notion 
of difference. In feminist research which remains in the empirical/positivist tradition the 
she dissolves into he as gender differences are collapsed into the (masculine) figures of 
the 11 everyman. 11 This sanitized figure remains a central weakness for feminism in the 
political claims of liberalism or Marxism. In research from a feminist standpoint, the 
68Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," 75-76. By "mainstream postmodernists" Di Stefano 
refers to Derrida, Lyotard, Rorty, and Foucault. 
69Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," 76. 
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idea of a differentiated female subject is preserved, but she is preserved at the rather 
high cost of denying her transformation or liberation from the conventions of 
femininity. Here, radical feminism begins to blur with "new-right anti-feminism," 
which also seeks to discover the correct and proper concept of female, and to celebrate 
and encourage this conception in social life. Finally, in a postmodern feminism, the she 
dissolves into a dizzying array of differences, none of which is privileged over the other, 
leaving no way to determine if the emancipation of women has been realized or not. 70 
Thus, finding all three major movements within feminist thought unacceptable, 
these more recent writers in feminist epistemology have begun a return to the 
Enlightenment, acknowledging that the feminist movement is fundamentally rooted in 
the ideals of justice and freedom.7 1 Many authors currently working in feminist theory 
continue to identify with the label "feminist," though no longer to indicate a liberating 
project for women alone, but rather to indicate a project of emancipation that is 
consistent with the goals and discoveries of feminist inquiry into human social life. 72 
The feminist movement began rooted in an effort to raise women from the oppression 
encountered in a male dominated society. Its goals, however, were never to include the 
liberation of women from their commitment to the social relations around them, nor to 
liberate humanity from our social existence. 
Alcoff and Potter have illustrated the situation that feminists must now be concerned 
with as an awareness that, "Each lives at a different node in the web of oppressions. "73 
Oppression exists, but so do connections between individuals. Oppression cannot be 
701bid., 77. 
71 Lennon and Whitford, Knowing the Difference, 1-14. 
72 Alcoff and Potter, Feminist Epistemologies, 4. 
731bid., 4. 
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accounted for when considering individuals in isolation, nor by declaring the relations 
between individuals universally oppressive. Many of these relations are the factors of 
social life which define individuals as who they are, and who they work to remain. An 
acceptable feminist epistemology must be able to identify those relations which are 
oppressive, and differentiate them from those relations which are the ties that bind us to 
our very identities and ways of life. 
Community of Subjects 
To defend against the radical difference championed by the postmodernists, many 
feminists have returned to investigate the connections and commonalties between 
individuals. While postmodernism had left feminism in an advantageous position, able 
to proclaim the diversity of women and all individuals in general, it also became 
"complex and unnerving, inhabiting a constantly shifting ground of emerging and 
dissolving differences. "74 Partly in response to the dissolving of knowledge into 
individual components, and partly for their need to account for human 
interconnectedness, feminists have turned to a communal understanding of knowledge, 
so that communities and groups replace the individual as primary in accounting for 
knowledge. 
In response to the fragmented individuals of empiricism, the emphasis on a partial 
humanity in standpoint theories, or the partial representation of humans in 
postmodernism, new approaches are being attempted which allow knowledge to 
account for complete human individuals and entire human communities. The primary 
goal of scientific knowledge, for these authors, should be to represent in a concrete 
whole, human lives as experienced by both men and women, the oppressed and the 
74oi Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," 68. 
oppressors. 75 The epistemology underlying this task is intended to capture what is 
human in men and women, rather than to identify the essential characteristics which 
separate them.76 Arriving at this knowledge will require a modified conception of 
rationality, allowing a new role for experience's interplay with reason. Women's 
experience cannot be privileged nor is it static; it is simply a characteristic of historical 
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existence. Neither experience nor reason, subjectivity nor objectivity, is a prior or more 
fundamental component of knowledge. 
This argument accounts for both physical and mental characteristics of human 
beings, as opposed to empiricism's separation of these aspects. It also opposes 
standpoint theory which introduces a new, female perspective upon subject and object 
relations which neglects the male perspective and loses the ability to account for all 
views. Postmodernism's fragmentation of science into a multiplicity of types and 
vantage points is also combined into a unified understanding of human social life. This 
knowledge should be able to articulate the inter-relatedness of the parts while respecting 
the specificity of differing experiences, providing a narrative of concrete situations, as 
experienced by all parties involved.77 The social conditions of any group of oppressed 
individuals must be seen in connection with the group from which the oppression 
comes. A feminist epistemology must account for the lives of women seen in 
conjunction with the lives of men, acknowledging men as both part of the problem and 
part of the solution to women's emancipation. An acceptable understanding of 
75oshadi Mangena, "Against Fragmentation: the Need for Holism," in Knowin~ the Difference: 
Feminist Perspectives in E.pistemolo~y. eds. Kathleen Lennon and Margret Whitford (New York: 
Routledge, 1994), 275-282. 
76Marina Lazreg, "Women's Experience and Feminist Epistemology: A Critical Neo-
Rationalist Approach," in Knowin~ the Difference: Feminist Perspectives in Epistemolo~y, eds. 
Kathleen Lennon and Margret Whitford (New York: Routledge, 1994), 59. 
77 Oshadi Mangena, "Against Fragmentation: The Need for Holism," 275-282. 
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knowledge must include individuals as they wholly exist, and account for the entirety of 
their social interactions. 
This group of feminist theorists also retains an argument against the commitment to 
"epistemological individualism," the assumption that, although other people exist, 
knowledge is produced by each individual alone, from one's own senses and 
experiences. 78 The argument of a traditional methodological solipsist often assumes the 
possibility of private knowledge production, through an individual's own language. 
Assumptions about a private language have allowed feminists to turn the insights of 
Wittgenstein on these individual knowledge gatherers.79 Here we are reminded that 
individuals cannot privately produce language because private communication leaves no 
way to distinguish between true statements and those that seem true. Only the 
cooperation of two or more individuals can distinguish between how things are and 
how they seem. 80 These feminists follow Wittgenstein in arguing that the individual 
cannot be epistemically prior to the community, and that the community is composed of 
"epistemically interdependent individuals. "81 Knowledge is then primarily a social 
construct, and social influences upon knowledge, relations of oppression included, must 
be accounted for in a claim to knowledge. 
Lynn Hankinson Nelson argues that postmodernism leaves any philosophical 
investigation with only two epistemological choices, where on the one hand we are 
committed to a Cartesian or essentialist self, or on the other hand, there can be no 
78Elizabeth Potter, "Gender and Epistemic Negotiation," in Feminist Epistemoloiies, eds. 
Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter (New York: Routledge, 1993), 163. 
79Jbid., 163. 
80Though, as Wittgenstein points out, this does not in any way guarantee an accurate 
representation of the way things exist. This only best supplies the individuals with a knowledge of 
"same" and "different," knowledge that is a necessary check against one's memory. 
81 Potter, "Gender and Epistemic Negotiation," 165. 
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epistemology at all. Nelson argues, however, that this does not exhaust the realm of 
possibilities. She feels that this postmodern dichotomy rests on an assumed 
individualism. 82 Similarly, postmodemism presents us with the choice between "one 
truth" or "multiple truths," and thus claims that there are no truths at all which are prior 
to any others. She rejects both the isolated individuals of traditional epistemology, and 
also the embedded, but not necessarily social subjects of standpoint theories. In 
response to this, Nelson proposes not a "middle ground" between these alternatives, but 
a communal account of agency and evidence that abandons the Archimedean points 
which base both objectivism and relativism.83 
She offers an account of epistemic agency which rests on three assumptions. First, 
agents of epistemology have no fixed historic content. Instead it is individuals, 
embodied and situated in a specific history who know, where their embodiment and 
context are also relevant to their knowing. Second, these agents are not isolated, but 
rather strongly related to other features of an epistemology, especially with regard to 
evidence for knowledge claims. This account considers evidence to be dynamic, 
relating to the new role of active knowers within a feminist epistemology. Finally, 
epistemology is understood as "radically interdependent with other knowledge.84 
For this change in epistemology to occur, the first item on an agenda of study must 
not be the individual knower, but rather an inquiry into how knowledge is generated 
within specific histories, social relations, and practices of communities. 85 It is within 
these practices that ontologies are developed, criteria for evidence are established, and 
82Lynn Hankinson Nelson, "Epistemological Communities," in Feminist Epistemolo~ies, eds. 
Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter (New York: Routledge, 1993), 128. 
83Jbid., 129. 
84Jbid., 123. 
85 Ibid., 126. 
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theories are made and rejected. The discovery of a piece of scientific evidence is only 
possible within a system of practices that exists within a community. Commitments 
there are made within particular communities to standards and methods that legitimize 
scientific knowledge. Even experience is fundamentally a social notion, interpreted 
through the guide provided by society. These communities are simply 
epistemologically prior to the individuals that live within them. With these bases for 
know ledge established, any notion of a solipsistic knower becomes inconceivable. 
Reconsidering Objectivity 
Some writers within this category of feminist thought have begun to discuss the 
need for feminist theory to return to notions rejected by standpoint and postmodern 
writers. Notions such as objectivity and rationality, it is argued, remain too useful in the 
construction of a social theory to be completely discarded. But these writers do not 
advocate a blind return to the notions as traditionally used, and remain enlightened by 
some of the more important claims of previous feminist thought. Important 
considerations they make in a return to these notions involve an account for human 
social existence and an insistence on the accountability of our knowledge production.86 
This justification is important not only to the criteria of other scientists, but also to the 
community of feminists. 
Writers from this group argue that a careful reconsideration of objectivity ought to be 
undertaken, to discover which aspects of it are needed for a feminist project, and which 
aspects are rightly discarded. Ismay Barwell writes that there is no necessary reason 
why, if part of a concept is rejected, that the entire concept must be forgotten. 
Objectivity is at work in two locations within science and philosophy, as a part of its 
86Lennon and Whitford, Knowin~ the Difference, 7. 
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methods, and as the goal to be achieved. Rejecting prior methodologies as not 
achieving their claim to objectivity is not necessarily followed by the need to reject 
objectivity as a goal for science. Objectivity remains a valuable characteristic of a theory 
because it indicates an intent to depict phenomena accurately and explain how and why 
events occur. This gives objectivity a relationship to "truth" which must be maintained 
as a regulatory principle in theories. 87 
The value of objectivity and truth for feminist theory lies in feminism's need for 
accurate descriptions and analyses concerning social organization which are being 
judged according to their justness. Not all of the many varieties of feminism, Barwell 
writes, see themselves as radical movements for social upheaval. Instead, feminist 
aims are towards the creation of social arrangements more just than those already in 
existence. Existing states of affairs need to be judged according to possible states of 
affairs. Any creation of a notion of justice will rely upon an accurate description of 
states of affairs, which is provided by objectivity. These possible, and more just social 
arrangements, need to be created according to some standard. This standard cannot be 
recreated each time they come to be considered by another individual. 
But this is not to say that traditional concepts will escape without a thorough re-
examination. Writers in this group note three aspects of objectivity that need to still be 
rejected. First, any claim to a 'God's-eye view' is eliminated, as practically and 
philosophically impossible. Second, the idea that objectivity needs a 'complete 
justification,' which might provide absolute certainty of scientific knowledge remains 
highly questionable. Finally, the notion that there could be any theory completely 
devoid of values brought about by the theory's self-understood goals is rejected. 
87Jsmay Barwell, "Towards a Defense of Objectivity," in Knowin~ the Difference: Feminist 
Perspectives in Epistemoloi:y. eds. Kathleen Lennon and Margret Whitford (New York: 
Routledge, 1994), 81-82. 
Epistemic values such as accuracy, simplicity, or comprehensivness are commonly 
constitutive of a theory.88 
The challenge remains, for these feminists, as to how to best achieve this ideal. 
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Ismay Barwell defends objectivity with a reworked notion of Harding's strong 
objectivity, while still questioning the primacy Harding gives to the perspective of 
oppressed groups. She rejects the traditional dichotomy that knowledge is either guided 
by interests or by the facts, in favor of an idea that different groups possess greater or 
lesser amounts of the truth, and that the interaction of groups can lead to a greater 
number of individuals possessing the truth. She argues that there must be a role given 
to a notion of groups as possessing shifting authority in perspective, depending on the 
subject, and changing over time. Interacting groups, critical of each other's perspective, 
will result in the production of knowledge not specific to one or another of the groups. 
With the additional acknowledgment of shifting authority, Barwell hopes to exclude an 
over abundance consensus or a lopsidedness of power.89 
Allessandra Tanesini agrees with a revisiting of the notions of "rationality" or 
"reason" which were rejected by feminists as irreparably sexist and androcentric. 90 
This rejection relied upon an assumption about the unchanging nature of words, and 
about their use in epistemology. For Tanesini, however, epistemology is not a simple 
matter of describing norms or current practices of word usage. Instead, epistemology 
should be understood as a practice of advancing and defending proposals on how to 
ground our knowledge. Epistemology is a constant process, something which creates 
88Ibid., 83. 
89 Ibid., 90-92. 
90 Allessandra Tanesini, "Whose Language?" in Knowing the Difference: Feminist 
Perspectives in Epistemology, eds. Kathleen Lennon and Margret Whitford (New York: Routledge, 
1994), 214. 
and recreates norms.91 What was once accepted as imperative does not dictate what 
must be the case today. Past use of the idea of rationality or knowledge can be 
redefined in terms of what is compatible with today's ideas of these concepts. 
Return to Justificatory Strategies 
Other feminist authors have used the notion of community to support the need for 
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legitimizing knowledge claims. Because feminism is an oppositional movement, it will 
always challenge authority, unable to embrace the idea that any claim of truth or 
legitimacy relies upon some mysterious universalism.92 For Lovibond, the idea of 
morality involves the idea of responsibility, and the ability to account for your actions to 
your community of equal fellow citizens. It will not be possible for this community to 
be an empirically existing one, but rather a notional one defined in terms of a general 
interest. 
Fricker proposes a theory of "holism" to form a suitable epistemology for feminism. 
This ideal must allow a role for value-laden observation of experience as has been 
argued for by many feminists, but must also provide a notion of truth, to avoid the 
relativist inability to act upon these claims. The criteria that her empirical account of the 
facts must meet are normatively determined, and a historical product. Thus we see the 
strong role that norms should play in such a theory, as well as the ability of empirical 
criteria to change over time, resulting in a "dialectic" between facts and values.93 This 
dialectic eventually becomes a form of self-criticism that will be inherent in the ideal of 
91 Ibid., 214. 
92sabina Lovibond, "The End of Morality?" in Knowini the Difference· feminist Perspectives 
in Epistemoloiy, eds. Kathleen Lennon and Margret Whitford (New York: Routledge, 1994), 65. 
93Miranda Fricker, "Knowledge as Construct: Theorizing the Role of Gender in Knowledge," 
in Knowin2 the Difference: Feminist Perspectives in Epistemolo2y, eds. Kathleen Lennon and 
Margret Whitford (New York: Routledge, 1994), 105. 
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knowledge. Thus, Pricker's holism provides an epistemological base for both feminist 
deconstructions and reconstructions of Western thought.94 
Other authors have addressed the need for a feminist epistemology to account for the 
role of norms in the interpretation of experiences.95 There must be an ideal of "truth" 
or some criteria for establishing what is "real," transcending situated perspectives as a 
regulatory ideal. Any social or political account of know ledge must remain able to 
represent and account for the events experienced in the real world. This "realism" is 
necessary, especially for a political movement such as feminism, because an 
emancipatory epistemology must also seek real change in the events of that world. It is 
necessary for an acceptable theory to be able to account for actual events if such a 
movement is going to retain the ability to present experiential claims as reasons for or 
against certain political views.96 
For many, feminism is a political project that requires the feminist claims of 
androcentrism and sexism in traditional epistemology and social science to be regarded 
as legitimate, and not only legitimate for feminists. For these writers, it thus becomes 
problematic to abandon totally the ideas of objectivity and the referential claims of 
knowledge. Contemporary feminist writing attempts to create a new form of 
rationalism on which a feminist epistemology can be founded. A "feminist knowledge" 
is being sought which will remain trustworthy to feminist inquiry. 97 Many of these 
writers have returned to the idea of accountability of knowledge, or the justification of 




97 Lennon and Whitford, Knowin~ the Difference, 7. 
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experiences, forcing it to be able to deal with issues of power and conflict over interests, 
and the ability of the self to change in the pursuit of knowledge. 98 
FORWARD WITH THE FEMINIST PROJECT 
This chapter has explored the developing project to ground feminist political and 
social theory in a coherent theory of knowledge. Feminism was followed, beginning in 
the claims and arguments of feminist empiricism, through its branching into feminist 
standpoint theory and an attempted alliance with postmodernist thought. Each of these 
developments was made on a valid critique of the inadequacy of competing theories, as 
each school of thought has also continued to critique other positions in defense of its 
own. With an understanding of the shortcomings of each of these theories, we have 
gained some understanding of where feminist theory might move in its next major 
development. Some of the clues to the development were explored in the overview of 
feminists who do not consider themselves in any of the available epistemological 
camps. 
In addition to an understanding of what is rejected by each of these groups, we have 
also seen some of the baggage, in the form of requirements, that has been taken on 
board the feminist project along the way. In the survey of these many parcels, we have 
been able to handle many claims made by feminist theorists, seeing which notions have 
been tried and rejected, and which aspects have been tried and found fitting. Those 
items which have been cast away from all of these schools of thought must be noted, 
and thus avoided in the future. The items remaining on board will have to be 
incorporated into the final construction of the feminist project. 
98Jbid., 13. 
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First, the Cartesian ideal of a dualistic split between mind and body in the 
investigation of human social interaction has been thoroughly rejected. All three of the 
later groups of feminist writers have demanded an understanding of human 
embodiment, and the consequences of context, to be accounted for in a theory of 
knowledge. Any idea that some unique, unattached, 'God's-eye view' of human life can 
be achieved by human beings, who cannot escape our physical existence, is rejected. 
Second, the move that standpoint theory makes towards an essential description of 
women ought to be rejected. As many have since argued, these claims seem antithetical 
to the original intentions of the feminist movement, to allow women to define 
themselves as they see fit, and for them not to be forced to comply with an imposed 
way of life. Another characteristic of standpoint theory is the tendency to privilege the 
perspective of some group's hold on reality over the perspective of others. While this is 
a notion founded upon the strong traditions of Hegel, we still do not have sufficient 
reasons why we ought to acknowledge or accept any group's primacy over another. 
Third, a feminist epistemology cannot be relativistic. This was seen as the most 
important reason for rejecting the alliance with postmodemism. What would become 
of the feminist movement if each individual is allowed their own understanding of 
correct social relations. On what basis would a feminist project judge one relation over 
another as just or unjust? And what basis would there be for rejecting an unjust 
situation? Feminism seems in need of some standard of judgment. What was found 
lacking in postmodemism, must be demanded of any acceptable theory, the ability to 
form a strong political movement on the basis of its claims. Women must be able to 
identify with each other as women, and must be able to identify concrete instances in 
their experiences to fight against, as well as be able to identify concrete improvement in 
social life that they can fight for. This was a central factor in the roots of the feminist 
movement, and will remain so until the creation of a truly just social order is created, 
and its maintenance guaranteed. 
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Therefore, as this paper continues to explore what may develop into a 
comprehensive feminist epistemology, we have been able to locate three characteristics 
that it must contain. First, this epistemology must acknowledge and account for the 
idea that knowledge is contextually derived and dependent. This will involve meeting 
feminist demands to account for both embodiment and embeddedness. 
Second, this feminist epistemology ought to be capable of accounting for individuals 
as distinct individuals, yet as individuals with a history and context. This will demand 
that a theory provide a more complex understanding of individuals than is currently 
available in any of these three theories. 
Third, an epistemology compatible with the emancipation of oppressed groups, 
women as well as others, must provide some means of justifying legitimate knowledge 
claims. It must be able to show how knowledge comes to be acceptable to a 
community and to individuals, and it also must be able to show why this knowledge 
deserves this status. In order to meet these demands, this epistemology must provide 
some understanding of the idea of justice. As of yet, no single feminist writer has 
devised such an understanding of knowledge. 
We leave for now our consideration of feminist epistemology in order to explore a 
possible source of inspiration for this next stage in feminist thought. After an account 
of this approach to political and social life, and the conception of knowledge it is based 
upon, we will return in the fourth chapter of this thesis to compare this theory to the 
needs of a feminist epistemology explored in this chapter. 
CHAPTER III 
COMMUNICATIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE 
In a separate venue, some distance from the previous chapter's circles of feminist 
theory, another writer and another school of thought struggle with many of these same 
issues, attempting to build a politically potent philosophical understanding of human 
existence and human potential. The critical social science of Jtirgen Habermas is one of 
the leading theories that seeks such an understanding of social life, considering both 
human social development and contemporary society, while building ideas for an 
improved social order in the future. This chapter will begin with an introduction and 
explanation of the steps Habermas has taken away from traditional social science's strict 
adherence to positivism and purposive rationality. Second, in order to grasp 
Habermas's conception of human social life, this chapter will explore the "lifeworld" in 
which his social and moral theory is grounded. Finally, this chapter will introduce the 
developments Habermas has made in his theories concerning moral and ethical life, and 
what these developments mean for human actors in their autonomy and communal 
commitments. It is from these three aspects of Habermas's work that this thesis will 
propose a path for resolving some of the internal dilemmas of feminist political and 
social theory. 
Habermas's early writings began to articulate his understanding of human 
knowledge, and the consequences this understanding was to have for a science 
attempting to describe social life. 1 In his "philosophical anthropology" he works out 
three distinctive characteristics of human understanding that form our basic 
"knowledge-constitutive interests." These interests are "knowledge-constitutive" 
because they determine what is to count as an object of knowledge, identify what we 
accept as relevant for a claim to knowledge, and provide different procedures for 
discovering and accepting these claims. 2 The three distinct categories Habermas has 
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separated our knowledge into are: the technical, the practical, and the emancipatory. In 
tum, each of these areas of interest corresponds to a type of science or discipline and an 
area of human social activity. 
The first, technical interest, is incorporated by the empirical-analytic sciences, and is 
associated with the human activity of work. Habermas argues that human work is a 
primary level of action, representing ways in which individuals control and manipulate 
their natural environment in order to physically preserve themselves. Technical 
sciences are intent on a "cosmological" mission of describing the universe in law-like 
statements as it is seen to exist. A scientist of these disciplines can and should work 
from a disinterested perspective, excluding bias and beliefs from claims of knowledge. 3 
Habermas emphasizes that his theory does not attempt to denigrate the empirical-
analytic sciences or knowledge. Rather, he argues that it is incorrect to claim that this is 
the only type of knowledge, or that all other knowledge ought be judged by this realm 
of technical human interests. 
I See Jurgen Habennas's Frankfurt inaugural address of June 1965, titled "Knowledge and 
Human Interest: A General Perspective," chap. in Knowled~e and Human Interest, (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1971; original German edition published by Suhrkamp Verlag, 1968), 301-317. 
2Richard Berstein, The Restructurin~ of Social and Political Theory, (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1976), 191-193. Habermas further argues that these categories are 
dependent on the most fundamental needs of the human species for cultural and biological 
reproduction. See Habermas, Knowled2e and Human Interest, 196-197. 
3Habennas, Knowled~e and Human Interest, 302-311. 
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Second, the historical-hermeneutic sciences incorporate the practical interests of 
human knowledge, and are associated with interactive human social existence. For 
Habermas, social interaction is a "nonreducable type of action requiring a distinctive set 
of categories for the description, explanation, and understanding of it. "4 Habermas 
argues that individuals shape and determine themselves through this aspect of human 
knowledge, not only through their work, but also through communicative interaction 
and language. Habermas emphasizes that these interactions are vital for understanding 
social and political life. In the historical-hermeneutic sciences the validity of knowledge 
claims are not dependent upon a technical control of nature, but instead rely on access to 
"the facts" provided by comprehending the meaning of activities, not by observing 
them. 5 Hermeneutic knowledge is always mediated, through the initial pre-
understanding of an interpreter to the circumstances investigated. Habermas fully 
develops the importance and intent of this human interest in his understanding of the 
human lifeworld, as will be explored in the second section of this chapter. 
A critical science, however, unlike the empirical or the hermeneutic sciences, is not 
content with theoretical explanations. Critical science is concerned with going beyond 
this type of knowledge to exposing instances when these other sciences become 
dependent upon or influenced by ideologies. The methodological framework which 
determines the meaning for or the validity of critical propositions is established by the 
concept of "self-reflection. "6 Here Habermas stands as part of a philosophical tradition 
arguing that "when reason or knowledge is properly understood, we realize that there is 
in it a primary interest or demand to become fully actualized. "7 "Reason ... means the 
4Berstein, The Restructurin~ of Social and Political Theory, 195. 
5Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest, 309. 
6Jbid., 310. 
?Berstein, The RestructurinK" of Social and Political Theory, 198. 
will to reason. "8 The human emancipatory interest seeks to utilize fully the human 
capacity of rationality, which Habermas defines more robustly than many have 
traditionally done. Additionally, Habermas believes that an "emancipatory interest 
cannot be realized by the solitary ego or Absolute Spirit, but only in and through the 
concrete social and political lives of men. "9 The results of this belief will be shown 
below in the development of Habermas's discourse ethics. 
59 
This chapter will explore briefly each of these aspects of Habermas's thought. It 
will first touch on Habermas's belief in the need for a deeper understanding of social life 
than can be provided by empirical science. Discussion will then move to Habermas's 
suggestion for how to understand social life, through an account of the lifeworld, and 
the science needed for this understanding. Finally, Habermas's ideas on ethics and 
morality will be discussed in relation to this lifeworld, along with the consequences 
these ideas have for individual lives, and his understanding of a scientific investigation 
of this relationship. With the philosophical developments discussed in this chapter in 
mind, the following chapter of this thesis will explore the constructive use to which 
feminist theorists can put Habermas's understanding of social life in their own 
development of an understanding of human knowledge. 
THE SHIFf TO A PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 
One of the central claims to Habermas's work is the inadequacy of a science which 
depends exclusively upon empirical-analytic criteria for its claims to knowledge. He 
identifies areas where empirical-analytic methods are appropriate, concepts bounded by 
8ttabermas, Knowledie and Human Interest, 314. 
9Berstein, The Restructurin~ of Social and Political Theory, 198. 
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human technical interests, and shows how the empirical-analytic sciences atrophy when 
they attempt to step beyond these limits. To demonstrate this inadequacy, Habermas 
does not directly attack the claim that these sciences are able to provide us with an 
accurate understanding of the world, and instead questions the ability of empirical 
science to explain how know ledge is accumulated and transmitted by the scientific 
community of inquirers. Habermas shows here that the intelligibility of this 
community, "with its distinctive forms of intersubjectivity and communication, 
presupposes a level of action-symbolic interaction-and a set of categories needed to 
account for that action, which are richer and more inclusive than those explicitly 
countenanced by the technical cognitive interests." 10 Thus the intelligibility of these 
disciplines, that these scientists are able to communicate with one another, cannot be 
fully explained by technical interests, and requires a more comprehensive concept of 
socialization and rationality. 
Expanding Rationality 
In order to develop this "richer and more inclusive" understanding of human 
knowledge, Habermas begins with a careful examination of what information is 
available to the human capacity for empirical-analytic knowledge. In the empirical-
analytic sciences the logic of inquiry leads to true statements about reality, through the 
scientific method, which has proven the best of methods for arriving at valid beliefs, 
"beliefs that all future events will not render problematic but rather confirm." 11 Valid 
beliefs are universal propositions about reality that can be transformed into technical 
recommendations. But this does not yet explain how scientific progress is possible.12 
lOJbid., 196. 
11 Habermas, Knowled~e and Human Interest, 119. 
121bid., 120-121. 
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The logic of experimentation on which scientific knowledge is produced does not 
explain how it is that scientists themselves came to the agreement that this knowledge 
has universal significance. Before scientists are able to agree on experimentation, there 
must have been agreement that has allowed their communication. For this, scientists, as 
well as all social actors, rely upon a rational agreement not limited by a technical 
interest, an agreement which must be included in our understanding of human 
knowledge. 
Part of this knowledge can be explained in an expanded concept of rationality, which 
Habermas develops by making a fundamental distinction between traditional notions of 
instrumental rationality and communicative rationality. Instrumental, or strategic, 
rationality is typically defined as the rationality that governs the choice between means 
to given (often material) ends. For Habermas, only those who presuppose a set 
objective world to act within will limit their definition of rationality to the empirical tests 
of truth and efficiency. Contrary to this "realist" view of rationality, Habermas points to 
another way of testing the rationality of one's expression, a method which is based upon 
the awareness that those actors who behave rationally have presupposed an objective 
world to act within. This phenomenological view of rationality accounts for the fact that 
the world is interpreted by individuals, and that for a community of individuals living 
together, this presupposed world is largely a uniform set of interpretations. 
Communicative rationality characterizes the activity of reflecting upon our interpretations 
and background assumptions about the world, bringing our basic norms to the fore, to 
be occasionally questioned and negotiated.13 Instrumental rationality takes these 
background assumptions for granted and concentrates on achievements in the world. 
13 Jane Braaten, Habermas's Critical Theory of Society (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1991 ), 12. 
The abstract, background concept of the world is a necessary condition if 
communicatively acting subjects are to be able to reach an understanding among 
themselves about events in the world. It is through this communicative practice that 
these acting subjects assure themselves of their common life-relations, of an 
intersubjectively shared lifeworfd.14 
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This lifeworld is bounded by the totality of interpretations presupposed, by all 
members, as background knowledge upon which all other interactions are founded.15 
Habermas further explains this concept as "implicit knowledge that can't be represented 
in a finite number of propositions; it is a holistically structured knowledge ... we cannot 
make it conscious and place it in doubt as we please."16 In the phenomenological 
view, being rational is most closely linked to being meaningful. Here, individuals are 
considered to be 'rational' whenever they act on the basis of their lifeworld, i.e., when 
they follow a norm established in that lifeworld. These actions are defensible when 
challenged, and if an action is criticized the actor can explain the situation in light of 
established norms to legitimize the behavior. Further, this phenomenological approach 
to rationality allows a theory to account for the rationality of utterances concerning 
personal desires or intentions. Criticism of these statements can be defended by 
explaining the action as a consequence of one's personal experience or particular 
history .17 Thus, phenomenology allows our understanding of the term rational to be 
l 41n the Theory of Communicative Action Habermas uses the word "lifeworld" in at least three 
different ways. This is the first, and most fundamental to his theory. This "lifeworld" is a 
foundational, intersubjective understanding of the world which seems closely related to a 
Wittgenstinian concept of a "form of life." For an explanation of his other uses of "lifeworld," refer 
to his Theory of Communicative Action, volumes 1 and 2. 
l 5Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 12-13. 
l 6Ibid., 336. 
17Ibid., 15. 
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expanded to include not only (i) assertions about the objective world, but also (ii) 
normatively regulated actions, and (iii) expressive self-presentations which are 
meaningful and understandable in a context connected to criticizable validity claims. 
These three types of communicative action, each being open to criticism, and each able 
to be defended with reasons, point to a definition of rationality that is implicit in each of 
these areas. Thus for Habermas, "rationality" becomes more broadly defined as being 
open to criticism and defensible with reasons. 
The rationality of all three of these types of actions are based in the end upon 
reasons for their validity. Validity claims are internally connected with reasons and 
grounds, found in the meaning of the speech act itself, and not connected to any 
additional sanctions. This validation involves giving reasons for the normative 
justification of this claim. If a hearer does not take the utterance of a speaker as 
immediately justified, the hearer is able to ask the speaker to validate her claims. Then, 
discussion ensues concerning the facts, norms, or beliefs that led to the utterance, until 
both parties come to an agreement on their validity. This process of coming to an 
understanding, and re-establishing a consensus about the interpretation of the world that 
was broken by doubting a statement's validity plays a fundamental role in continuing the 
lifeworld of the subjects. This process, of giving and responding to reasons for an 
utterance, Habermas refers to as "argument." Rationality is therefore firmly tied to the 
idea of validity, and depends upon this linguistic give and take of reasons to support its 
claim to the title 'rational.' 
The lifeworld also refers to one of many "layers" of knowledge. This layer 
functions strictly in the background and is absolutely needed by any subject who acts 
communicatively .18 All cultural renditions of a lifeworld must be complex enough to 
l 8Ibid., 337. 
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allow actors to relate to concepts in the objective, social, and subjective realms of human 
action if these actors are to be able to behave rationally. With every utterance, any 
speaker must be taking up reference to one of these three worlds and orienting her 
actions towards it. These are more closely understood as one of three 11actor-world 11 
relations: 
(i) The objective world represents the totality of all entities about which true 
statements are possible. Action towards the objective world presupposes relations 
between an actor and a world of existing states of affairs. Action here gives the agent 
the ability to form beliefs about the existence of the world through her perception of it, 
and further develop intentions to bring about desired states of affairs by choosing 
promising means.19 In the objective world a decision is made among courses of 
possible action, toward an end, guided by maxims, and based on an interpretation of the 
situation. Consideration for this world is often the base of utility and game-theories in 
sociology, economics, social psychology. 
(ii) The social world represents the totality of all legitimately regulated interpersonal 
relations. Action within this world is normatively regulated by "something recognized 
as obligatory in the social world supposedly shared by all the members of a 
collective. "20 All actors for whom the corresponding norm shares the same force 
belong to the same social world. Members can then expect one another, in 
corresponding situations, to orient their action to the values held by each of them. 
Because an actor is able to take up relations to this world, existing norms motivate to the 
degree to which all present value the norm, and to the degree to which different needs 
are interpreted through the socializing process. Normatively regulated action is 
l 9Jbid., 87. 
20Habennas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, 120. 
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behavior of members of a social group who orient their action to common values, not 
about solitary actors who encounter other actors in their environment. In the social 
realm, actors comply with a norm, thus fulfilling a generalized expectation of behavior. 
This action is not a cognitively predicted behavior, but rather accounts for the normative 
sense that others are entitled to expect a behavior. Consideration for this world is often 
the base of theories in the study of sociology. 
(iii) The subjective world represents the totality of the experiences of the speaker to 
which he has privileged access.21 Here an actor engages in dramaturgical action, 
presenting a view of himself toward his own subjective world. In this world, desires 
and feelings are primary motivations. Desires are oriented towards need satisfaction, 
while feelings "perceive" situations in the light of possible need satisfaction.22 Actors 
orienting their actions towards the subjective realm purposefully disclose their 
subjectivity, and are centrally concerned with a presentation of self Consideration for 
this world is often the base of theories in the study of phenomenology. 
Each of these areas of action relies to some degree upon a linguistic medium to carry 
actor-world relations. In the objective world, language is one of several media through 
which speakers attempt to influence others or the world. In the social world, language 
is presupposed as the medium which transmits values and consensus. For the 
subjective world, language is the medium of self-representation. Habermas's critique of 
empirical analytical science and its reliance upon purposive-rational activity has not 
rejected its foundations. Instead, he finds the realm of understanding available to 
empiricism inadequate for investigating the complexity of human social life, and argues 
for the creation of a science that is able to account for the full range of human activities. 
21 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 100. 
221bid., 91-92. 
This science will focus on the foundation of this complexity, human abilities to 
communicate linguistically with both a community and themselves. For Habermas, 
"The phenomena in need of explication are no longer, in and of themselves, 
the knowledge and mastery of an objective nature, but the intersubjectivity of 
possible understanding and agreement-at both the interpersonal and 
intrapsychic levels. The focus of investigation thereby shifts from cognitive-
instrumental rationality to communicative rationality. And what is 
paradigmatic for the latter is not the relation of a solitary subject to 
something in the objective world that can be represented and manipulated, 
but the intersubjective relation that speaking and acting subjects take up 
when they come to an understanding with one another about something. In 
doing so, communicative actors move in the medium of a natural language, 
draw upon culturally transmitted interpretations, and relate simultaneously to 
something in the one objective world, something in their common social 
world, and something in each's own subjective world. "23 
Leaving Descartes 
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The three realms of action also play a role in Habermas's understanding of the 
evolution of human social life. For Habermas, a correct understanding of the 
development of society is as important as a full understanding of rationality. In 
developing his theory of communicative action, Habermas argues that contemporary 
society must be viewed as the product of a historical evolution, and traces the increasing 
complexity of human interaction from tribal organization, through traditional society, to 
the organization of modem society today. This transition in social organization is 
understood as having accompanied a shift in the norms that govern action, from those 
based only in traditions to norms that can be rationally justified. 
One of the figures central to Habermas's concern for social evolution is Max Weber 
and his theories of social rationalization and secularization. The great influence that 
Weber has had on more recent philosophy and sociology is not lost on Habermas, and 
23Jbid., 92. 
accordingly he makes a great effort to explain Weber's theories and expose their 
weaknesses. Most importantly, Habermas seeks to prove wrong the conclusions 
reached by Weber in his interpretation of Western civilization's historical evolution.24 
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Weber theorized that the development of human societies was represented in the 
diffusion of purposive-rational action into social spheres previously governed by 
religion or tradition, focusing particularly on the rationalization of the economy and the 
state. History has thus brought a general loss of meaning and freedom to human life 
through the de-mystification of traditions which once guided much of human 
interaction. Habermas argues that this theory is incomplete, as it does not account for, 
nor even consider, the concurrent rationalization of the lifeworld that has occurred, 
particularly the additional rationalization of the means to reaching a shared 
understanding about that lifeworld. 25 
Habermas intends to prove that the loss of meaning that Weber envisioned for 
human life is neither unavoidable nor a true account of social existence. In order to do 
this, Habermas attacks the conception of rationality central to Weber's thinking. For 
Weber, it was the strategic-purposive rationality, especially apparent in capitalism's rise 
in legitimacy to replace tradition and religious social ordering, that is responsible for the 
loss of meaning. It is this conceptualization of reason in purely subject-object terms that 
is the fatal flaw in Weber's prognosis. Weber, and all who like him consider human 
rationality in only instrumental terms are wrong. 26 Habermas argues that because 
Weber could only conceive of rationality in terms of subject-object relations he was 
24oavid Rasmussen, Readini Habeunas (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 24. 
25 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 339-340. 
26other classic theories which fall, arguably, with this argument include Hobbesian self-
interest, Hegelian recognition, and Marx's concept of labor. See Rasmussen, Readini Habermas, 
25. 
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unable to ground rationality in anything other than these relations. For Habermas, this 
exposes traditional rationality as merely an ideology. In order to ground rationality in 
something other than itself, and to be able to account for the full richness of human 
social life, this strict adherence to subject-object rationality must be rejected. 
Habermas's theories can be read as an argument against not only this tradition of 
purposive-rational dominance, but against all post-Cartesian philosophy of the subject, 
or philosophy of consciousness, which was left with the concept of a completely 
isolated subject whose relationship to the world can only be understood instrumentally, 
and cannot be intersubjectively established. 27 One cannot fully conceive of oneself, or 
truly be self-consciousness, if there are only subject-object relations. One must use a 
more pragmatic approach to conceptualize the performative, and not only the referential, 
use of the expression "I" that allows a self-consciousness. Traditionally, only the 
referential aspects of the expression "I" were acknowledged, which neglected the 
performative "I's" aspects. It is this performative "I," the "I" as different than and 
distinct from others, that promises to save philosophy. 28 
THE LIFEWORLD 
Habermas's use of Action Theory 
An important foundation for much of Habermas's thinking is the use that he makes 
of action theory. The theory of communicative action is tightly linked to an action 
theory in order to show how our basic moral intuitions are grounded in something 
27Rasmussen, ReadinG Habennas, 26. 
28ttabennas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 397. 
deeper and more universal than our particular traditions. 29 In this case, Habermas is 
linking our "basic moral intuitions" to a fundamental characteristic of human beings, 
our ability to communicate. Habermas uses the term "action" to refer to the symbolic 
expressions with which a human actor assumes a relation to an aspect of the 
intersubjective lifeworld.30 In this realm, knowledge is guided by a knowledge-
constitutive "practical" interest, an interest that has as its aim not the technical control 
and manipulation of the environment, but the understanding of conditions for 
communication and intersubjectivity. 31 Members of the human species become 
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individuals through and within social networks that provide them with a basic 
orientation towards the world. In this shared world, individual identities are formed and 
maintained. Thus, both the integrity of the individual and the welfare of the community, 
equality and solidarity, are accounted for in communicative action. All of these actions 
are fundamentally oriented to the human act of linguistic communication, upon which 
all of these events depend. To understand communicative action, an actor becomes 
involved in the presupposition of a linguistic medium which reflects the actor's relation 
to the world. 
Habermas argues that there are two forms of action: the strategic and the 
communicative. Strategic action is oriented towards achieving success in the world. In 
strategic actions actor A seeks to influence the behavior of B through the use of threats, 
29Thomas McCarthy, "Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism: Rawls and Habermas in 
Dialogue," Ethics 105 (October 1994): 47. 
30ffabermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 96. 
31 Habermas clarifies his definition of "action" by emphasizing that "action" does not 
specifically refer to bodily movements or physical operations which are performed as a part of an 
"action" and includes meaning only secondarily, through being embedded in another action. In 
other words, "A bodily movement is an element of an action but not an action." Consider, for 
example, the bodily motions involved in playing or teaching. See Theory of Communicative 
Action, vol. 1, 96-97. 
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sanctions, or rewards in order to cause the interaction to proceed as A intends. On the 
other hand, action oriented towards reaching an understanding is called communicative, 
and is non-instrumental. In communicative action, speaker A seeks to rationally 
motivate hearer B by referring to the binding effect in the implicit guarantee by speaker 
A that she will, if necessary, make efforts to validate her claims made in 
communicating.32 This communicative action remains "rational" in the sense that a 
communicatively achieved agreement has a basis upon which all agree. It cannot be 
forced upon or forced by either party.33 Habermas's claim that these communicative 
forms of language are primary to strategic types is both fundamental to his theory, and 
controversial. 34 
In a communicative model of action, language is relevant via the pragmatic use 
actors make of it in their orientation to reaching understanding amongst themselves. 
Reaching an understanding functions as a mechanism for the coordination of actions. A 
basic coordination of actions is essential for actors who share the same social context, 
allowing actors to base their actions on the expected reactions of others. Without this 
coordination, no actor would be able to predict the responses of other actors to even the 
simplest of social actions. Action coordinating is achieved through coming to an 
intersubjective agreement about the validity of their utterances amongst themselves. 
The theory of communicative action presupposes language as the medium for reaching 
3 2 Jtirgen Ha berm as, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. by Christian 
Lenhart and Shierry Weber Nicholson (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 1990; original German 
edition printed by Suhrkamp Verlag, 1983), 58. 
33Habennas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 287. 
34Habennas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. I, 397; and Rasmussen, Readin~ 
Habermas, 27-28. 
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this kind of understanding, in the course of which actors, through relating to the world, 
reciprocally raise validity claims amongst each other that can be accepted or rejected. 35 
Every process in which action oriented towards reaching an understanding occurs 
takes place against the background of this pre-understanding founded within a cultural 
context, their lifeworld. When one of these background norms of action is brought to 
the fore by participants in order to contest it, the rest of this background remains firm. 
There is no way that actors can simultaneously argue over all parts of their 
communicative background. This is because in order to understand an utterance, the 
interpreter must have a background familiarity with the conditions surrounding its 
validity. One must know what conditions do or would make the validity claim 
connected to the assertion acceptable. The only context from which the interpreter could 
gain this knowledge is from having participated in the communication community 
around her. She can understand the meaning of a communicative act only because it is 
embedded in contexts of action oriented to reaching understanding. The interpreter has 
learned through socialization within that particular culture which conditions validate a 
symbolic expression and which do not. 
This validity can be claimed in relation towards one of the three aspects of the 
lifeworld to which humans orient themselves. Again, these are the objective, the social, 
and the subjective aspects of the lifeworld. With each utterance, a speaker is making a 
claim that her statement is valid in relation to one of these realms. Each speaker, who 
has oriented her actions toward reaching an understanding with the other actors 
involved, with each utterance, claims validity in terms of one or more of the following: 
(i) Truth. That the statement made is true relative to the existential world. 
35Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 99. 
(ii) Rightness. That the speech act is right with respect to the normative context 
of interaction. (Or that the norm expressed is legitimate.) 
(iii) Sincerity. That the manifest intention of the speaker is meant as it is 
expressed. 36 
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To each of these claims made by the speaker, a communicatively competent hearer is 
able to accept or reject the claim, responding with a yes or no. As long as this process 
continues, and as long as claims to validity are accepted, the lifeworld remains unified 
and unproblematic. Eventually, however, a claim will not be redeemed as valid, and a 
process of establishing which actor is correct, the norm proposer, or the rejecter, will 
ensue. This process is one of serious discourse, and will be elaborated in the final 
section. 
Autonomy Through Socialization 
As one progresses into Habermas's theory it is important to understand the emphasis 
the theory of a communicative ethic places on the role of the universal and the 
contextual. Habermas often reiterates the importance of the individual's social context 
for developing any ideas of individuality or solidarity. He feels that many previous 
moral theories have overemphasized the universal, and are thus unable to account for 
the specific individuals that make up the real world. On the other hand, strictly concrete 
and contextualized theories are not able to offer any conception of morality, which 
depends on a non-specific point of view. 
Habermas explains how methods typically used to identify the individual are flawed, 
and lead to the individual being suppressed by the universal. For example, many 
36Jbid., 99. 
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theories are able to identify individuals numerically. 37 Here, the individual is 
considered as a private concept, and is defined as a deviation away from the universal 
features of the social context. On the other hand, some theories attempt to account for 
individuality qualitatively. Here, the differentiation of social roles is used as a means to 
increase individualization. In other words, the greater the number of social roles that are 
available for an individual to choose from, the more unique each person's combination 
of roles can be. In both of these cases however, the universal characterization 
overshadows any uniqueness. If each is uniquely individual, there is no comparison to 
allow differentiation. Qualitative methods also seem flawed as there is no reason to 
believe that having an increasing number of social roles to choose from increases 
autonomy. Habermas criticizes these theories that identify the individual "ironically as 
the nonidentical. "38 
Habermas argues instead for a concept of individualization that allows us to 
understand autonomy, and the capacity to be one's self. It should allow us to 
distinguish between two phenomena: (i) social differentiation, and (ii) progressive 
individualization. We can arrive at this type of an understanding by revisiting Cartesian 
dualism. This subject-object model of consciousness is sufficient only for 
understanding the ego as knowing consciousness as an object, i.e. the conscience is 
conceived of as an "it." In contrast, Habermas uses a view of the "practical self' to 
demonstrate his understanding of individualization. He begins the explanation of this 
self with the writings of Mead. Mead retains the dualistic ideal of a self-reflecting upon 
itself as an object. In this rendering, however, the object is not found from the third-
37Jilrgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Ihinkin~: Philosophical Essays, trans. William Mark 
Hohengarten (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 1992; original German edition published by 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988), xii. 
38Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking, 157. 
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person perspective, but rather from a second-person perspective as a participant in a 
communicative context: where the other is an alter-ego. The self then conceives of itself 
as the "alter" of this alter-ego. Mead explains this as when an organism first takes up a 
relationship to itself, and is thus first constituted as a subject, in the moment when 
communicative relations are established between organisms. Subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity are thus coeval. 
This new self-understanding is constituted of two parts: 
(i) the theoretical "me," or I which is a person's consciousness of her "self'; and 
(ii) the practical "me," (alter) which is the agency through which she monitors her 
behavior. 
For Habermas's theory of individualization, it is the practical me that is of interest here. 
This "me" (alter) comes into existence as the subject establishes a practical relation to 
herself by adopting a normative attitude of an alter ego toward her own behavior (which 
is the "I"). In later development this me (alter) expands to encompass the generalized 
expectations of all members of society, thus becoming the attitude of the generalized 
other. Thus a self identity which is constituted solely in this "practical me" would be 
totally conventional in character (reflecting only the generalized norms of society). For 
Habermas. the "I" of presocial impulses does battle with the "me" of convention, 
constrained by social norms. 
This points to a critical potential embedded in this understanding of the selfs 
development. The suppression of the "I" indicates that the identity of the individual is 
not a true one, and remains to be emancipated from this internal suppression. The 
releasing of this "I" is a precondition for the emergence of a post-conventional self 
capable of moral reasoning. At the conventional (strictly norm-governed and not yet 
individualized) stage of reasoning the "I" is suppressed by the "me." In the 
development to a postconventional level of reasoning, the priority of the I and me will 
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become reversed, the I will project a new intersubjective context, that of a wider, 
universal community. It is the selfs relation to a universal community which will 
make the achievement of true self-knowledge possible. To realize one's true identity the 
self cannot remove itself from this community. Instead, in order to develop to the post-
conventional level of moral consciousness, it is necessary that the individual take up a 
critical attitude to the merely given norms of the particular community 
Individualization then, is not equal to social differentiation, nor to an increasing 
number of social roles. Habermas does, however, see the increase in societal 
differentiation as necessary. This process leads to the disintegration of conventional 
reasoning via a breakdown of the conventional individual's ability to reconcile the new, 
large number of social roles. This breakdown becomes emancipatory, allowing the 
individual to escape from the traditional confines and norms of her community, though 
in the process losing herself (her meaning). It then becomes possible for the self to 
project the regenerated, universal community with which she can reason, thus finding a 
true self-identity and a moral ideal. 
To show why this does not again triumph the universal over the individual, 
Habermas argues that a balance is struck between the "moral self-determination" and 
the "ethical self-realization." First, moral self-determination transcends the specific 
context to a universal normative consensus. But this does not imply the leveling of 
differences. It implies the abstraction of universalized norms, which become more 
compatible with concrete diversity, and more tolerant of different, tolerant, forms of life. 
Second, through ethical self-realization actors appeal to the projected universal 
community, not for agreement, but for recognition of her claim to authenticity. When 
making any claim, I also claim my individuality. Even rejection of these claims is 
confirmation of "me," of the selfs claim to identity. Hence, communication between 
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individuals does not clean away differences between individuals, it confirms, and is 
necessary for that difference. 
Communicative Action 
We have seen how human actions regulated by norms, expressive self-presentations 
and evaluative expressions, combine with speech acts to form a communicative 
community. This practice, which must be conceived of in its entirety, forms the 
lifeworld for acting human subjects, and provides the foundation for all of their actions 
and orientations to the world. Operating within their lifeworld, actors use this 
communicative community of criticizable validity claims to achieve, sustain, and renew 
their identities and individuality as well as a consensus about their interpretation of the 
world. An important premise of this theory is that language, as communicative 
discourse, is both emancipatory in the ways we have seen, and even more 
fundamentally, has a priority over other forms of linguistic usage in certain forms. 
Habermas has made this claim based upon the nature of discourse rather than from any 
particular reading of political theory. This claim rests upon the scientific/empirical 
assertion about the nature of language (i.e., its acting as a foundation for all social 
interaction), thus freeing the theory from any claim of epistemology.39 Habermas is not 
arguing that communicative forms of language ought to be primary, but arguing that 
they are primary. "Reason does not need to be regenerated, it is by nature regenerative 
in the sense that reason as communicative reason is embedded in language. "40 This 
stems from language's original use as an instrument oriented to reaching understanding, 
39Rasmussen, Readin~ Habermas, 18. 
40Rasmussen, Readint: Habermas, 28; See Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 
I, 288-292. 
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rather than oriented to achieving success. Communicative actions are foundational, and 
can not be reduced further to teleological terms. 
Embedded within the practice of coming to a consensus about the lifeworld, there is 
a fundamental practice that can be seen as "rational." This understanding of rationality 
is not strictly tied to tests of truth or efficacy about means to a desired end. Instead, a 
richer understanding of rationality extends to include actions that are meaningful, and 
can be supported by reasons. Thus, we must be clear about the role of reasons in 
communicative action. We say that in each speech act an actor makes a claim to validity 
in one of the three realms of action: objective, social, or subjective, and must be 
prepared to support that claim with reasons if called upon to do so. An individual "only 
understands reasons to the extent that one can understand why they are or are not 
sound." This knowledge comes to a hearer by applying his "own standards of 
judgment," or "standards that he has made his own."41 These reasons are responded to 
with either a yes or a no, which indicates the hearer's acceptance or denial of the validity 
of the reason. Since all rational actions must be able to be criticized, all rational actions 
are supported with claims to validity. 
The subjects of a communicative community are able to operate normally, in 
everyday communication, as long as the consensus of norms is continued. This is the 
case when speaker A makes an assertion x, to which a hearer B responds by rejecting 
the validity of x with criticism y. In support of her assertion x, A then offers a reason z 
in support of her assertion. To this reason, B applies his powers of judgment and 
responds with a "yes" or "no" to that reason. If the reason is accepted, consensus is re-
established and communication continues as usual. If however, B rejects the validity of 
reason z in support of assertion x, then the communicative consensus has broken down 
41 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 116. 
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and must be repaired. For this repair an argument must ensue between A and B, an 
argument free from force, and based only on the rational acceptance of reasons to 
rebuild consensus, ensuring the further, proper functioning of the lifeworld. For this 
reason, Habermas believes, "that the concept of communicative rationality, which refers 
to an unclarified systematic interconnection of universal validity claims, can be 
adequately explicated only in terms of a theory of argumentation. "42 Argumentation, 
then, must be further explored. This theory next turns from normal, everyday 
communicative action that occurs between individuals in a lifeworld, to seek an 
understanding of the discourse that emerges between individuals when a breakdown in 
this shared world occurs. This type of serious discourse is the argumentation that will 
repair breakdowns in the lifeworld. Habermas's understanding of the rules of these 
arguments will be explored in the next section, the theory of Discourse Ethics. 
THE UNIVERSAL 
Before beginning this section, a possible misunderstanding within Habermas's 
theory of discourse ethics should be clarified. In this section, an argument will continue 
to be built upon the idea of a community based upon an intersubjectively shared pre-
understanding of the world, communicating with itself about the regulation of social 
actions. Linguistic communication between individuals leads to the grounding of 
universal principles. These universal principles are the only principles that Habermas 
intends to refer to as "morals." Guides to social action that are context and group 
specific, and not universally valid, are to be called "ethics." Habermas is not centrally 
concerned with grounding, explaining, or justifying these ethical principles. He is 
42 Ibid., 18. 
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concerned with and focused upon the grounding and foundation of morals, morals 
which posses validity across contextual situations, and are understood as universal. 
Thus his theory would be better labeled "Discourse Morality," or a "Discourse Theory 
of Morality." The title "Discourse Ethics," however, has been affixed to his theory, and 
thus he, as well as all other authors, continue with the original wording.43 Thus, in what 
follows, the ethical is what relates to the contextual and the moral refers to the universal, 
except references to "discourse ethics," which is intended to be universal. 
In his theory of discourse ethics, Habermas has set out to champion the project of 
modernity against anti-enlightenment critiques, talcing direct aim at claims that "the 
Enlightenment's project of establishing a secularized morality free of metaphysical and 
religious assumptions has failed. "44 By rejecting these claims, he also attempts to 
unravel the paradox of modernity. Habermas hopes to understand, in less dire terms, 
the loss of meaning that has accompanied modernity's turn away from the tradition and 
religion that once ordered so much of human interaction. In order to support these 
arguments he developed two complementary theses, one of society based on the 
rationalization of institutions and interaction, and another of rationality grounded in 
linguistic communication. It is through these two theses that Habermas finds an 
understanding of rationality that allows insight into the moral. 
Using the Kantian tradition as a point of departure, his theory of discourse ethics 
seeks to defend the primacy of justice over the good. Habermas argues that we must 
separate questions of ethics, which give us information about the pursuit of certain ends 
given our preferences, from questions of morality proper which provide us with insight 
43McCarthy, "Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism," note 7; and Jiirgen Habermas, 
Justification and Application, trans. Ciaran P. Cronin (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 1993; 
Original German edition published by Suhrkamp Verlag, 1990 and 1991), 2. 
44ttabermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 43. 
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about justice and a fair and impartial consideration of competing claims. He seeks to 
provide an understanding of morality that is universally valid, and not dependent on 
ethical concerns for the good life. Habermas, however, departs significantly from 
Kantian thought by arguing against the role of solitary reflection. With Habermas, both 
consciousness and thought are seen as structured by language, and as such are social 
aspects of humanity. The subject, in considering issues of morality, must be seen in the 
context of communication, where meaning and individual identity are communally 
determined. 
If it has not already been made apparent, it should be made clear now that 
Habermas's theoretical construction of the moral does not attempt to avoid a serious 
consideration of modern pluralism. While the diversity of claims to validity in modem 
times may rule out the idea of philosophy providing a universal answer to the question, 
"How should I (we) live?" Habermas does not believe that this denies the possibility of 
a "narrower" sort of theory, specifically, a theory of justice.45 Discourse ethics seeks to 
understand the moral point of view from which questions of right are fairly and 
impartially judged. This point of view will be characterized by its impartiality amongst 
claims and acceptability to all concerned with these claims. This will at last arrive at the 
procedure that Habermas envisions for the community of moral subjects engaged in a 
dialogue of practical argumentation aimed at reaching a rational agreement between the 
actors involved in the cultural context in question. 
In the exploration of discourse ethics, the consequences a linguistically founded 
theory of consciousness have for an understanding of human interaction will be seen. 
After Habermas's understanding of meaning and validity are seen to be based on 
linguistic agreement, the possibility of universal agreement on certain aspects of action 
45McCarthy, "Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism," 46. 
will be grounded. This will allow an understanding of discourse ethics to show how 
human beings can be capable of agreeing upon principles to guide our actions in the 
world, a concept of morality which can be shared across lines of tradition and 
community. 
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Understanding the power that normative validity holds in a moral theory of 
communicative action, Habermas argues that meaning is given to actions by the 
communicative community, rather than by a solitary thinker. Even the concept of truth, 
so central to many philosophies of consciousness (as leading to a God-like knowledge 
of the cosmos), is displaced by what is acknowledged as valid by all in communication. 
Finally, rationality as well was found in terms of communication rather than a mode or 
style of solitary thought. The next section shows, in discussing meaning, truth, and 
rationality, a dependence upon 'what has been accepted by the communicative 
community,' or what has been accepted as 'valid' by the community. In the final 
sections we will see how Habermas describes and empowers the idea of validity, and 
how through this idea he is able to ground his universal moral principle. 
Meaning. Truth. and Rationality Through Consensus 
To begin the move towards discourse ethics, Habermas's ideas concerning meaning 
and truth must be grounded in the idea of a lifeworld, as the foundational background 
agreement between all subjects in a communicative community. In this community, we 
must understand how mutual understanding between speakers is possible.46 The 
answer for Habermas stems from an idea of communicative competence, which all 
capable of speech in a community possess concerning the shared knowledge of the 
norms of communicative rationality. The most basic of these shared norms is that the 
46Braaten, Habermas's Critical Theory of Society, 19. 
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use of language to reach an understanding between actors is the original mode of 
language use.47 Because there is a fundamental motivation amongst the participants in 
communication to work for and accept a consensus, this is never a mere "agreement for 
the sake of agreement." It is a necessary aspect of communicative ability. 
Habermas argues that linguistic meaning must be understood in communicative 
terms. Every utterance depends upon two characteristics of communication for its 
meaning. First, every utterance implies or states a propositional component p that 
predicates something of an object. The second, and equally important aspect of an 
utterance is how this propositional content is put forth. The force of the utterance is 
given to it by its illocutionary component. This component may or may not be made 
explicit by a performative clause such as: "I assert ... ," "I command .... " Even without 
such a stated claim, an utterance may make a promise, a promise to support the 
statement with reasons.48 For Habermas, communicative actions are only those in 
which all participants pursue only illocutionary intentions, which establishes that the 
speaker is performing some action with her speech, and work to mediate acts of 
communication. In fact, however, this illocutionary component of the speech act is only 
one of the three distinct validity claims that each utterance makes. With her utterance, 
the speaker makes a truth claim relating to the objective world, she claims the rightness 
of her assertion regarding the social world of normatively regulated interactions, and 
claims the truthfulness of the statement relating to the subjective world of experiences to 
which only the speaker has access. The meaning of a statement is thus tied to 
conditions of its validity. 
47Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 287-288. 
48 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. I, 288; and Theory of Communicative 
Action vol. 2, 89. 
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Further, each of these claims is universal in two senses. First, each of these claims 
is itself a universal formal feature of linguistic communication. Rational 
communication is not possible without making one of these claims. Second, each also 
claims to be universally defensible for its claims to truth, rightness, and sincerity. In 
other words, a claim to validity points implicitly to a procedure of argument, of the 
giving and taking of reasons, that could be given in support of the validity claim. 49 In 
discourse ethics the idea of the world is no longer understood through a monological 
consciousness, but rather through interacting subjects who make validity claims 
amongst themselves. Meaning must be viewed pragmatically in terms of the 
acceptability conditions of utterances raised to claim validity. 
From this conception of meaning, Habermas understands the idea of truth in a 
language community as a social one. For example, the difference between knowledge 
and ignorance is not made in order to clarify statements from the perspective of a 
disembodied ideal observer.50 Instead, the difference must be understood from the 
view of the human community engaged in communication. It is a basic need of this 
group to achieve and maintain a solidarity based upon mutual and rational agreement 
about how the world is. An agreement about these ideas for an entity beyond this 
community would have no purpose for them, would be meaningless, and not sought. 51 
Thus, anyone fully capable of communicating in a community has at least an implicit 
understanding of what is meant by 'truth.' This is because every speaker is aware that 
they can be held accountable for presenting a statement as true, that they could be called 
upon to produce reasons why the utterance ought to be accepted. Truth must be 
49ttabennas, Postmeta,physical Thinkin~, ix-x. 
50Braaten, Haberrna,s's Critical Theory of Society, 22. 
51 See Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 279-286 on the purpose of validity 
claims. 
understood as one of many rationally criticizable validity claims. For all actors who 
communicate in this way, 'truth' is that which can be agreed upon as the rational 
consensus of all thus engaged. 
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This illustrates the emphasis that Habermas makes between his pragmatic theory of 
truth, and other, semantic theories of truth. Truth for Habermas must be tied to its 
communicative purposes, rather than some form of 'metalanguage' seeking an absolute 
know ledge. This understanding of truth arises through an understanding of the way 
"truth" is used in communication. The phrase, "xis true," is used to support the idea of 
justifiability of a statement in a discussion. It does not supposes some god-like ability 
to know the state of the cosmos. Thus the concept of truth stems purely from its 
purpose in maintaining a communicative competence between subjects.52 
If truth is understood as a type of validity claim, we must further clarify what it 
means to r.laim that an agreement is rational. Habermas argues that we generally 
evaluate validity claims not by directly comparing a statement with a state of affairs in 
the objective world, but by examining the reasons that a speaker can give to support 
what she has said. As above, to claim that one's statement is valid, is to claim that good 
reasons could potentially be given in support of it. These reasons are evaluated on their 
intersubjective acceptability. To be rational, it is important that these arguments be 
decided through the force of the better argument alone, and not influenced by any power 
relations between the participants. Habermas describes certain conditions that speakers 
must feel are met before they are confident that an agreement was reached based on 
reasons alone. These conditions form a basic structure of argumentative speech that 
52Braaten, Habermas's Critical Theory of Society, 22-23. 
creates a general symmetry between participants. Haberrnas has referred to these 
conditions as an ideal speech situation.53 
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Originally this ideal speech situation was used as a way to describe the conditions of 
an argument that would have to be met in order to be able to call the outcome of that 
argument rational. These conditions were meant to show how the agreement, could, in 
the end, be based only on reasons and the power of the better argument. The conditions 
of the ideal speech situation are summarized in three main points: 
(i) That the argument is open to all competent communicators. (Potential 
Participants) 
(ii) That everyone is free to question any assertion. (Equal Opportunity) 
(iii) That all are free from any internal or external coercion. (Repression Free) 
Habermas emphasizes that this "ideal" speech situation should not be misunderstood as 
a condition that must be achieved in actual social life. 54 The criteria in the ideal speech 
situation should not be considered as constitutive rules of discourse in the sense in 
which chess rules are constitutive of a real chess game. While the rules of a chess game 
"determine the playing of the actual chess game, discourse rules are merely the form in 
which we present the implicitly adopted and intuitively known pragmatic 
presuppositions for a special type of speech .... "55 The ideal is to refer to its "regulative 
functions." It is also emphasized that the participants need only feel that the conditions 
of this ideal speech situation are met to a sufficient degree. When this is the case, then it 
is correct to say that the participants were rationally motivated to agree with a speaker, 
and communicative consensus will again maintain prominence. Habermas argues that 
53see Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 88; and Theory of 
Communicative Action, vol. I :25. 
54ttabermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 91-93. 
551bid., 91. 
the ideal speech situation is an "inescapable presupposition" of argumentative speech, 
and should not be interpreted as a simple contextual convention. 56 
The Principle of Universalization 
86 
What concerns Habermas at the outset of grounding a principle of universalization is 
to show how agreement is at all possible among diverse individuals in a communicative 
context. Thus, before he seeks to explain how individual norms are to be evaluated by a 
group to determine their validity, he explains how agreement between diverse actors is 
even theoretically possible. His principle of universalization (U) will show that 
agreement is possible in moral argument "whenever matters of concern to all are open 
to regulation in the equal interest of everyone. "57 
To begin, in Habermas's theory of normative acceptance, ethical norms do not claim 
to be true or false, but rather claim to be valid or invalid. Normative claims are 
understood as different from, but in some ways analogous to truth claims. Truth claims 
are descriptive statements which show concern for the external, existing state of affairs. 
While normative validity claims concern what are intersubjectively recognized as 
"legitimately ordered interpersonal relations. The truth of a proposition signifies the 
existence of states of affairs in much the same way as the rightness of actions signifies 
the observance of norms."58 In statements about normative validity, we can see 
reflected a dependence of language upon the social world, one which is not true for 
instance between language and the objective world. While there is an "unequivocal 
relation" between existing states of the world and statements about it, the existence of a 
561bid., 89. 
571bid., 66. 
5 8 Ibid., 59-60. 
social norm does not guarantee its validity. Therefore, we must distinguish between 
"the social fact that a norm is intersubjectively recognized and its worthiness to be 
recognized. "59 
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For a norm to be deserving of the status 'valid' we must be able to say that there are 
good reasons for it being so. Obviously then, with the assertion of a claim to validity, 
there is an implicit guarantee to support it with reasons. Indeed, it is the case that one 
"ought" to provide these reasons when questioned about how a moral judgment was 
arrived at. While this is true of normative judgments, the same is not true of statements 
about a worldly state of affairs. There is no concept of "ought-to-be-justified" tied to 
judgments about the world. Habermas feels that when questioned about how we make 
empirical judgments about the world, we present reasons based in epistemologies and 
the philosophy of science. When, on the other hand, we are asked what makes moral 
judgment possible, we immediately proceed to describe our ability to adjudicate 
normative claims, or our "logic of practical discourse. "60 
For Habermas, this logic of practical discourse is based upon a fundamental 
assumption that is shared universally when actors engage in argumentation over 
normative claims to validity. This means that actors must implicitly accept the rules 
discussed in the ideal speech situation, as well as implicitly acknowledging the 
possibility of agreement between actors. Habermas expresses this necessary condition 
for discursive argumentation as: 
(U) All affected can freely accept the consequences and the side effects that 
the general observance of a controversial norm can be expected to have for 
the satisfaction of the interests of each individual.61 
59Jbid., 61. 
60Jbid., 62. 
61 Ibid., 93. 
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Habennas explains this as a bridging principle which, as a presupposition of 
argumentation, makes agreement in practical discourses possible whenever matters of 
concern to everyone are open to regulation in the equal interest of everyone. The 
principle of universalization insists that all affected must freely agree that the 
consequences of a norm satisfy the interests of each individual. Being a moral 
principle, it is meant to reflect the "general intuition" that true or valid statements are not 
only valid for the single actor, but for all that may be affected.62 
Before leaving discussion of the principle of universalization, it is important to 
clarify its role in communicative action. (U) is a moral principle, and the only moral 
principle in Habermas's theory. It is not a rule of logical argumentation, nor is it a 
substantive principle of participation, nor a basic norm. If (U) were conceived of as a 
rule or a norm which is produced within a cultural tradition, it would itself require 
justification. This is not the case. (U) is necessary for the process of argumentation to 
occur and to be resolvable at all. If (U) were not in principle possible (i.e., if no 
agreement was even conceivable), no actors would enter the discourse. As a 
presupposition of argument, (U) shows us what it means to have achieved agreement in 
the moral argument. Every argument, occurring in any context, is based upon the 
pragmatic presupposition "from whose propositional content the principle of 
universalization can be derived. "63 The principle of universalization justifies the 
existence of moral argumentation at all. 
62 Habermas, Justification and Application, 52. 
63 Habermas, Mora] Consciousness and Communicative Action, 82. 
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Discourse Ethics 
Leaving the justification for moral argumentation via the principle of universalization 
(U), we move to consideration of the actual discourse that actors go through in moral 
argumentation. While nearly all philosophies have expressed an idea of the importance 
of impartiality in moral judgments, those that rely upon teleological reasoning are not 
sufficient for determining validity. Teleological reasoning can only provide information 
about the consequences of situations: (i) where all persons followed the norm or, (ii) if 
all persons acting in an identical position followed the norm. These perspectives, 
however, are not able to account for all possible points of view. For example, (i) 
excludes the consequences of this norm from the viewpoint of different individuals; 
while (ii) denies the concrete differences among discrete individuals. Habermas, on the 
other hand, asserts that "true impartiality pertains only to that standpoint from which 
one can generalize precisely those norms that can count on universal assent because 
they perceptibly embody an interest common to all affected. "64 This is a reflection of 
the intuition that valid norms deserve recognition by all concerned. Thus in order to 
make moral judgments from a truly impartial point of view, each must consider the 
perspectives of all persons who will be affected by the norms. 
Within discourse ethics, Habermas moves from a principle thatjustifies the practice 
of moral argumentation (U), to a principle used in application, in deciding which of the 
contested norms that have been brought to the discourse are in fact worthy of being 
called ethical norms. This principle of application is what Habermas has called 
discourse ethics (D), and provides the actual criteria that must be met by a proposed 
norm to be claimed valid. The idea of an ethics of discourse is reflected in the principle: 
64Ibid., 65. 
(D) Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with 
the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical 
discourse. 65 
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Discourse ethics states the basic idea of a moral theory, but is not a part of the logic of 
argumentation. This principle presupposes that we can justify the norm we have chosen 
to consider, but this assumption was justified by the discussion of the principle of 
universalization. 66 Individuals, who were shown capable of (U), must engage in an 
actual discourse to validate a norm. This discourse will be concluded when (D) has 
been achieved. 
The principle of discourse ethics (D), is a guide to a procedure, that procedure of the 
"discursive redemption of normative claims to validity. "67 This practical discourse is 
not a method for the production of justified norms, but rather a procedure which will 
allow the testing of the validity of the norms that have been proposed to the community 
in discourse to debate over. This shows how this discourse is dependent upon the 
context of the community to bring contending norms before it to be decided upon. This 
discourse is also always connected to a concrete point in the lifeworld where there has 
been a breakdown in consensus. Thus, while the procedure is quite formal (in the 
Kantian sense) it depends upon and deals exclusively with, concrete norms. 
It is within this procedure of discourse that needs of mere individuals will be 
discarded for needs of the community as a whole. When norms are questioned, the 
norm is defended with casuistic evidence about the consequences and side effects of 
65Jbid., 93. 
66Jbid., 66. 
6 7 Ibid., I 03. 
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applying the norm for the fulfillment of accepted needs. 68 This limitation to accepted 
needs shows that needs are not taken at "face value" but are first interpreted through 
critical reflection in discourse. For Habermas, an individual's experiences and interests 
are not satisfactory bases for the validity of a claim. These personal claims are 
subjected to the criticism and reflection of the community, thus "transcended and made 
to be intersubjective."69 In this way, personal experiences (and needs) are brought out 
of the private and into, and thus part of, the world that the communicative community 
shares. Interests which are anti-social are found to not be generalizable, because of 
being based on needs which deny more basic and general interests. 70 This gives rise to 
what Habermas refers to as "discursive will formation." 
Discursive will formation, which leads to the discovery of genuinely generalizable 
interests, happens within an interactive process that Habermas refers to as need 
interpretation. Habermas shows how individuals know that they have needs, and 
shows how others are convinced that others have these needs. The only needs and 
interests relevant to ethical norms are those which are universal or generalizable. An 
ethical norm could only be universally valid if it is based in these, common, universal 
interests. A norm cannot be universal if only some of the group's interests are 
represented. What Habermas refers to as generalizable interests belong to a very 
specific group of interests, interests that are discovered in the context of "general will." 
For Habermas, these interests are those that we can only find as social beings, and only 
through a "reflective dialogue." This is what some authors feel is one of the more 
681bid., 65. 
69Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 67-68; Braaten, Habermas's 
Critical Theory of Society, 31-32. 
70Braaten, Habenuas's Critical Theory of Society, 32; Moral Consciousness and 
Communicative Action, 67. 
important and unique features of Habermas's Discourse Ethics, the way in which he 
feels that genuine and generalized interests are formed.71 
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It is the process of ideal role taking, and producing a general will that returns to 
support the "action-coordinating function that normative validity plays" in the lifeworld. 
Moral arguments are not solved by isolated individuals, but are only solved in 
cooperation with other actors. It is necessary that in these moral matters the common 
will of the community be expressed, and not the judgment of a single person. For this 
reason a "real" argument is needed in which participants are those real individuals 
concerned with the outcome of the debate. It is only this real argument, consensually 
solved, that can give participants in the communication community the knowledge that 
"they have collectively been convinced of something. "72 
The basic norms that will be represented in contextual law and morality are 
substantive principles to be justified within practical discourse and fall outside the realm 
of what moral theory alone can produce. Historical eras change, and each community's 
lifeworld will generate its own ethical ideals. It is these discourses which give rise to 
the ethical principles and make use of substantive normative rules of argumentation.73 
It is these rules alone that a theory of moral argumentation is able to produce. Each 
specific context produces norms to bring into the arena of discourse where they will be 
judged valid or rejected. 
Finally, Habermas is not arguing that all norms must be shown as universally valid. 
There are many areas of social interaction that do not depend on universal norms, and 
yet posses norms for that group. Examples of these are rules of etiquette or tactfulness, 
the expectations of family members, and the standards found within private, voluntary 
72Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. 67. 
7 3 Ibid., 86. 
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associations. Habermas distinguishes these non-universal norms from the universal by 
the method with which they achieve validity. These non-ethical norms need only prove 
valid for a consensus of that group, and no further. 74 It is important that these 
generalizable interests be discoverable, as otherwise all the norms validated will only 
seem valid in the context of that communication community. 75 Those norms that are 
specific to a community should be seen as candidates for universal norms, but only for 
that context until they are put to a test of universalizability. These contextualized norms 
are where Habermas finds concerns for the "good life." Most of these will be required 
to stay there, in context, and unacceptable to universalization. 76 
SCIENTIFIC, PRACTICAL, AND CRITICAL 
Habermas has followed the development of human societies from pre-modem 
groups that relied upon God or fate to settle debatable issues to contemporary 
civilizations with highly complex methods of dispute resolution. The secularization 
and rationalization of society that Habermas shows in this process, however, have left 
us with no way to establish normative rightness or propositional truth except through 
the medium of rational argumentation. Through this development, "normatively" 
secured agreements are replaced by agreements that have been communicatively 
achieved, which are the only agreements considered to be acceptable or legitimate. In 
other words, as the older sources of legitimacy (God) have lost their authority, social 
actors have had to increasingly rely upon their own resources. To do so, human beings 
74Braaten, Habeonas's Critical Theory of Society, 33; Habermas, Moral Consciousness and 
Communicative Action, 104. 
7 5 Habennas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 104. 
76Braaten, Habennas's Critical Theory of Society, 35. 
have reached agreements based upon rational argumentation, and they have expanded 
these arguments into ever more spheres of experience, even those once considered 
beyond debate. 
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This intersubjective discourse is, for Habermas, emancipitory. This occurs not only 
because agreements are communicatively achieved, and thus "free" (because humans 
are forced to take ever more responsibility for their actions and utterances), there is also 
a logic of equality that Habermas finds, unavoidably, within the rational argumentation. 
Actors have had to assume that the conditions for an unlimited and unconstrained 
discourse have been achieved and that all participants are sufficiently free from internal 
and external constraints, and thus the agreement has been decided based only upon the 
force of the better argument. It is assumed that each has an equal opportunity to express 
their views, and each has assumed responsibility for their claims to validity. It is from 
this "idealized" relationship between actors in argumentation that we derive the notion of 
the universalization of normative validity claims, and the ideas of freedom and equality. 
Habermas's exploration of the human capacity for technical knowledge of the 
objective world found this knowledge insufficient to explain fully the realm of human 
actions he identified. This capacity was supplemented with a practical knowledge of the 
social world shared by human beings, in order to describe our ability to mutually 
understand one another. In addition, in order to understand how human beings relate to 
their own inner, subjective worlds, Habennas argues that it is necessary to allow for a 
critical realm of knowledge as well. Only with these three separate, but complimentary, 
sets of knowledge does Habennas feel it is possible to fully represent the way humans 
act in the world, interact with other individuals, and also remain distinct in their own 
views of themselves. Having then seen the manner in which Habermas incorporates 
his idea of technical, practical, and critical knowledge into the objective, social, and 
subjective realms of action, the next chapter will integrate these ideas with the 
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epistemological demands made from the empirical, standpoint, and postmodern schools 
of feminist thought. 
CHAPTER IV: 
TOWARD A 
COMMUNICATIVELY STRUCTURED FEMINISM 
This thesis first examined the rifts that exist between differing schools of thought in 
feminist political and social theory concerning their conception of scientific knowledge, 
the role of social existence within science, and the ability of science to produce 
knowledge which is universally legitimate. This review has shown feminist concern for 
these ideas split into three distinct schools of thought; those empirically oriented, the 
standpoint feminists, and the postmodernists. Second, this thesis turned to examine the 
way that Jiirgen Habermas has dealt with these same issues in his theory of 
communicative action and discourse ethics. From the outset of the examination of 
Habermas's theories, we were introduced to his belief that human knowledge is possible 
in three realms, the technical, the practical, and the critical. The present chapter now 
moves to demonstrate the ways in which a communicatively structured understanding 
of science, as found in Habermas's works, can resolve many of the differences that exist 
between the themes of feminist theories examined in chapter two of this thesis. The 
challenge here will be to demonstrate how the many claims for an acceptable theory of 
feminist epistemology, made by the three schools of feminist thought, can be shown to 
exist within Habermas's three interwoven realms of human action: the objective, the 
social, and the subjective. Aspects of each school of feminism will be shown to be 
compatible with a communicative ethic, and where some specific claims of a school 
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may be unacceptable, it will be shown that the fundamental concerns of those theorists 
are compatible with a communicatively structured feminism. 
In order to accomplish this, it must be shown that communicative action is able to 
account for the variety of demands made by feminist theory. First, in order to avoid 
losing the benefits of analytic science, a proper role should be established for the claims 
of empirical feminism. Their task of "objectively" explaining and describing the world 
as it exists around us remains both useful and necessary for feminist theory. How 
communicative action accounts for objectivity will need to be shown useful for 
describing the world. A feminist theory that seeks knowledge of the world, and a 
trustworthy description of changes to be proposed and accomplished will continue to 
rely on many aspects of empirical theory. Further, in a world of concrete individuals it 
is important to account for the lives of actual people and to identify concrete changes 
and improvements in their lives. Second, the claims made by the standpoint theorists, 
to account for the embodiedness and contextual embeddedness of human beings, must 
also be accounted for. Specifically, a science will need to account for the role that 
women play in their relations with others, not accounting for them as further atomistic 
individuals, which standpoint theory claims has been detrimental for women in the 
many male-oriented theories of the past. Again, communicative action will need to 
prove that it is capable of accounting for these demands. These claims, however, must 
be tempered by the needs of postmodern theory in order to determine the degree to 
which this new theory will allow an individual to exist as an individual, guaranteeing 
one not be assigned a particular way of being. This idea is fundamental to any feminist 
movement which seeks to separate the lives of women from the roles that have long 
been assigned to them in social life. But, as has been shown, feminists are also wary of 
too much individualism, and argue against falling into the abstractness that arguably 
accompanies a postmodern emphasis on the individual's distance from other beings. A 
balance must be found between these competing and seemingly mutually exclusive 
claims, a balance that communicative action will be able to provide. 
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To respond to these claims, it will be necessary to examine many of the bases of 
communicative action, including its handling of empirical science, the role of the 
lifeworld, and Habermas's understanding of an individual's autonomy. The role which 
communicative action allows for technical knowledge, empirical claims about the 
world, will be shown as incorporating the claims of empirical feminists, while 
providing a way of moving past the limits of empirical knowledge as demanded by 
standpoint and postmodern theorists. Social knowledge, accounted for in an 
understanding of the lifeworld, must be shown to meet the demands of embodiment 
and contextuality argued for by standpoint theory. It will also be seen to account for 
standpoint claims of politically oriented knowledge, focused upon participation, rather 
than a neutrality toward the status quo. Finally, it will be shown how communicative 
ethics also takes seriously the demands of postmodemism, considering an individual's 
unique identity, and one's ability to be free of a pre-determined way of being. 
It is also appropriate to ask, with Sandra Harding, "Why do feminists need an 
epistemology at all?" I Postmodemists have vehemently argued that there has already 
been too much "policing of thought" and that epistemology tends to rationalize the 
beliefs of the powerful and eventually legitimize exploitation. Why do feminists need to 
reproduce this cycle? For Harding, and many other feminists, the answer is three-fold. 
First, feminism needs a defense against and an alternative to objectivism, which insists 
on a value-free, disinterested defense of the status quo. Equally, feminism needs a 
defense against and alternative to relativism, which cannot provide a basis for judging 
between justice and injustice in social life. Finally, feminism relies upon an 
I Sandra Harding, "Feminism, Science, and the Anti-Enlightenment Critiques," 87-90. 
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epistemology to end male domination. A feminist epistemology could help expose and 
demystify understandings of male and female social relations, energizing both to work 
for the emancipation of women in all social contexts. 
Further, inquiry into feminism's need for an epistemology may also seem to imply 
that the needs and values of feminism are theoretically prior to a more strictly 
philosophical account of epistemology. This is countered, however, by feminists who 
argue that it has usually been the case that philosophical inquiry is preceded by social or 
political agendas, pointing to evidence of the traditional agenda to exclude women from 
serious philosophical investigation. 2 Miranda Fricker, in agreeing with this account of 
a gender-biased tradition, points out that as a part of Western philosophy, feminism is 
not unique in bringing a political agenda to epistemology, but is rather simply making 
this agenda explicit in its investigations. 3 The implications which this will have are not 
yet fully apparent, but, she argues, it is clear that the project must be two-fold, both 
deconstructive and reconstructive, something must be built back, where the old has been 
tom down. 
EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE 
The goal of empirical feminism, to produce accurate, objective descriptions of the 
world based on the sensory experiences of individuals, is also the aim that Habermas 
attributes to the human capacity for technical knowledge. As has been explored, 
feminist empiricism accepts the tenets of philosophical realism, assuming the existence 
of the world independent of human "knowers." Empirical feminism argues that sexism 
2see Genevieve Lloyd, The Man of Reason: 'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy 
(London: Methuen, 1984 ). 
3Fricker, "Knowledge as Construct," 95. 
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and androcentrism are identifiable biases of individual actors which can be removed by 
a more strict application of the existing norms of empirical science. The absence of any 
bias in science is to be equated with the achievement of objective knowledge, which is 
understood as providing an unmediated truth about the world, "it frees substantive 
knowledge about reality from the distorting lenses of particular observers. "4 We have 
seen, however, that many feminists refuse to accept this understanding of science, 
claiming that it has led to the exclusion of women and a continuation of their 
oppression. The strong thesis of these anti-empiricism feminists, however, calling for a 
rejection of all that is identified with this type of science, also leaves feminist theory in a 
weak position, without a regulating ideal of truth or value and without a trustworthy 
description of the world. Thus, some feminist writers have sought to re-work a type of 
empiricism that will provide the desired functions while furthering the project of 
emancipating women from their subordinate position in society. 
Habermas has written about empirical science as well, concerning its proper role and 
the need to supplement it with a more complex understanding of human capacities for 
know ledge. In the theory of communicative action, and more clearly in later writings, 
he argues for the necessity of empirical science, as well as its incompleteness. The need 
for an empirical knowledge is strong in Habermas's writing, for he remains as much a 
sociologist as a philosopher, and throughout his works, he has attempted to remain free 
from a purely transcendental foundation for his theory, which he considers too abstract 
to be fully convincing. 5 Habermas's intent, in his theory of communicative ethics, is to 
build an empirical theory "with strong universalistic claims." He argues that this is 
possible because his theory is as much based in empirical claims about the role and 
4Mary Hawkesworth, "Knowers, Knowing, Known," 329. 
5Rasmussen, Readin~ Habermas, 94. 
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nature of language in human social life as it is about the emancipatory potential that 
exists within this language use. He follows closely the works of science based on 
empirical methods of Durkheim, Mead, Weber, and Piaget, as each incorporates a 
philosophical idea into the context of his empirical research. To achieve a full 
understanding of the lifeworld that human beings exist within requires knowledge of the 
"whole spectrum" of human knowledge, not only the "fruits of science and 
technology. "6 Thus, in comparing the demands of feminist empiricism to the role of 
empiricism that Habermas argues for, it will be shown that a rejection of empirical 
science is not appropriate and instead, an acknowledgment is needed that a greater range 
of know ledge is possible and can be pursued in philosophical and social inquiry. 
'Realist' Knowled~e 
In developing her idea of an acceptable feminist epistemology, Fricker argues for the 
importance of a feminism to be able to account for a "mind-independent reality placing 
normative constraints upon what we may correctly believe about the world. "7 She 
asks, "What would it mean ... to be committed to the eradication of poverty, or of 
violence against women, without a realist commitment to the empirical proposition 
that. .. whole communities are periodically wiped out by famine, or that many women 
suffer domestic violence and other forms of attack by men ?"8 Any realist account must 
be backed by empirical claims, in order for them to be listed as reasons for political 
beliefs or action. Feminism must be allied with an epistemology that allows us to 
appeal to states of affairs as rational constraints upon political thought. In her account of 
6Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 18. 
?Fricker, "Knowledge as Construct," 98-99. 
81bid., 99. 
feminism, a realist view of knowledge is necessary for empirical beliefs to count as 
normative constraints upon our beliefs and actions. 
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Habermas accounts for the traditional understanding of subject-object relations in 
two ways. First, in his conception of rationality, he provides a "realist" account such 
that a rational actor engages in activities that are "goal-directed, feedback-controlled 
interventions in the world of existing states of affairs. "9 Further, communicative action 
accounts for empirical claims in its conception of action. For Habermas there are two 
fundamental types of action, that oriented toward success, and action oriented toward 
reaching an understanding. While, as explained above, he holds that action oriented 
toward understanding is prior to action for success, action towards success is still 
necessary and is further separated into social and nonsocial components. Nonsocial 
action oriented toward success Habermas refers to as "instrumental action," social 
action oriented toward success is "strategic action." Action oriented to success is 
"instrumental when we consider it under the aspect of following technical rules of 
action and assess the efficiency of an intervention into a complex of circumstances and 
events." Action oriented to success is "strategic when we consider it under the aspect 
of following rules of rational choice and assess the efficacy of influencing the decisions 
of a rational opponent." IO Thus, when feminist theorists such as Fricker demand that 
we be able to be philosophically committed to the correcting of unequal physical 
circumstances or that we take action against the unacceptable treatment of one individual 
by another, communicative action allows us certainty in these convictions. This realist 
knowledge is also able to act as a reason for action, as Habermas argues instrumental 
action is valid because of technical rules, and strategic action is taken because of the 
9Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 11-12. 
I Olbid., 284-286. 
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rules of rational choice. Fricker further argues that this knowledge should place some 
limits upon our normative beliefs. Habermas, by accepting experiential knowledge as 
legitimate, also commits communicative action to these limits and avoids a 
commitment to social values that do not reflect an agreed upon interpretation of the way 
the world exists. 
These actions are a part of the theory of communicative action, and actual aspects of 
human life. They are not, however, a complete understanding of social existence, as 
this form of action does not explain how mutual intelligibility or coordination of actions 
is possible to actors engaged in action oriented toward success. For this, a more 
fundamental understanding of human interaction is needed and action oriented toward 
success must be augmented by the addition of action oriented to understanding. That 
communicative action is prior to strategic action remains a fundamental claim for 
Habermas, and forces us to step beyond the claims of empirical science made by both 
feminism and this part of communicative action, and into the claims made concerning 
the fundamentally social nature of a suitable epistemology. 
Role for Objectivity 
Within the feminist debate over the nature of technical knowledge there is a need to 
determine whether or not the notion of objectivity ought to play a role in knowledge 
claims. One criticism of objectivity arises from the empiricists who accept the goals of 
objectivity, but argue that in practice objectivity has not yet lived up to its own 
standards. Other arguments, notably from the standpoint theorists, hold that objectivity 
is neither achievable or desirable, as it is irredeemably androcentric and tied to a version 
of knowledge not compatible with feminist needs. Finally, postmodernists argue 
against objectivity as a feature of epistemological foundations, which it is argued, are 
either repressive or do not exist. Within these diverse critiques lie two more 
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fundamental considerations relevant for feminist theory. First, is the debate over 
whether or not objectivity is possible to achieve in a knowledge claim. Second, is 
whether or not, if objectivity is possible, it is desirable for feminists. I I 
Before considering these two possibilities, it is necessary to clarify what "objectivity" 
is understood to mean, and why it has been understood as a valuable and beneficial 
characteristic of knowledge. Ismay Barwell explains this as follows: 
When objectivity was a characteristic of a theory, the theory was 
supposed to provide accurate explanations of how and why things 
happened as they did. Accuracy or truth were valuable either because 
they 'could be relied upon' or because they had intrinsic value. It is this 
connection which is crucial. The ultimate value of objectivity lies in this 
connection with truth and truth must be preserved as a regulatory 
principle in at least some theoretical enterprises. I2 
Feminism remains a movement for social change and requires descriptions and 
analyses of human social life that allow judgments about justice and injustice. These 
judgments will require a trust in the description of how things are. This has not, 
however, committed the idea of objectivity to any type of "view from nowhere," or to a 
"complete justification" of knowledge claims. 
For Barwell, the value that remains in the goal of theoretical objectivity resides in the 
notion that the goals of objectivity are non-arbitrary; they apply to every actor 
considering the notion based on an agreed upon understanding of the constitutive goals 
of the idea of "objectivity." Thus, it will be necessary to build a sufficient compatibility 
among the principles of objectivity which are used by differing groups. This ideal 
would necessarily be self-regulating according to standards which were not in danger of 
being arbitrarily co-opted by either individuals or groups. What these standards might 
1 I This division is made in Barwell, "Towards a Defense of Objectivity," 80. 
l 2Jbid., 81-82. 
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be remains unexplored in Barwell's analysis, but there is another feminist who explores 
further the role of objectivity in feminist theory. 
One of the strongest proponents of the need for continued objectivity in feminist 
epistemology is Sandra Harding, who, writing from a feminist standpoint, argues that 
women are better able than men to achieve a true objectivity. This notion, which she 
considers "transformed" from the old notion of objectivity, has the potential to be 
improved into a "strong objectivity." Examining the characteristics of this objectivity, 
and the benefits she argues are derived from it, will show whether or not the objectivity 
available in communicative ethics might also meet with Harding's concerns. 
Harding's objectivity is not achievable by one group or an individual, and is only 
available to a society with the inclusion of marginalized groups into the process of 
legitimizing knowledge. This is important because culture-wide beliefs often serve as 
legitimate evidence in scientific inquiry, and only the inclusion of those groups rejected 
by the majority culture will allow an unbiased conclusion to the debate. The objectivity 
that is characteristic of traditional empiricism is too weak, as it fails to set about to 
identify all of the historical-social "desires, interests, and values that have shaped" 
scientific agendas, allowing these beliefs to shape science. Traditional objectivity was 
also limited in that it excluded certain groups that held beliefs which were considered 
"different from the accepted notions of science. Harding also feels that not all values 
need to be excluded as "bad." For example "democracy-advancing values" have 
systematically generated less partial and distorted beliefs than others." 13 Traditional 
objectivism weakens its attempts to maximize objectivity because it turns away from 
critically identifying all of those broad, "historical social desires, interests, and values" 
that have shaped past history. These weak, traditional notions of objectivity created an 
I 3 Harding, "Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology," 71. 
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idea of "objectivity" based on a mystic notion, allowing it to be perverted by dominant 
groups. Those values that encourage the participation of more groups, especially those 
that have previously been left out of the production of knowledge are good, and ought to 
be included in the investigation of human affairs. 
To achieve these new standards of objectivity in social understanding, Harding 
provides us with the process of "reflexivity," which gives strong objectivity the ability 
to avoid the mysticism of objectivism, and encourages the participation of marginalized 
groups. Harding's notion of "strong objectivity," however, should not be confused with 
traditional notions of this idea, as it differs from that notion in many ways. Objectivity 
in traditional science refers to some characteristic of a knowledge claim, characteristics 
that it should or should not possess. Harding's "strong objectivity" seems more to refer 
to a process for creating a type of knowledge that is acceptable to the many different 
groups that are affected by that knowledge, this acceptability seems determined by 
validity. Harding does not reject a political agenda for her notion, nor strive to make it 
value-free. Instead of these claims, Harding's objectivity is specifically "democracy 
enhancing" and aimed at rooting out gender injustices, and would somehow work to 
provide a voice for the opinions of those outside of powerful circles. Her purpose is to 
ensure that might does not make right in knowledge production. This more open 
process requires an understanding of what others think of us and our beliefs and 
actions, not just what we think of ourselves and our ideals. Strong objectivity "is useful 
in providing a way to think about the gap that should exist between how any individual 
or group wants the world to be and how in fact it is." 14 
Returning to Habermas, these very same concerns are found in his understanding of 
discourse ethics. He provides a method of legitimizing beliefs and know ledge open to 
14Jbid., 72. 
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all concerned with the outcome. While he argues that the ability of science to describe 
the world as it is still fundamentally remains, claims about how knowledge should 
affect diverse individuals remain for these individuals to negotiate, and should not be 
decided only by a few. Where Harding only alluded to some method of arriving at this 
consensus in validity, Habermas provides us with his complex notion of reaching an 
understanding amongst actors in discourse ethics. Further, his process of diversifying 
knowledge claims, Harding's "reflexivity," he refers to as "decentering" one's 
understanding of the world, achieving the same goal of greater participation in the 
knowledge forming process. 
For Habermas this discussion of scientific objectivity is included in his 
understanding of the process that actors in a communicative situation must undergo in 
order to reach a mutual understanding about something in the world. In this process, 
actors not only use speech acts to represent a state of affairs in the world, they are also 
creating or renewing interpersonal relationships, based on the legitimately ordered 
interactions of the social world. Further, what Harding vaguely referred to as how an 
individual "wants the world to be," Habermas argues for as the subjective world, 
accounted for in those speech acts in the expression of the lived experiences of 
individuals, to which they alone have access. Whether or not these individuals in 
communication have reached an agreement is indicated by the acceptance or rejection 
that each participant gives to the validity claims made with every utterance in the debate. 
When one actor rejects a validity claim, she is claiming that "the utterance is not in 
accordance with either the world of existing states of affairs, our world of legitimately 
ordered interpersonal relations, or each participant's own world of subjective lived 
experience." 15 Thus Harding's concern for both individual and group differences from a 
l 5ttabermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 137. Italics in original. 
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dominant norm are not excluded from consideration in Habermas's process of reaching 
agreement, but remain a part of the negotiation. When all of these voices are included in 
knowledge production, knowledge from all three of these worlds, Harding's "strong 
objectivity" can be achieved. 
We have seen then, that Harding does not so much rely upon the nature of objectivity 
as possessing a special quality which provides a better source of understanding feminist 
knowledge, but instead finds the most benefit in the process that must be undertaken to 
achieve "strong objectivity." It seems that instead of emphasizing the importance of 
objectivity itself, a theory could arrive at an equally "objective" knowledge by 
emphasizing the role which individuals or groups play in the acquisition of knowledge 
judged reliable and valid by the whole. As we have seen, this is precisely where 
Habermas seeks to emphasize the importance of objectivity, in a process that provides, 
not a mystically endowed bit of knowledge, but rather a unit of knowledge that is 
accepted by all in debate over the value of that knowledge as legitimate. 
Further, the concerns of Barwell, about the agreement between groups who may 
hold differing conceptions of objectivity, and about the need for some self-regulatory 
standards upon which objectivity must lie, can be found in Habermas's ideal speech 
situation. As was explored above, this set of circumstances must apply to a degree that 
each individual feels has been sufficient to consider an agreement rational. All who 
desire to participate must be allowed to, they must be free from any internal or external 
constraints, and they must be free to debate any aspect of the argument. These 
standards are self-regulatory and are needed for any rational agreement which is to 
convince participants of its validity. 
Leaving this chapter's consideration of Habermas' s use of empirical knowledge we 
see that communicative action has accomplished a number of the tasks outlined at the 
beginning of this section. It has been shown to fulfill the need for access to knowledge 
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of how the world actually exists. Feminist theory does not exist in isolation from a real 
world of events and situations, which must be responded to by these theorists. In order 
to respond to these facts, feminists need an accurate and trustworthy knowledge 
responsible to the norms of empirical science and placing constraints upon how this 
knowledge is interpreted. Through its acceptance of such a science, and a notion of a 
communicatively achieved objectivity, communicative action accomplishes just this. 
SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE 
We have seen, communicative action contains an important role for empirical 
knowledge, and is able to account for the demands a feminist science would make for 
objective, "realist" knowledge of the world. Within this first step in comparing 
feminism and communicative action, however, already lies the need to expand the 
empirical explanation of knowledge beyond a simply positivistic account of the world. 
Habermas has accepted this task, and presents an expanded notion of rationality, beyond 
what the realist vision allows, by proposing a theory of human action more varied than 
action simply oriented towards success in the world. A more fundamental 
understanding is necessary; one based upon language, the human ability to 
communicate, and our need to exist amongst each other and with ourselves. As will 
now be demonstrated, these concerns closely resemble those that initially turned 
feminists away from the limits of atomistic empiricism, toward a more informed notion 
of human social life, dependent upon those around us for our identities, and united in 
some form of solidarity. This will be demonstrated in the compatibility of feminist and 
communicative conceptions of context, truth, and solidarity. 
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Contextuality 
Allison Jaggar has written that a feminist theory cannot be based on the abstract 
individualism of Cartesian thought which assumes that essential human characteristics 
arise prior to any social context. Jaggar, arguing for a feminist standpoint, feels that 
meaning is given to inner experience and behavior only by the emotions, beliefs, and 
attitudes supplied by our social context. As argued above, the idea of a "pre-social 
human being without any determinate kind of nature is conceptually incoherent." 16 
Habermas agrees. and his use of action theory, and socialization through the lifeworld, 
insure the necessity of a social context. Indeed, not only is his theory founded upon the 
communicative nature of social activities, it discusses clearly the role of raising and 
socializing young members of society as part of communicative action. As explored in 
its own chapter above, the theory of communicative action denies neither our physical 
or social existence. Differences in biology are not removed by the theory, there is no 
neutrality that removes these aspects of existence. Based upon these claims, a 
standpoint such as Jaggar's will be able to identify with the embedded subjects of 
communicative action. 
Iris Marion Young points to another advantage Habermas's theory would provide 
for feminism. Her writing has called for a new public/private distinction in social and 
political theory which is also compatible with Habermas's theory. Following the 
feminist slogan "the personal is political" Young wants to redefine the private not as 
what has been excluded from the public, but rather to define private as what an 
individual excludes others from. This would be characterized as "withdrawing" rather 
16 Allison Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature, 42. 
111 
than being kept out. I 7 Modem politics, she argues, is characterized by an over 
emphasis on reason, which excludes any passion from the public sphere. She argues 
for two new principles which would deny a social division of the spheres differentiating 
institutions and human activities. In order to allow open discussion over new topics 
such as, the sexual division of labor or sexual violence, no social institution or practice 
ought to be excluded from public discussion or debate a priori. She also argues that no 
aspect of a person's life or their actions ought to be excluded from the public and forced 
into the private. This would allow differences of age, sex, or race to become part of 
public discourses. These demands would lead to the liberation of public expression to 
include discussion of both ends and means, reasons and passions, all of which 
feminists seek to incorporate into social life. The principles of discourse ethics, again, 
are that no one be excluded, that any claims may be made and criticized, and that no 
coercion may enter the discussion. These principles should surely satisfy the demands 
of Young for a new, more open and inclusive, understanding of public and private in 
public dialogue. 
Consensus Theozy of Meaning and Truth 
For many feminists a fundamental reason for rejecting previous philosophies has 
been the lack of female voices in their construction of regulatory ideals, and feminist 
bases for accepting new ideals have been to see that women's voices are included in 
their creation. On an even more basic level, the norms of an epistemology must be 
justifiable to women as well as men. Ideas central to philosophy such as knowledge, 
171ris Marion Young, "Impartiality and the Civic Public: Some Implications of Feminist 
Critiques of Moral and Political Theory, in Feminism as a Critigue: On the Politics of Gender, eds. 
Seyla Benhabib and Druci11a Cornel1 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 74. 
justification, or reason need not be abandoned, but remain to be struggled over, 
redefined and reworked until acceptable to the notions of modem social actors. 
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Arguing that an ideal of truth is needed, transcending situated perspectives as a 
regulatory ideal, Miranda Fricker writes that an acceptable feminist epistemology must 
provide a strong role for political and social values.18 Further, this feminism must be 
constrained by two provisions. One, it must provide an account of norms as providing 
the basis for beliefs, and second, it must distinguish between first and second-order 
perspectives in order to provide some capacity of self-criticism. The first provision is 
intended to direct our attention to the idea that there are some things that we ought to 
believe in order to constrain us from believing "anything at all." These beliefs must be 
presented to the subject with normative force, in order to be enforced and accepted. The 
second rule is a continuation of this, and must epistemologically account for how it is 
indeed possible for human beings to critique their actions. 
In building an acceptable idea of knowledge she proposes a theory which is 
accountable to experience, but not fully determined by it. With the incorporation of 
political and social values into epistemology, she will also provide a role for political 
argumentation in order to regulate the unavoidable influence of these political interests 
into a dialectic of facts and values. This acknowledges that political values, as well as 
empirical "facts" influence our beliefs. Thus, there is no need for a sharp categorical 
distinction between facts and values. All beliefs in the system of beliefs become 
interdependent, justification for one depends on its coherence with the rest of the 
system, and the first rule she proposed is accounted for. If a realist account of empirical 
belief is depicted as normatively constrained by the world, then norms have provided 
empirical beliefs.19 
18fricker, "Knowledge as Construct," 95-109. 
I 9Jbid., 106-107. 
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In communicative ethics, Habermas certainly accounts for both of these 
epistemological demands, an understanding of the relationship between norms, beliefs, 
and empirical information, as well as a very detailed understanding of an individual's 
ability to critique her social world. His "consensus theory of truth and knowledge" 
allows an active role for normative beliefs to inform what is held as an empirical truth, 
as well as what is to conform with social demands for legitimacy. Recall from above 
the weight that Habermas places on validity of claims in the determination of truth, "the 
concept of truth combines the objectivity of experience with a claim to the 
intersubjective validity of a corresponding descriptive statement, ... "20 Thus the idea of 
truth is only possible in a community that is tied to the same interpretations of 
statements. If speakers and listeners are able to identify when a statement is true, or 
accepted as valid by the community, then they also have access to the meaning of the 
statement. The meaning of utterances cannot be understood without also knowing the 
conditions of the statement's validity.21 Truth depends on the "idealized agreement" that 
occurs when an individual is able to relate the notion to an ideal communication 
community, one sharing a collective identity and the goal of reaching agreement on 
discussion about the organization of their lifeworld. How Habermas moves from the 
relation of facts and intersubjective validity of statements to criticizable validity claims, 
as well as Pricker's need for "first and second order perspectives" for a critical 
examination of our beliefs will be accounted for more specifically in the section 
concerning critical knowledge below. 
20ttabermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, 72. 
21 Habermas ... Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 276-277. 
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Solidarity 
In building a coherent epistemology for feminist theory, the agents of knowledge 
must be carefully theorized to provide a role for both the identities that individuals can 
claim as part of a group and the identity they claim as unique to themselves. These 
demands are apparent in many aspects of feminist theory, and one of the most 
important arguments they have made in support of the notion of solidarity is the need 
for a theory to appropriately account for an individual's position in a community. This 
is especially true of feminist standpoint theories, who depend on the notion that 
differing positions within a social structure are able to provide different perspectives 
from which to view that society, one of these perspectives often being more privileged 
than the others. For standpoint feminists, it is generally the position of women in 
society, subjugated into that position as a social group, that holds a privileged position 
over the perspective of men. Nelson's understanding of epistemological agents 
describes them as not being "isolated or isolatable." Feminists from many camps have 
argued that an atomistic knower is impossible, based on reasons of human biology, 22 
others have argued against claims that human knowledge is personal property, and 
insist instead on "interpersonal relations" as being the actual source of human 
knowledge.23 As Jaggar has written, the very discovery of a women's standpoint 
depends on the "collective process of political and scientific struggle. "24 
22ttelen Longino, often categorized as a feminist empiricist, has argued for plural accounts of 
knowledge in Science as Social Knowled~e· Values and Objectivity jn Scientific Inquiry, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). Alison Jaggar uses biological arguments for 
pluralistic understanding of knowledge in her Feminist Politics and Human Nature. 
23 Nelson, "Epistemological Communities," 121-160. 
24Jaggar, Feminist Politics, 371. 
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To Habermas, the mere existence of an individual, and any of her capabilities, also 
depends upon a social setting for both socialization and the capacity to know herself as 
an individual. "In communicative action, the suppositions of self-determination and 
self-realization retain a rigorously intersubjective sense: whoever judges and acts 
morally must be capable of anticipating the agreement of an unlimited communication 
community, and whoever realizes himself in a responsibly accepted life history must be 
capable of anticipating recognition from this unlimited community. "25 This unlimited 
community, as we have seen, is the result of moving through an identification of the 
actual community around the individual and substituting the notion of this unlimited 
community in place of the actual one. The actual community is necessary for the 
individual to make any decisions about the good life, and the expanded notion of the 
community is required to make any decisions about morality. In both instances, the 
role of community, and the individual's place in it, remain centrally important to the 
individual's ability to make life choices. The individual remains indebted to the 
community for her individuality. 
Lynn Hankinson Nelson has recently written that: 
By current lights it is persons, embodied and situated in specific social 
and historical contexts, who know, with both their embodiment and 
"situations" relevant to their knowing. According to feminist 
epistemologies, such situations need to be specified using the analytic 
category gender, a category whose "content" and meaning are dynamic 
and multileveled and one whose relationship to other categories and 
social relations (e.g., class, culture, and race) as well as to knowledge, 
remains both contested and central to feminist theory. 26 
This notion of "situation" or "location," she continues, is becoming more complex in 
feminist theory, and functions as a "bridging" principle for diverse feminist 
25 Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinkini. 192. 
26Nelson, "Epistemological Communities," 121. 
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epistemologies, whether empirical, standpoint theorists, or postmodemists.27 The 
"contest" referred to above, over the relations of analytic categories, is further described 
as one undertaken by the agents of knowledge themselves, as opposed to the "passive" 
recipient or collector of knowledge characteristic of Cartesian knowledge. "These 
agents also differ from their predecessors in foundationalist epistemologies in that they 
shape, as well as undergo and absorb, experience; they construct meaning and 
knowledge-even, some say, negotiate and decide these. "28 
Turning again to Harding's standpoint theory for women, we see also that her 
"strong objectivity" relies on an important position for groups. Her argument is 
dependent upon the existence of groups who will form the same sense of identity 
amongst themselves, and in opposition to other groups. It is the various ideas of these 
differing groups that must be accounted for in the production of knowledge. While it 
has usually been the case that a dominant group in society-white, wealthy, males-has 
determined what was to count as acceptable and legitimate knowledge, it is now 
understood that true and impartial knowledge cannot be achieved without the input of 
non-dominant and marginalized groups in society. Harding leaves us, however, at the 
point of identifying the importance of the process that allows groups to negotiate 
amongst themselves for a knowledge claim. She does not describe what this process is 
to look like, or articulate the rules under which it will proceed. But it is certain, that 
within strong objectivity, Harding's primary epistemological agent is not the individual, 
but the group or community, that must struggle to have its own unique voice heard. 
For Habermas, the role of community in knowledge production is no less important. 
Habermas 's understanding of the life world, as explored above in detail, argues 
27Ibid., 152, note 1. 
28Ibid., 121. 
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specifically that the knowledge of an individual is dependent upon the cultural traditions 
handed to her by the community in which she is socialized. Habermas has responded 
to these needs by accounting for both "individuality and solidarity" within his theory. 
Justice and solidarity are two sides of the same coin because practical 
discourse is, on the one hand, a procedure that affords everyone the 
opportunity to influence the outcome with his "yes" or "no" responses 
and thereby takes account of an individualistic understanding of equality; 
on the other hand, practical discourse leaves intact the social bond that 
induces participants in argumentation to become aware of their 
membership in an unlimited communication community.29 
CRITICAL KNOWLEDGE 
These two realms of knowledge, that of empirical knowledge of the objective world 
around us and the practical knowledge which guides and coordinates our actions in the 
social world, do not however, fulfill the demands made upon a social science by either 
Habermas or writers in the feminist camp. To do so will require paying attention to the 
claims and demands made by feminists more closely allied with postmodern thought, 
and the related thinking of Habermas on individuals' ability to know themselves, and to 
exist as unique entities within the larger group where that identity is acknowledged. 
This final area of knowledge will be explored in this section, which incorporates 
Habermas's ideas of critical knowledge and its role in emancipatory human interests 
with the fears of postmodern feminists about essential descriptions of human nature and 
the totalitarianism brought with many foundational social and political theories. This 
third section will undertake an examination of these ideas, showing that Habermas 
meets the demands of postmodern feminists, while at the same time not abandoning the 
technical and practical bases of knowledge already established. This section will also 
29Habermas, Justification and Application, 154. 
118 
address some of the critical reviews communicative action has received from feminist 
theory. 
Gender Bias 
Nancy Fraser begins her examination of the theory of communicative action with the 
question: "in what respects does Habermas's critical theory clarify and/or mystify the 
bases of male dominance and female subordination in modern societies?"30 She begins 
by reviewing a distinction within communicative action between the lifeworld and the 
political/economic system it supports, which she points out, provides a powerful view 
of the public-private split of concern to many feminists. To explore this dichotomy she 
uses four concepts to represent the four categories created by a public-private and 
system-lifeworld matrix: family, (official) economy, state, and the public sphere.31 At 
the systems level, there is a distinction between the public state and the private official 
economy. At the lifeworld level there is the distinction between the family and the 
public (social) sphere. The private sphere links the economy and the family while the 
public sphere connects the state and the public sphere of social "will formation." 
Fraser argues that there exists a gender bias in Habermas's theory by pointing out 
that these distinctions, in male-dominated, capitalist societies, rely upon traditional sex-
roles. To illustrate this, she first takes the case of the wage laborer. There is a strong 
sense, she argues, in which the worker is seen to be male. It is the male that leaves 
home to enter the private, economic-system in order to "bring home" the means of 
support to the family. Thus, only men create this link between these two private 
(economy and family) spheres. There is also a feminine subtext to the link of private 
30Nancy Fraser, "What's Critical About Critical Theory?" 114. 
311bid., 114-117. 
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roles, via a woman's role as the consumer of goods. In capitalists families, it is 
generally the female who is the consumer, while the male is at work, thus the link in the 
private worlds between economy and family, via the consumer, is distinctly female. 
Finally, for Fraser, it is a significant deficiency in the theory that Habennas makes no 
mention of child rearing in the link between the economy and the family. There is no 
mention of the unpaid labor that is fundamental to the rearing of children, and is also 
generally a female role. 
Habennas also seems to rely upon a gendered subtext to link the public spheres. For 
this, Fraser points to the role and concept of the citizen. In traditional capitalism, the 
role of the citizen is also seen to be a typically male role. This citizen has the ability to 
vote and the ability to engage in political debate and opinion formation. While 
Habermas does not mention gender roles in this context, Fraser notes that these 
activities are historically male. There is a more fundamental part of citizenship that 
Fraser points to which further points to the gendering of citizen, the role of soldiering. 
The role of soldiering is to protect the state and the family (women and children) who 
cannot protect themselves. Therefore the link between the protection of the state, and 
the role in public debate are characterized by traditionally masculine roles. Habennas 
remains dangerously androgynous on both the links between the systems and lifeworld 
spheres.32 
In conclusion, Fraser does not entirely reject Habermas's theory. She generally 
attributes it's weaknesses to "blind spots" of androgyny. She concludes with three 
changes that would need to be made in a "feminist critical theory." First, she points out 
that a feminist framework could not separate the male-dominated family and the state-
regulated economy into the two primary, separate categories of domination. Second, a 
32Jbid., 127-128. 
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feminist theory cannot assume that influences move in only one direction in social life, 
norms, even as they weaken, continue to influence both institutions and social life. 
Finally, it must focus more exclusively upon the "evil" of domination and 
subordination, rather than upon simply the faults in welfare-capitalism. 33 
These criticisms of a private and public distinction within Habermas's theory of 
social rationalization do not, however, significantly weaken Habermas's claims about 
the three-fold nature of knowledge. The lifeworld/system distinction within 
communicative action that Fraser critiques is used by Habermas as a method to describe 
the process of cultural rationalization, to illustrate the inadequacy of instrumental 
rationality, and identify crisis points within the lifeworld, not to ascribe an essentialism 
to men and women. That these roles are unalterable is an assumption of Fraser. 
Focusing her critique upon two aspects of Habermas's thought ignores the more 
fundamental distinctions Habermas relies upon in the nature of knowledge. While 
Fraser is able to critique communicative action by attributing to it responsibility for the 
way the world appears today, this is not a fault of communicative action which 
Habermas argues is used only to describe, not prescribe. Further, Fraser misses 
entirely the subjective aspects of communicative action in which Habermas 
acknowledges the importance of an individual's ability and desire to reject standard 
values or aspects of the community. Finally, while the lifeworld/systems dichotomy 
does exist within communicative action, this does not form nearly so fundamental an 
aspect of the theory as the three realms of human action, which are not foundationally 
tied to a particular gender. 
33Jbid., 138. 
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Considerin~ Communicative Rationality 
Iris Marion Young critiques the rationality inherent in critical theory.34 She argues 
that an emancipatory ethics must break away from modern political ideas, developing a 
conception of normative reason which is not based upon an opposition between reason 
and desire, for this contrast has been used by traditional theories to exclude the 
experiences of women from discourse. Her attack on Habermas is that, while his 
theory offers a good departure towards such an ethic of reason and desire, he still relies 
too heavily upon the ideas of impartiality and universality. 
Impartiality begins with the idea of an observer standing apart from a situation and 
judging without having any role in or connection to the situation. This requires the 
impartial observer to assume a normative rationality based on a situation that does not 
exist. Rationalizing in this way simplifies and removes otherness from the specific 
situations and specific individuals and assumes a kind of authoritarianism which need 
not take into consideration any point of view other than its own. An integral part of a 
feminist theory would need to remove this universal authoritarianism of reason.35 
Habermas, she acknowledges, has been able to move away from the authoritarianism of 
impartiality. His rationality is based on the give and take of reasons in argument, of 
being reasonable and to being willing to talk and listen. Thus, truth and rightness are 
reached through discussion, not through intuition or with tests of consistency which 
removes reason from its great height. Also encouraging to feminist ethics is that 
communicative action considers statements about art and opinion as equally valid as 
factual statements. 36 




Habermas, however, still retains some commitments to impartiality and to an 
opposition between reason and desire. Habermas writes that all participants enter 
discourse reasoning from the perspective of their experiences and need not leave behind 
their motives and feelings. As long as all participants can speak freely, motives and 
feelings will not have strictly private significance, and thus will not bias the outcome of 
a discourse mixed with other needs and feelings. But, Young feels, in Habermas's 
commitment to consensus as a basis for this discourse, desires become neutralized. 
Young feels this is a transcendental argument in that it imposes an abstract restraint 
upon the motives of real participants in the discussion.37 
To Young, Habermas must assume that utterances have a single meaning, and are 
understood in the same way by all participants. This further limits the knowledge that a 
participant can bring to the discussion and relies upon several "unities." First, a unity of 
speakers, who must be assumed to know and faithfully represent their desires. Second, 
a unity between subjects that share the same meaning of words. Finally, a unity in the 
relation between the word spoken and the object in the world that it represents. 38 Young 
also feels that Habermas ignores or devalues the "expressive and bodily aspects of 
communication. "39 Reason based on the goal of reaching consensus, and limiting its 
functionality to argumentation, unnecessarily limits the richness of language. This 
ignores the other aspects of communication, jokes or metaphors, as well as other goals, 
the sharing of care and love. 
In reading Habermas, however, these attacks seem misconstrued. The "consensus" 





individuals" but rather a necessary condition for meaningful communication. Actors 
may not want to achieve a mutual understanding, but this is at the cost of intelligibility, 
and no "communication" follows. Second, Young misses the role of misunderstanding 
in communicative action. Habermas acknowledges that misunderstandings occur, and 
that every utterance must be checked against background understandings. If the actors' 
backgrounds do not sufficiently overlap they must engage in "repair work" to reach 
sufficient common understanding. Every act of communication potentially will be 
misinterpreted and need to be repaired.40 Finally, Young has written that Habermas 
ignores the expressive bodily aspects of communication. Referring to Habermas, 
however, we see that he directly accounts for bodily movement in his definition of 
actions which are incorporated into his understanding of communication.41 As for the 
"richness of language" that Young feels Habermas ignores, it is difficult to see how 
aspects of communication like the "sharing of care and love" are excluded by discourse 
ethics which refer specifically to social and subjective worlds, about relations with 
others and feelings towards them, respectively. 
Marie Flemming argues that communicative action remains irreparably incompatible 
with feminist demands because of its basis in an misogynist conception of reason.42 
Flemming attacks Habermas as being either "unaware of feminist critiques of 
modernity or, even worse, unconcerned about them."43 She bases these claims first, on 
the absence of sex-gender questions in Habermas's works, and second, upon the 
argument that "his adoption of a naturalistic stance toward logic ensures that his account 
40Habennas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, 124-126. 
41 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. I, 96-97. 
42Marie Flemming, "Women's Place in Communicative Reason," 25-262. 
4 3Ibid., 258. 
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will reproduce dualistic categories that are repressive for women. "44 Habermas's 
communicative reason, she claims, continues to rely upon the philosophy of the subject 
and legislates women as 'Other' and irrational. 
These criticisms themselves, however, seem incompatible. First, without 
mentioning women or gender in his theories, it is complicated to see how this legislates 
a repressive treatment of women. Her argument is based upon a reading of Albrecht 
W ellmer's argument that Kantian monologism is based in a community, and thus based 
in dialogue. From this, Flemming determines that "autonomous reason is already an 
implicitly communicative reason ... and cannot be justifiably viewed as fundamentally 
different and competing traditions. "45 Rejecting Habermas's communicative rationality 
because it is no different than the rationality of Kant's atomistic legislating individual, 
however, seems to disregard the important separations from Kant that Habermas 
undertakes in the role of a situated, historical, individual engaging in discourse with 
other actors to establish mutual understanding. 
Her attack that Habermas is "unaware" or "unconcerned" with feminist critiques of 
modernity also seems inaccurate. While this paper argues that the major thrusts of 
feminism revolve around critiquing the application of empirical reason, the neglect of 
contextuality, and the need to represent individual identities, Flemming's rejection of 
Habermas, is based upon his response to Nietzsche's postmodern questioning of the 
"value of values themselves. "46 She argues that communicative action reproduces the 
dualism that is inherent in the traditional values of Enlightenment philosophy, 





identified with all that is to be devalued. None of these dichotomies, however, are 
overly central to communicative ethics, which is more fundamentally based on the 
tripartite distinctions between realms of action, knowledge, and rationality. There is no 
fundamental "true or false" in communicative action; instead, Habermas argues for an 
emphasis on "truth, rightness, and sincerity" as foundational values. Habermas also has 
replaced a traditional "mind/body" distinction with a richer understanding of the 
difference s between the objective, social, and subjective realms of human action. The 
remaining dualism central to Habermas's thought is the yes or no response that is given 
by any communicatively competent individual, male or female, to an utterance made by 
another individual. This does not seem to assign women an "irrational" role, nor does 
this simply ignore postmodern attacks on modernity's values. 
Seyla Benhabib writes to defend a role for a type of "universalism," which must be 
included in a feminist theory if they are to separate themselves from the imposed roles 
of situated communities. Her idea of universalism is different in several ways from the 
strong, deontic universalism found in many empirical theories. A "feminist 
universalism" would need to be interactive rather than legislative, cognizant of gender 
difference rather than gender blind, and sensitive to context differences rather than 
situation indifferent. This universalism is arguably found in Habermas's 
communicative action.47 
As has been explored above in this essay, there is a firm place for contextual 
relations in communicative action. Through discourse ethics, Habermas commits 
actors only to the norms and values that have arisen in their specific communicative 
context, and fully accepts that different norms and values will arise in different 
situations. We can also see in Habermas the shift toward an interactive rationality. This 
4 7 Sey la Benhabib, Situatin~ the Self: Gender. Community And Postmodernism In 
Contemporary Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1992), 4-5. 
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can be found in his definition of truth, which is no longer substantive, derived from an 
objective reality to be grasped, nor does it rely upon a particular state of the human 
mind. In returning to Habermas's understanding of the three worlds we inhabit, the 
objective, social, and subjective, none of these has a monopoly on truth. Instead, 
Habermas argues for truth based on consensus which becomes linked to validity, and 
thus relies also upon sincerity and the appropriateness of the claim, as well as its 
objective appearance.48 
Another theme of Benhabib's work is the necessity of a moral theory to account for a 
"concrete other" in moral reasoning that works in addition to the "generalized other" of 
more traditional liberal moral theorizing. A generalized other excludes differences in 
moraJ reasoning and focuses upon only those aspects common to all participants. In the 
past this aspect of theories has often worked to exclude women as "different," bringing 
claims to moral reasoning that were not the same as men's. A "concrete other" in moral 
reasoning allows individuals to remain distinct and different in whatever way they 
choose, and thus, as they actually are. Discourse ethics, as provided by Habermas, is 
able to account for this need for a generalized and concrete other. In discourse ethics, a 
moral perspective is to be part of an actual dialog, not a theoretical process, and without 
placing limits on the information that a participant can bring to a discourse. Benhabib's 
support of discourse ethics allows us to see an escape from androgynous universalism 
that feminists argue against, without falling into standpoint theory's inescapable 
embeddedness. Discourse ethics also provides a successful method of reasoning as we 
actually are, engendered and concrete beings. 
48Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 70-72. 
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Non-Foundational 
There are many feminists who argue against the foundational and meta-theoretical 
aspects of traditional notions of knowledge and science. Feminists argue against the 
foundational nature of a theory of knowledge because of what they interpret as its 
tendency to be used to universalize certain aspects of experience, while at the same time 
excluding others. Habermas has also taken steps to show that communicative action 
can be understood as being free of foundational claims or ultimate justifications, which 
he feels is a weak position for a philosophy to attempt to defend. Transcendental 
analysis he argues, is a non-empirical argument for achievements for which there is no 
alternative, "arguing to prove the "nonsubstitutability of certain mental operations that 
we always already perform in accordance with rules. "49 For Habermas, the correct 
role of philosophy is to mediate between the realms of knowledge that human beings 
are capable of orientation towards. 50 Communicative action is built upon an empirical 
claim concerning the nature of language, its development, its functions, and its use in 
social life. As Rasmussen reads Habermas, "the theory of communicative action 
attempts to become, ... a quasi-scientific theory and not a venture in foundational 
epistemology. "5 1 
One such anti-foundational feminist, Jane Flax, argues for a close alliance with the 
postmodern trend of contributing "to the growing uncertainty within Western 
intellectual circles about the appropriate grounding and methods for explaining and 
interpreting human experience. "52 While she makes this claim in order to step away 
49ttabermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 2. 
50Jbid., 14-16. 
51 Rasmussen, Readin~ Habermas, 23. 
52flax, "Postmodernism and Gender Relations," 41. 
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from a overly strong feminist standpoint, she also points out the necessity for feminism 
to take part in the work of casting doubt upon Enlightenment ideals of a coherent self or 
an objective foundation for knowledge. 
Writing on the same theme, Fraser and Nicholson work to connect the goals of 
feminist and postmodern attempts to "develop social criticisms which do not rely on 
traditional philosophical underpinnings. "53 Specifically, they are hoping to show that 
philosophy can no longer play the role that it once did as a ground to social criticism and 
politics, because, they argue, contemporary social life has reached a point were "grand 
narratives of legitimation" are no longer believable. Modem foundationalist 
epistemologies and moral and political theories have been criticized by both feminists 
and postmodemists as being contingent, partial, and historically situated, while being 
presented as universal and ahistorical. 54 Fraser and Nicholson here are criticizing both 
traditional forms of philosophizing and the standpoint feminists use of "very large 
social theories" which claim to "identify causes and constitutive features of sexism that 
operate cross-culturally." 55 The chief place of error in these theories is that they are 
"not sufficiently attentive to historical and cultural diversity, and they falsely universalize 
features of the theorist's own era, society, culture, class, sexual orientation, and ethnic, 
or racial group. "56 While they feel it is not the "size" of these theories that condemns 
them, it will be important for a feminist theory to "replace unitary notions of woman 
and feminine gender identity with plural and complexly constructed conceptions of 





social identity ... "57 They continue, without offering details, that "In general, post-
modern feminist theory would be pragmatic and fallibilistic. It would tailor its methods 
to the specific task at hand, using multiple categories when appropriate and forswearing 
the metaphysical comfort of a single feminist method or feminist epistemology. "58 
"Multi-leveled," "pragmatic," and "forswearing a single method" all resemble the 
structure of communicative action and discourse ethics. More importantly at this time, 
however, is the argument that Habermas also makes that his theory avoids any 
foundationalism. Habermas has written that he hopes to find a more modest role for 
philosophy than that of "usher and judge" of the sciences. As Habermas sees it, the 
proper role of philosophy is not to differentiate and appropriately limit the various 
realms of modem life. This is a task that philosophy cannot accomplish. Instead, 
Habermas feels that the differentiation of these realms is a given in today's world. 
Philosophy is left (without claims to a totality) with the role of mediator between these 
realms, adjudicating between the various spheres. 59 Habermas does not want to allow 
philosophy the power to clarify the foundations of science once and for all, which 
would define the limits of what can and cannot be experienced. This would be equal to 
showing the sciences their proper place. 60 For individuals to mutually understand one 
another in Habermas's lifeworld will require a cultural tradition that "ranges across the 
whole spectrum, not just the fruits of science and technology." Philosophy will be able 
to play a role in the communication and intelligibility between the "cognitive-
instrumental, moral-practical, and aesthetic-expressive dimensions" of human 
571bid., 34-35. 
58Jbid., 35. 
59Rasmussen, Readin~ Habennas, 21-22. 
60Habennas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 2. 
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knowledge which have arisen. The issue now is "to overcome the isolation of science, 
morals, and art and their respective expert cultures. "61 
Perhaps this role of philosophy as mediator between realms of knowledge that 
Habermas envisions is the same role that Haraway seeks in her postmodern "manifesto 
for cyborgs" faithful to "feminism, socialism, and materialism. "62 Her central image of 
a cyborg is to represent the need for understanding of the relationship between "machine 
and organism," between "social reality" and "fiction." Her essay dwelt on the 
breakdown of boundaries, and the need to take responsibility in their changing. She 
writes of the confused boundary between human and animal, often reduced by biology 
and evolutionary theory to an ideological struggle. 63 Second, she considers the 
differences that remain between the physical and the non-physical world, the lines 
between imagination and spirituality and technology and materialism. Habermas's 
thesis of the confusion of these boundaries, and the need for a mediation between them 
is an idea not alien to postmodernists at all. 
61 Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Co~municative Action, 19. 




COMMUNICATIVE ACTION AS FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY 
Feminist political and social theory today still faces a dilemma, as the 
epistemological discord within feminist theory has not yet been resolved. Being 
composed of at least three distinct and often mutually exclusive schools of thought, it 
has been difficult for feminism to maintain a consistent attack upon the social and 
political structures it seeks to change. Feminist empiricism, standpoint feminism, and 
the postmodern feminists each stand upon their own entrenched philosophical grounds, 
making their distinct demands for an acceptable feminist epistemology, and attacking 
other positions as weak or misguided. None of these schools, however, is immune to a 
critique of its own position, and the inconsistencies of each or all of them suggest the 
need to move beyond the separate and specific demands of each towards a more 
comprehensive, coherent, and powerful understanding of "feminist ways of knowing." 
While a growing number of feminist theorists acknowledge the need for this new 
direction for feminist thought, there is as yet no single theory able to account for all of 
feminism's epistemological requirements. 
This thesis has suggested, and demonstrated, that a possible source of enlightenment 
for this next step in feminist thought is provided by Jtirgen Habermas. His theory of 
communicative action and discourse ethics seeks not only to defend some of the 
Enlightenment against the attacks of postmodemism, but also to enrich and clarify our 
understanding of human social life. In order to accomplish these tasks, Habermas has 
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grounded his claims concerning what is known and knowable about human life upon a 
detailed understanding of human knowledge. It is this complex notion of human 
knowledge, and its differentiation into the objective, the social, and the subjective realms 
of human action, that is able to account for the diverse epistemological demands of 
feminist political and social theory. 
It has been shown that the three realms of Habermas's knowledge account for the 
underlying claims of the differing groups of feminist theory, and provide a basis for 
reconciling the differences between them. Habermas's objective realm of knowledge 
corresponds to the concerns of empirically oriented feminists. Need for an accurate 
description of the events and conditions of the real world, as well as a trust in the human 
potential for grasping these objects and events accurately, is provided by communicative 
action and necessary for any feminist epistemology. Standpoint feminism's concern for 
interpersonal relations, accounting for the context of an individual's or group's existence, 
is reflected by the type of knowledge that Habermas considers practical in nature. 
Habermas's conception of our capacity for social knowledge, which guides our actions 
with other human beings, is shown to be dependent upon both social existence and 
human abilities to communicate with each other. Finally, Habermas acknowledges the 
human potential for critical knowledge to explain the individual's ability to differentiate 
herself from the group, a task which a postmodern concern within feminism demands 
in order to avoid essentializing any aspect of women. 
The shared concern for accurate knowledge of the physical world and the human 
need for both solidarity and autonomy has been shown to be present in both feminist 
theory and communicative action. Within the theory of communicative action 
Habermas has implied what would necessarily be the type of political organization 
needed in order to realize the social order he visualizes. Some feminist scholars have 
also pursued their theories in order to uncover what an acceptable "feminist politics" 
might resemble. The politics of empirical, standpoint, and postmodernist feminism 
find compatibility with the politics that a communicative ethic advocates. 
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The politics envisioned by a feminist standpoint can be drawn out from the example 
of Harding's strong objectivity. For Harding, "strong objectivity requires that scientists 
and their communities be integrated into democracy-advancing projects ... " I She argues 
for a scientific project and political order that is specifically biased towards the inclusion 
of more and more groups of actors. This is not only argued to be a benefit in the 
objective world of sciences, and in the political realm of social order, it benefits actors 
subjectively as well as, by creating less distorted beliefs about the social system. 
Harding's goal of conducting political inquiry with a bias toward greater democratic 
procedures is intended to further increase the degree of democracy at work in these 
procedures. 
A discourse ethic would placate the demands placed on politics by Harding in that its 
constitutive rules require the participation of all that might be affected by an established 
norm, those powerful in a society as well as those marginalized by it. Further, a social 
conception based on communicative action assures us that not only do groups have the 
ability to add to the debate over their good life, the participation of the marginalized will 
be required for the outcome to be rational. Harding's writing also is concerned with the 
ability of the scientist in a society to determine what will be reflected in the norms of 
that community. Habermas, while certainly convinced of the threat that an elite group 
could gain control over the establishing of legitimate cultural norms, has specifically 
established his procedures so that such an occurrence would be unlikely to occur, or if it 
did, certainly it would be judged and exposed as non-consensual, and non-rational. 
There is no room in the participatory scheme of Habermas for a single "true" voice to 
I Harding, "Rethinking Standpoint Epistemologies," 69. 
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determine what is legitimate, for unlike other theories in defense of rationality, the 
terms, subject matter, and conditions of the debate are not to be determined in advance, 
but left solely up to the argument of the participants. 
Fraser and Nicholson have written that the most important advantage of a 
postmodern feminism would be its usefulness for the political practices of 
contemporary feminism. 2 For them, feminism has become a matter of "alliances rather 
than of unity around a universally shared interest or identity." Feminist politics needs to 
recognize the diversity of women's experiences and reflect the notion that no single 
solution will solve all of the challenges facing women. Politics must reflect that while 
there are commonalties, none are universal, and that commonalties are strewn 
throughout with differences, even conflict. The solidarity of women needs to be 
accounted for in a manner "broader, richer, more complex, and multilayered." Iris 
Young, inspired by feminist postmodemism, argues for a "politics of difference" 
described as a "political vision of inexhaustible heterogeneity." This politics realizes the 
oppressiveness of assumptions about the unity of women, and respects the importance 
of acknowledging the specific differences between women. Alcoff and Potter write 
that the terms and project of feminism today must address virtually all forms of 
domination found in social contexts, not simply gender-based domination. This is 
because women exist in all of the classes and ranks and categories of human beings. 3 
Habermas's hope with a discourse ethics is to allow the greatest diversity and 
participation possible in his ethics. At least one description of the politics necessary for 
a communicative politics labeled it a "radical democracy. "4 It follows from 
2Fraser and Nicholson, "Social Criticism Without Philosophy," 34-35. 
3 Alcoff and Potter, Feminist Epistemolo~ies, 4. 
4Rasmussen, Reading Habermas. note I 0. 
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Habermas's theory that the principles of radical democracy are built into the very 
structure of language. This stems from the nature of rationality that is built into 
language, and the notion that rationality, once it is apparent, seeks its full range of action 
and is thus laden with an emancipatory potential. 
For Thomas McCarthy, Habermasian politics would be characterized by 
"unrestricted deliberation in the democratic public sphere. "5 For in communicative 
action the basis of political sovereignty arises from the popular use of reason in a variety 
of public arenas, voluntary associations, social movements, or the mass media. This 
use of reason by the public is transferred into administrative power by legal institutions. 
Habermas works deliberately to decenter political power into multiple and differing 
arenas for "detecting, defining, and discussing society's problems and the culturally and 
politically mobilized publics who use them, serve as the basis for democratic self-
govemment and thus for political autonomy."6 Further, because the public use of 
reason is reflexive, as the use of reason demands to be fully realized, these public 
debates are necessarily open and reflexive. This is why Habermas has limited his 
explanation of the process to the procedure that is to be followed in public discourse, 
and leaves all of the substantive questions and answers of social life to be determined by 
the debating public. 
In conclusion, Habermas's communicative action provides an acceptable unifying 
epistemology for the needs of a feminist political and social theory working to 
emancipate human lives from social oppression. This stems from communicative 
action's ability to account for the complex notions of autonomy and solidarity in a way 
that draws upon the strengths of both, without becoming tied to the powerful claims of 
5McCarthy, "Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism," 63. 
61bid., 49. 
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either. While this simplification of the issues seems to detract from the complexity of 
the problem, Habermas himself has narrowed the question to a single statement, most 
clearly characterized by his long study of a phrase by William James, a maxim that in 
Habermas's words, "asserts the reciprocal dependence of socialization and 
individualization, the interrelation between personal autonomy and social solidarity, that 
is part of the implicit knowledge of all communicatively acting subjects":? 
The community stagnates without the impulse of the individual, 
the impulse dies away without the sympathy of the community. 8 
7Habermas, Justification and Application, 114. 
8William James, quoted by Habermas, Justification and Application, 113. 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Alcoff, Linda and Elizabeth Potter, eds. Feminist Epistemoloiies. New York: 
Routledge, 1993. 
Barwell, Ismay. "Towards a Defense of Objectivity." In Knowini the Difference: 
Feminist Perspectives in Epistemoloiy, eds. Kathleen Lennon and Margret 
Whitford, 79-94. New York: Routledge, 1994. 
Benhabib, Seyla. Situatini the Self: Gender. Community and Postmodernism in 
Contemporary Ethics. New York: Routledge, 1992. 
Berstein, Richard. The Restructurini of Social and Political Theory. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1976. 
Bordo, Susan. "Feminism, Postmodernism, and Gender-Skepticism." In 
Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. Linda J. Nicholson, 133-156. New York: Routledge, 
1990. 
Braaten, Jane. Habermas's Critical Theory of Society. Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1991. 
Chodorow, Nancy. The Reproduction of Motherini. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1978. 
Code, Lorraine. "Taking Subjectivity into Account." In Feminist E.pistemoloiies. 
eds. Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter, 15-48. New York: Routledge, 1993. 
Di Stefano, Christine. "Dilemmas of Difference: Feminism, Modernity, and 
Postmodernism." In Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. Linda Nicholson, 63-82. New 
York: Routledge, 1990. 
Flax, Jane. "Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory." In 
Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. Linda Nicholson, 39-62. New York: Routledge, 
1990. 
Flemming, Marie. "Women's Place in Communicative Reason." In Women and 
Reason, eds. Elizabeth Harvey and Kathleen Okruhulik, 245-262. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1992. 
138 
Fraser, Nancy. "Struggle over Needs: Outlines of a Socialist-Feminist Critical Theory 
of Late Capitalist Political Culture." Chap. in Unruly Practices: Power. Discourse. 
and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory, 161-185. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1989. 
____ . "What's Critical about Critical Theory? The Case of Habermas and 
Gender." Chap. in Unruly Practices: Power. Discourse. and Gender in 
Contemporary Social Theory, 113-143. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1989. 
Fraser, Nancy and Linda Nicholson. "Social Criticism Without Philosophy: An 
Encounter Between Feminism and Postmodemism." In Feminism/Postmodemism, 
ed. Linda J. Nicholson, 19-38. New York: Routledge, 1990. 
Friedman, Marilyn. "Feminism and Modem Friendship: Dislocating the Community." 
In Feminism and Political Theory, ed. Cass R. Sunstein, 143-158. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1990. 
Fricker, Miranda. "Knowledge as Construct: Theorizing the Role of Gender in 
Knowledge." In Knowin~ the Difference: Feminist Perspectives in Epistemolo~y. 
eds. Kathleen Lennon and Margret Whitford, 95-109. New York: Routledge, 1994. 
Gilligan, Carol. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's 
Development. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982. 
Habermas, Jiirgen. Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics. 
Translated by Ciaran P. Cronin. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1993. Original 
German edition published by Suhrkamp Verlag, 1990 and 1991. 
____ . Knowledge and Human Interest. Translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro. 
Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. Original German edition published by Suhrkamp 
Verlag, 1968. 
____ . Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Translated by Christian 
Lenhart and Shierry Weber Nicholson. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1990. 
Original German edition published by Suhrkamp Verlag, 1983. 
___ . Postmetapbysical Thinkin~: Philosophical Essays. Translated by William 
Mark Hohengarten. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992. Original German 
edition published by Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988. 
____ . The Theory of Communicative Action. volume 1. Reason and the 
Rationalization of Society. Translated by Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press, 
1984. Original German edition published by Suhrkamp Verlag, 1981. 
139 
____ . The Theory of Communicative Action. volume 2. Llfeworld and System: A 
Critique of Functionalist Reason. Translated by Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1987. Original German edition published by Suhrkamp Verlag, 1981. 
Haraway, Donna. "A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist 
Feminism in the 1980s." In Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. Linda Nicholson, 190-
234. New York: Routledge, 1990. 
Harding, Sandra. "Feminism, Science, and the Anti-Enlightenment Critiques." In 
Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. Linda Nicholson, 87-88. New York: Routledge, 
1990. 
____ . "The Instability of the Analytical Categories of Feminist Theory." In 
Feminist Theory in Practice and Process, eds. Micheline R. Malson, Jean F. O'Barr, 
Sarah Westphal-Whil, and Mary Wyer, 15-34. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1986. 
___ . "Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What Is 'Strong Objectivity."' In 
Feminist Epistemologies, eds. Linda Alco ff and Elizabeth Potter. New York: 
Routledge, 1993, 49-82. 
____ .Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking From Women's 
Lives. Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1991. 
Hartsock, Nancy. "Foucault on Power: A Theory for Women?" In 
Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. Linda Nicholson, 168-172. New York: Routledge, 
1990. 
____ . Money. Sex. and Power: Toward a Feminist Historical Materialism. New 
York: Longman, 1986. 
___ . "Rethinking Modernism: Minority vs. Majority Theories." Cultural 
Critigue 7 (Fall 1987): 187-206. 
Hawkes worth, Mary. "Knowers, Knowing, Known: Feminist Theory and Claims of 
Truth." In Feminist Theory in Practice and Process, eds. Micheline R. Malson, Jean 
F. O'Barr, Sarah Westphal-Whil, and Mary Wyer, 327-351. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1986. 
Jaggar, Allison. Feminist Politics and Human Nature. Sussex: Rowman and Allanheld, 
1983. 
____ . "Love and Know ledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology." In Women 
and Reason. eds. Elizabeth D. Harvey and Kathleen Okruhlik, 115-142. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1992. 
140 
Jay, Nancy. "Gender and Dichotomy." Feminist Studies 7 (1981): 38-56. 
Kantor, Rosabeth Moss. "Women and the Structure of Organizations: Explorations in 
Theory and Behavior." In Another Voice: Feminist Perspectives on Social Life and 
Social Science, eds. Marcia Millman and Rosabeth Moss Kantor, 34-74. Garden 
City: Anchor Books, 1975. 
Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1970. 
Lazreg, Marina. "Women's Experience and Feminist Epistemology." In Knowing the 
Difference: Feminist Perspectives in Epistemology, 45-62. New York: Routledge, 
1994. 
Lennon, Kathleen and Margret Whitford, eds. Knowing the Difference: Feminist 
Perspectives in Epistemology. New York: Routledge, 1994. 
Lloyd, Genevieve. The Man of Reason: 'Male' and "Female' in Western Philosophy. 
London: Methuen, 1984. 
Lofland, Lyn H. "The "Thereness" of Women: A Selective Review of Urban 
Sociology." In Another Voice: Feminist Perspectives on Social Life and Social 
Science, eds. Marcia Millman and Rosabeth Moss Kantor, 144-170. Garden City: 
Anchor Books, 1975. 
Longino, Helen. Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific 
Inquiry. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. 
____ ."Subjects, Power, and Knowledge: Description and Prescription in 
Feminist Philosophies of Science." In Feminist Epistemologies, eds. Linda Alcoff 
and Elizabeth Potter, 101-120. New York: Routledge, 1993. 
Lovibond, Sabina. "The End of Morality?" In Knowing the Difference: Feminist 
Perspectives in Epistemology, eds. Kathleen Lennon and Margret Whitford, 63-78. 
New York: Routledge, 1994. 
Malson, Micheline R., Jean F. O'Barr, Sarah Westphal-Whil, and Mary Wyer, eds. 
Feminist Theory in Practice and Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1986. 
Mangena, Oshadi. "Against Fragmentation: the Need for Holism." In Knowing the 
Difference: Feminist Perspectives in Epistemology, eds. Kathleen Lennon and 
Margret Whitford, 275-282. New York: Routledge, 1994. 
141 
Messing, Karen. "The Scientific Mystique: Can a White Lab Coat Guarantee Purity in 
the Search for Knowledge about the Nature of Women?" In Women's Nature: 
Rationalizations of lneguality. eds. Marian Lowe and Ruth Hubbard, 75-85. New 
York: Pergamon Press, 1983. 
McCarthy, Thomas, "Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism: Rawls and 
Habermas in Dialogue." Ethics 105 (October 1994): 47. 
Millman, Marcia and Rosabeth Moss Kantor. Another Voice: Feminist 
Perspectives on Social Life and Social Science. Garden City: Anchor Books, 
1975. 
Nelson, Lynn Hankinson. "Epistemological Communities." In Feminist 
Epistemologies. eds. Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter, 121-160. New York: 
Routledge, 1993. 
Nicholson, Linda, ed. Feminism/Postmodernism. New York: Routledge, 1990. 
Potter, Elizabeth. ''Gender and Epistemic Negotiation." In Feminist Epistemologies, 
eds. Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter, 161-186. New York: Routledge, 1993. 
Rasmussen, David. Reading Habermas. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990. 
Tanesini, Alessandra. "Whose Language?" In Knowing the Difference: Feminist 
Perspectives in Epistemology, eds. Kathleen Lennon and Margret Whitford, 203-
216. New York: Routledge, 1994. 
Tuchman, Gaye. "Women and the Creation of Culture." In Another Voice: Feminist 
Perspectives on Social Life and Social Science, eds. Marcia Millman and Rosabeth 
Moss Kantor, 171-202. Garden City: Anchor Books, 1975. 
Young, Iris Marion. "Impartiality and the Civic Public: Some Implications of Feminist 
Critiques of Moral and Political Theory." In Feminism as a Critigue, eds. Sey la 
Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell, 57-7 6. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1987. 
